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THE SURGE OF PUBLIC OPINION
ON THE EVE OF THE GREAT WAR

BY

JONATHAN FRENCH SCOTT

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To
MY WIFE

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

JONATHAN FRENCH SCOTT was born in Newark, New Jersey, in 1882.

He was graduated in 1902 from Rutgers College, of which his father, Dr. Austin Scott, was president.

Mr. Scott taught for four years in secondary schools, then took three years graduate work in history at the University of Wisconsin, where he later took the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

In 1910 he married Marguerite Egbert, of Pasadena, California.

He has served on the history faculties of Bowdoin College, the University of Chicago, the University of Michigan, and was assistant professor of history at the University of Rochester.

For the last two years he has been traveling in Europe, where he has done extensive research in preparation for the present volume.

His previously published works are *Patriots in the Making* (1916) and *The Menace of Nationalism in Education* (1926).

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

In preparing this book I used collections of material in the Bibliothèque Nationale and the American Library in Paris, the Bibliothèque de la Guerre at Vincennes, the Weltkriegsbücherei at Stuttgart and the Widener Library of Harvard University. The newspapers consulted represent many shades of opinion in Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia, France and England. I did not attempt to study Italian opinion or Belgian opinion, both of which would make interesting subjects for further investigation.

I am under obligations to the officials of all the institutions mentioned for many courtesies. At the Bibliothèque de la Guerre I profited greatly from the kindness of M. Marcel Dubois, M. Louis Bourreau, and M. Pierre Renouvin, the distinguished author of the best French study of the origins of the Great War. At Stuttgart I was accorded the very great privilege of staying at the Schloss Rosenstein, formerly a castle of the King of Württemberg, which now houses the Weltkriegsbücherei. I can never hope to thank adequately Dr. Felger, the Director of the Library, and his associates, Dr. Schoenian and Frau Schiedeck, as well as Herr Busse of Stuttgart, who did so much to make my visit to Stuttgart both pleas-

ant and profitable. Through the friendly offices of Herr Busse I was enabled to meet a number of the political and other leaders of Württemberg.

For translations from the Russian I am indebted to Madame Skobtzoff of Paris.

JONATHAN F. SCOTT.

New York University
Washington Square College
February 15, 1927

FOREWORD

In preparing this book the author has taken care to verify statements in regard to which question might arise. It has seemed wise, however, to avoid encumbering the text with the innumerable references necessary to substantiate each statement. Readers who wish to find authority for statements made will find it convenient to consult the list of references, which are to be found at the end of the book.

JONATHAN F. SCOTT.

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FIVE WEEKS

CHAPTER I

HISTORICAL THEORIES AND WAR ORIGINS

TWO widely divergent theories of history bear vital relationship to the study of the immediate origins of the Great War. The first lays stress on the part played in the historical process by the leaders of men, exalting their achievements, and in consequence, emphasizing their responsibilities. According to this conception it is the titanic few who make or mar human destiny. The other theory minimizes the individual, no matter how great he may be, laying stress instead on social, economic, and political conditions, on an inexorable or almost inexorable march of events, on the reactions of public opinion, as the determining factors in history. According to this theory the leader is hemmed in by influences such as these, and perhaps forced to march in a direction very different from that which he would have chosen had he been completely free. Tolstoi has even gone so far as to say that "all leadership is a kind of flight." The two conceptions are epitomized in the question that has long baffled philosophically-minded historians: Do men make history, or does history make men? Between these two theories the student of the origins of the

Great War must, consciously or unconsciously, either choose or compromise.

Sturdy Carlyle is the classic exponent of the idea that men make history. "For as I take it," he says, "Universal History, the history of what man has accomplished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great Men who have worked here. They were the leaders of men, these great ones, the modellers, patterns, and in a wide sense creators, of whatsoever the general mass of men contrived to do or to attain; all things that we see accomplished in the world are properly the outer material result, the practical realization and embodiment of thoughts that dwelt in the Great Men sent into the world; the soul of the whole world's history, it may justly be considered, was the history of these." [1]

At first sight this theory seems to have the better of it. If one looks only at the surface processes of history, the great individual seems all-important. A king leads forth his hosts to battle and conquers a province; the conquest is glorified and recorded as his personal achievement. He has "made a place for himself in history." Henry the Eighth of England wishes to marry Anne Boleyn, divorces Catherine of Aragon against the will of the Pope, separates himself and his people from the Church of Rome and establishes the Church of England. On

[1] Source references not included in the text will be found at the end of the book.

the surface the new establishment appears to be, primarily, his personal work. So, too, it is Martin Luther who seems to be chiefly responsible for the Protestant Church in Germany. And it is apparently solely the genius of Napoleon which creates his vast empire; when that genius fails, the whole empire topples and falls to the ground. So a modern social psychologist, rallying to this interpretation of history, asks: "Would Germany now be a nation, but for Frederick the Great and Bismarck? Would America, but for Washington, Hamilton, and Lincoln? Would Italy, but for Garibaldi and Mazzini and Cavour?"

If this popular conception of history has its heroes, it has also its villains. If it attributes to heroes the glorious achievements of the human race, it lays the great calamities at the villains' doors. To many people, perhaps to most people, in England, France, and America, the Kaiser was the villain of the Great War. Such people still believe that he deliberately "willed the war." They look upon him as a man of fiendish character, who brought endless misery and suffering on the world simply in the hope of gratifying his illimitable ambitions. So-called historians have incorporated such stuff in textbooks for children, and it is now being ladled out in school after school. Other persons, a little better-informed, associate von Bethmann-Hollweg and the leaders of the military party in Germany as culprits with the Kaiser.

Austria-Hungary is looked upon as the "vassal" of Germany, and the Crime of Sarajevo as the convenient pretext for beginning a war long planned.

The theory of individual responsibility for the immediate origins of the Great War is apparently accepted not only by many ill-informed and misinformed persons in Europe and America, but also, either directly or by implication, by certain diplomats and statesmen who themselves played their parts on the stage or behind the scenes before and during the great struggle. Thus the Italian statesman, Nitti, quotes a leading European statesman as saying to him a few years before the war that, "there was everything to be feared for the future of Europe where the peoples of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary, almost two-thirds of the whole continent, were governed in an almost irresponsible manner by men without will or intelligence: the Czar of Russia; the German Kaiser, a madman without a spark of genius, and the Emperor of Austria-Hungary, an obstinate old man, hedged in by ambition. Not more than thirty persons," he added, "act as a controlling force on these three irresponsible sovereigns, who might assume, on their own initiative, the most terrible responsibilities."

So, too, President Wilson, just before America's entrance into the conflict, differentiated between the German people and the German Government, absolving the people of guilt and accusing the rulers

and little groups of ambitious men. Lord Oxford and Asquith holds that the war would probably have been averted in 1914, had it not been for the untimely death of Baron Marschall, who was for a short time German Ambassador at the Court of St. James's. "I am as satisfied as one can be of anything in the domain of conjecture," he says, "that, if he had remained, there would have been no European War in 1914. He was the only German statesman whose personality and authority were such as might have proved adequate not only to dominate the impetuosities and vagaries of the Kaiser, but to override and frustrate the long-laid and short-sighted plans of the military junta in Berlin." Finally Lord Haldane implies the heavy responsibility of a few individual leaders for precipitating the conflict, when he says that "a few unlucky words made all the difference in the concluding days of July, 1914:

" 'Ten lines, a statesman's life in each.' "

Even the new and painstaking "revisionist" scholarship, which is doing so much to place the immediate origins of the World War in their true light, has concentrated on the responsibilities of individuals and governments rather than on general influences. In Germany there has been a disposition to place on the shoulders of the Kaiser, von Bethmann-Hollweg and other German leaders, a larger share of responsibility for the outbreak of the titanic struggle than, during the conflict itself, they were supposed by

Germans to have borne. Professor Fay, several years ago, emphasized the part played by the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold, and by certain of the Russia leaders. Professor Barnes later held Berchtold to be but the tool of the Austrian war party, led by Conrad von Hötzendorf, the Chief of Staff. Izvolsky, too, formerly Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs and at the opening of the war Ambassador to France, has figured as a scapegoat. Even Lord Grey has been taken to task. But with certain of the "revisionists" the chief *bête noir* is now M. Poincaré. Indeed, some of them, both in his own country and elsewhere, would have him step into the uncomfortable niche so long occupied by the Kaiser, as the arch-conspirator, the Machiavellian plotter of the World War. The reaction against the traditional explanations of the war's origins is a healthy one, and its exponents deserve high praise for the courage they have shown in espousing an unpopular cause for truth's sake; but it is certain that some of them have gone too far in their anxiety to shift the burden of "war guilt" from the shoulders of one individual to those of another, or from one set of individuals to another set.

In contrast with the theory that the individual leader has been of prime importance in the historical process, stand the views of such historical thinkers as Lamprecht and Karl Marx. Lamprecht neglects the element of personality, subordinates the history of

politics to that of culture, and puts his emphasis on conditions. "In the reaction against the political school," says Gooch, "he presents Germania without her political backbone." In collective psychology, not in the actions of great men, he thinks to find the true explanation of historical development. Marx teaches that the course of history is determined, not by individuals and institutions, but in the last analysis by economic conditions. From this he evolves his theory of the social revolution. Believing in the materialistic conception of history, holding that the rich are growing richer and the poor growing poorer, he accepts the class-struggle as inevitable. Economic conditions, he maintains, will ultimately force the workers of the world to the wall, and then, having "nothing to lose but their chains," they will in desperation unite and overthrow their masters and oppressors, the capitalists.

Marx does not disregard the element of leadership entirely, however. He holds that an energetic leader of great capacity can do much to guide and hasten development. But this leader he believes to be merely an executive, carrying out what has already been, in a general way, predetermined, rather than a towering personality moulding men and circumstances to his will. "Man, even the most heroic, is not the sovereign maker and law-giver of social life, but its executive; he only follows out the tendencies and currents set up by the material foundation of society."

In commenting on the immediate origins of the Great War certain statesmen and diplomats seem to lean toward the idea that underlying conditions and the march of events were responsible for the catastrophe, rather than individual leaders. Thus the French Ambassador at the Court of the Tsar wrote in his diary on July 27, 1914: "In relation to the distant and profound causes which have determined the actual crisis, there is no longer individual initiative, there is no longer human will, which can resist the automatic mechanism of unchained forces. We diplomats, we have lost all control over events; we can only attempt to foresee them and to insist that our governments adapt their conduct to them." And the Austro-Hungarian statesman, Andrassy, sets forth his conviction that the World War was rather the result of mistakes, of ill-will, of mistrust and of the instinct of self-preservation than of political calculation. "No Power willed the World War, perhaps not even Russia," he says. "Up to the very last moment attempts were made to find a peaceful way out. The difficulties of the situation, however, were stronger than the will of statesmen."

Statesmen ordinarily as far apart as von Bethmann-Hollweg and Lloyd George testify to the triumph of events over men, in the dark days before the storm broke. In a speech of July 30, 1914, the German Chancellor expressed the belief that "all Governments, including that of Russia, and the great

majority of the nations were peaceable themselves, but control had been lost, and the stone had started rolling." Similarly, Lloyd George, in the oft-quoted extract from his speech of December 23, 1920, said that "the more one reads memoirs and books written in the various countries of what happened before the first of August, 1914, the more one realizes that no one at the head of affairs quite meant war at that stage. It was something into which they glided, or rather staggered and stumbled, perhaps through folly, and a discussion, I have no doubt, would have averted it." Clearly the point of view inherent in such statements is that the forces which those in responsible positions attempted to guide, direct and control, finally became too powerful to manage and in the end overwhelmed all in the maelstrom of conflict.

Those who approach the study of war origins from the psychological, rather than from what is commonly known as the "historical" point of view, attempt to indicate and analyze some of these forces. Trotter and MacCurdy, for example, emphasize the importance of the "herd" in relation to war. Man, according to Trotter, is essentially a herd animal, and MacCurdy says that man "is deaf to the voice of one without the herd, but infinitely suggestible to influences coming from within it."

Now, so far as important wars are concerned, the herd of to-day is the nation. And the people of each

nation are continually subject to certain psychological influences which tend to get them into trouble with the people of other nations. Among these psychological influences are national pride, pugnacity, love of power, suspicion and fear. Fear is perhaps the most important influence of all. "The fear motive," says Partridge, "is probably much deeper in human nature, both in the lower and the higher social reactions, than is commonly supposed, the concealment of fear being precisely a part of the strategy of defense. Fear has created more history than it is usually given credit for. The aggressive motive alone, in all probability would never have made history such a story of battles as it has been. Nations usually attribute more aggressive intentions and motives to their neighbours than their neighbours possess, and war is certainly often precipitated by an accumulation of mutual distrust and suspicion."

In the name of patriotism the psychological causes of war have been continually stimulated. The school, the press, in recent times the cinema, and sometimes even the pulpit, have all tended to develop and foster national pride, pugnacity, suspicion of other countries. As a result of such suggestions and of other influences there has grown up in the various nations an atmosphere of distrust, egotism, and irritability which readily develops into a neurosis, such as that described by Mrs. Playne in her "Neuroses of the Nations."

When a crisis approaches, when war draws near, the coming catastrophe is viewed with horror. But at the same time, along with this horror, "some thoughtful introspectionists admit, can be detected a 'something' which seems to hope that war will come. This 'something,' like the fascination of a horrible spectacle, is, of course, the unconscious wish. When it has come as close to consciousness as this, its shadow, as it were, being seen, war is truly imminent, for now the herd antagonism is mightily augmented by the primitive passion for violence." The last "cause" that serves to precipitate the disaster, and of which historians often make so much, MacCurdy believes to be of little importance; for toward the end people are in a state of such nervous excitement that war has become practically inevitable. The actual declaration of war brings with it a feeling of momentary relief. The suspense is over for the time being, the irrevocable decision taken.

If these psychological interpretations of the causes of war be even approximately correct, public opinion in the various countries must have counted for much in the fateful crisis of the summer of 1914. The acceptance of this point of view does not necessarily imply a mechanistic conception of the historical process. It does not necessarily imply that history makes men rather than that men make history. It does not mean that the leading statesmen in the various governments are relieved of all responsibility

for the precipitation of hostilities. It does not mean that they were mere puppets, playing the parts for which fate had cast them. What it does mean is that there was an interaction of influence between leaders and followers, that the leaders were not as free as they appear on the surface to have been, that public opinion, in their own and other countries, had more effect on their actions than is generally supposed.

"There is, no doubt," says President Lowell, "always some mutual influence between leaders and followers." And he repeats the story of a Frenchman in the Revolution of 1848, who "was cautioned not to follow a mob to the barricades and replied, 'I must follow them. I am their leader.' A leader," he continues, "must ask himself whether his followers will support him in the course he proposes to take, for, except in times of popular excitement, there are always some among them who are liable to break away from him because they give more weight to other considerations than to his influence." King John could never have broken away from Rome as did Henry the Eighth, for England would not have followed him. Cavour could not have led the Italians to unity, had not Italian public opinion been prepared for his leadership by Mazzini, the men of the Risorgimento, and by other influences. President McKinley would not have asked the Congress of the United States to declare war on Spain in 1898 had he not had American public opinion behind him; indeed, it is quite

possible that it was public opinion that swept him into this demand. Since, then, historical scholarship has thus far given little attention to the mutual influence between leaders and led during the great diplomatic crisis in 1914, it may be that a general study of public opinion from June 28th to August 4th of that year will be of service in getting one step nearer to a true understanding of the immediate origins of the Great War.

An investigation of this sort, however, presents difficulties of a special character. For one thing, public opinion itself is somewhat nebulous. Its boundaries can not be marked out with exactitude. It shades off into governmental action at one end, into private opinion at the other. Furthermore, it is one thing in England and France, quite another in Russia. In France and in England, in 1914 as now, the masses had the ballot and were given at least a smattering of education. In the Russia of 1914 the masses were ignorant and had had but the faintest experience with political liberty. A Russian newspaper just before the outbreak of the war printed the story of a Russian workman who was present at a patriotic manifestation, and who, carried away by patriotic emotion called out: "Down with Serbia!" When his neighbors called attention to his mistake he cried out just as fervently, "Down with Austria!" (Rousskaya Viedomosti, July 30.) [2] There must have been thou-

[2] Newspapers are of the year 1914, unless otherwise specified.

sands in Russia as ignorant as he, whose voices counted for nothing.

In all countries, of course, the highly placed count for far more as factors in public opinion than the man in the street.

Walter Lippmann has called attention to the political importance of "the powerful, socially superior, successful, rich, urban social set" which "is fundamentally international throughout the western hemisphere. Its power in foreign affairs is very great, and in war time its prestige is enormously enhanced. That is natural enough because these cosmopolitans have a contact with the outer world that most people do not possess. They have dined with each other in the capitals, and their sense of national honor is no mere abstraction; it is a concrete experience of being snubbed or approved by their friends." The influence of this set, exercised so largely behind the scenes, it is impossible to measure; but presumably it plays a very important part in times of crisis; and its influence is undoubtedly less pacific than that of certain other less powerful, though numerically far larger, social groups.

Furthermore, there is the question as to how far the Press, the chief instrumentality for voicing public opinion, was controlled or influenced by the governments in 1914. It is very evident that certain newspapers, such as the Austrian Fremdenblatt, the German Lokal Anzeiger and Norddeutsche Allge-

meine Zeitung, the Russian Novoïe Vremya, stood in close relations with their governments, though this does not necessarily mean that the governments controlled all the utterances or opinions of these journals. That the German Government could exercise a wide pressure on the newspapers is suggested in a message of von Bethmann-Hollweg sent to the Secretary of State for Alsace-Lorraine on July 16, 1914, in which he says: "I have arranged at Berlin that all press polemics with France shall be cut out as far as possible during the next few weeks, and I would ask you to do the same thing at Strassbourg." It will be noted that he says, "as far as possible." It is now well known, too, that Russian gold was used liberally with French newspapers before the war to strengthen French support of the Franco-Russian Alliance. It is said, too, that the French Government itself subsidized the Press "to keep it in hand."

On the other hand, anyone who goes through the newspapers of the European countries for, say, a quarter of a century before the outbreak of the Great War will find plenty of frank criticism of home governments and their policies. The Russian Government's recognition of Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1909, for example, was greeted with decided disapproval by the Russian Press and large sections of the people.[3] Some months after this

[3] "The news of the Russian capitulation has provoked a lively indignation in all classes of the population."—Dispatch from St. Petersburg: Matin, March 29, 1909.

the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Aerenthal, found quite embarrassing the belligerent attitude of the Austrian Press toward Russia. He anxiously informed the Russian Ambassador at the Ballplatz that he had had nothing to do with the Press campaign regarding the possibility of a breach between the two cabinets. In June, 1914, a German diplomat, speaking of the favorable reception accorded a certain matter of British foreign policy by the British Press, exclaimed: "To what criticisms and faultfinding by the German people's representatives and the German Press would not the Imperial German Government be exposed, what a cry over our foreign policy and our diplomacy would not be raised, if a similar declaration had been read before the Imperial Diet." The independence of the British Press is so generally recognized that it needs no discussion.[4] The very divisions among the British newspapers during the diplomatic crisis of July and early August, 1914, make clear their readiness to take an independent stand on questions of foreign policy. The whole question of governmental influence over the organs of public opinion in the European countries deserves more study than it has yet received; but there is no reason for assuming anything like a general subservience of the Press to the governments.

All these difficulties in a study of this sort may be

[4] Lichnowsky, July 14, 1914, spoke "of the well-known independence of the [British] Press," Kautsky Documents, p. 107, No. 43.

frankly admitted. It may be admitted that public opinion in Russia expressed itself influentially in circles far more restricted than did public opinion in France or England. It may be admitted that the governments exercised a certain influence over a part of the Press, the precise limits of which can not be determined. It may be admitted that the force of public opinion can not be measured with the same accuracy as that with which one can determine whether or not a great Crown Council was held in Germany on July 5, 1914, or with which one can establish the date of the order for general mobilization in Russia. The exact relationship between leaders and followers can not be accurately defined. But, if public opinion is somewhat nebulous, it is none the less real. It is something with which politicians have constantly to deal. So, whatever the difficulties of measurement, it yet remains true that there were powerful currents in the streams of national life, which those in command in the difficult days of the crisis of diplomacy had to consider, and which may in some cases have swept them off their feet and into the whirlpool of war. It is the contention of the writer that the influence of public opinion in certain countries during the diplomatic crisis of the summer of 1914 was the most important factor in precipitating the war.

CHAPTER II

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN OPINION AND DIPLOMACY AFTER THE ARCHDUKE'S ASSASSINATION

ON June 29th, the day after the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Field Marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf had an interview with the Austro-Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Berchtold. In this interview Conrad expressed the opinion that the Dual Monarchy should mobilize its forces against Serbia. Such a step seemed to him unavoidable; Berchtold demurred. He argued that the outward occasion for such action was lacking. Furthermore, public opinion would first have to be prepared. He feared lest a revolution might break out.

"Where, then?" demanded Conrad.

"In Bohemia," said the Count.

"Do not let yourself be persuaded into that belief," replied the Field Marshal emphatically.

It may be that Berchtold exaggerated the danger of revolt. At the same time, it is quite possible that he was correct in his judgment that public opinion in the Dual Monarchy was not prepared for an immediate act of force against Serbia. An examination

of such newspapers and other historical sources as are available for this study does indeed reveal a widespread assumption, directly after the assassination, that "Belgrade" was responsible for the crime. It shows a strong anti-Serbian feeling in Austria-Hungary, coupled, in certain quarters, with a demand for vigorous action against the Slav state. On the other hand, in other quarters, voices were raised distinctly against a policy that would culminate in war with Serbia. As the days passed, however, nervousness increased, the irritation of the people was stimulated by certain influences, the tension grew greater; so that by the time the ultimatum was sent to Serbia on July 23rd, public opinion seems to have been more ready for this step than it would have been immediately after the Crime of Sarajevo. Despite all this, however, strong as the feeling against Serbia was, it does not appear that it was owing to the direct pressure of public opinion that the Austro-Hungarian Government formulated and carried out the policy that led to war with the monarchy of King Peter. With the evidence of these characteristics and developments of Austro-Hungarian public opinion, during the period from June 28th to July 23rd, 1914, this and the following chapter will deal.

Anger at the deed at Sarajevo awaited no sign from the Government to manifest itself in unreasoning outbursts against the Serbs within and without the Dual Monarchy. In Sarajevo itself, ever a cockpit

of racial and religious antagonisms, overstrained emotions found vent, a few hours after the assassination, in a wild anti-Serbian demonstration. About half-past ten in the evening a crowd of Moslem and Croatian youths, many of them students, gathered in the Franz Josephstrasse. From there they marched through the streets, singing the national anthem, cheering for the Emperor and for Austria. "Down with the Serbs!" they cried. "Out with them! We want not these murderers! Down with the enemies of the Monarchy!" Later, halting in their pilgrimage, they knelt and offered prayer for the murdered Archduke and his wife. Then, in ever-increasing numbers, they marched to the Hotel Europa, the property of one of the Serbian leaders, and bombarded it with stones. Apparently it did not occur to the police to interfere with the manifestants; so finally troops of soldiers entered the scene and restored order. (Die Neue Freie Presse, June 29.)

The next morning the tumult broke out again. A mob sacked several Serbian shops, the palace of the Serbian Metropolitan, a printing-house, a bank, the Hotel Europa and the café of the same name. The Serbian schools were completely destroyed. Serbs no longer dared risk themselves in the streets. (Le Matin, June 30 and July 5.) "God be thanked we are all alive," telegraphed Jestanowitsch, the proprietor of the Hotel Europa, to his son in Berlin. "Of our dwelling-house only the roof and the walls

are left. Inside, everything is destroyed. The silverware and all the jewelry have been stolen. The stables, the carriage-house, the harness and all other articles of use have been destroyed. Only the horses are left. The whole 'Hotel Europa,' inside and outside, has been damaged and pillaged."

Nor was Sarajevo by any means the only center of trouble. On this and succeeding days anti-Serbian demonstrations were reported from Graz, Djakova, Mostar, Novi-Goritza, Agram, Vienna and a number of other cities, towns and villages. In Ombla, near Ragusa, a Serbian flag was torn to pieces and the house of a Serbian set on fire. In Agram, stormy scenes were enacted at a meeting of the Croatian Landtag. A member of the Serbian opposition called out, "Long live King Peter!" and in quick answer to him came enraged shouts of "Down with the assassins! Down with the Serbs!" In Vienna, on the evening of June 30th, a band of from three hundred to four hundred students assembled in front of the Serbian legation, tumultuously voicing their hostility. A Serbian flag, which they had brought with them, was publicly burned. The police finally intervened and forced the manifestants to evacuate the street; but no arrest followed and the crowd then marched to the Schwarzenburg Square, where fervid, youthful orators made patriotic and bellicose speeches calling for war on the Serbs. (Neue Freie Presse, Matin, Reichspost, Pester Lloyd, June 29 to July 10,

passim.) The number and the violence of these demonstrations shows how ready certain elements of the population were to take for granted the guilt of Serbia for the Crime of Sarajevo, and to proceed from angry denunciation to armed revenge.

It may be argued justly, however, that these furious manifestations were not necessarily typical of public opinion as a whole in the Dual Monarchy. In every country there is always a minority of excitable, strongly prejudiced or ill-balanced people ever ready to seize an occasion for stirring up trouble. To these the murder of the Archduke offered seemingly providential provocation. Significant, then, as the demonstrations may have been because of their widespread and violent character, conclusions in regard to popular sentiment in the Monarchy drawn solely from accounts of these outbursts would be one-sided and inaccurate. To these must be added, for a more general and more representative view of public opinion in the Hapsburg realm, such evidence as may be drawn from the editorials of newspapers of various types, from the reports of the Bourse, from the comments of foreign observers.

Some of the more reactionary newspapers revealed much the same indignation in print that the rioters expressed in their angry outbursts. These journals, without proof, assumed the guilt of Serbia and raged against her. Sometimes they hinted at war; sometimes they openly urged it. The very day after the

assassination the Reichspost (June 29) accused "the exponents of an insane Great Serbia propaganda" of selecting for sacrifice "the noblest and first representative of the great empire idea." "We have here to do," continued the journal, "with a well-prepared plan, with a criminal attempt, which would strike in the person of the Archduke, heir to the throne, the idea of the state." "Wherever Serbian influences are at work preparing and creating the Great Serbia," commented the same newspaper on July 1st, "there rages murder. Out of the embittered hearts of men rises the question: 'How long, then, will the Serbian murder spectre carry on its handiwork unchecked?' How long? The whole Monarchy, and not only the Monarchy, awaits the answer to this question." This journal then quoted a letter from the Tyrol, describing the sorrow of the people, and concluding: "To-day, however, there runs through the whole land only one cry, the cry for vengeance and atonement." In another issue (July 2) the Reichspost argued that the peril from Serbia would increase, unless respect for Austria's power were restored "with the mailed fist."

Among the other newspapers exemplifying the same bitterly anti-Serbian point of view were the Militärische Rundschau,[1] the Neues Wiener Journal, the Oesterreichische Volks-Zeitung, the Innsbrucker

[1] "In Austria-Hungary the chief offenders have been the Reichspost and the Militärische Rundschau."—London Times, July 16.

Nachrichten, and the Croatian newspaper, Hrvatski Devnik. On June 30th the Militärische Rundschau published an article vehemently attacking Serbia and the Serbs, under the title: "To Belgrade!" "It is not we," said this newspaper, "who utter this cry; it is the bourgeois journals representing the interests of the civil population and accustomed to make peace at any price the basis of bourgeois happiness. In these circles people feel themselves at last persuaded that liberty does not consist in leaving others free to assail them with bombs or revolvers, for to be free it is necessary to begin by defending one's own liberty." About the same time the Hrvatski Devnik stated that "an organized band of criminals has carried out the deed, long since prepared in Belgrade and here, which is part of the program of Serbian nationalism. For the sublime dead the Croatian people weeps, but it also swears revenge on the murderers and the originators of this frightful crime." A little later (July 6) the Innsbrucker Nachrichten published a leading article by Lieutenant-Colonel Rudolf Merkh in which the writer argued that when a people is growing old, its soul longs for eternal peace, but that eternal peace "rules only in the grave, and this is well! A sound body politic knows no peace, it seeks war; it knows that only through this can it exist."

Journals of this type fumed at the seeming unwillingness of the Government to take vigorous action against Serbia. The Oesterreichische Volks-

Zeitung complained of the "Mollusk policy" (*Molluskenpolitik*) which it alleged the Government of Austria-Hungary had hitherto employed against Serbia. It demanded that the people of Belgrade rid themselves of the nest of murderers, which "vomits its brood" over the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy. The Neues Wiener Journal kept urging the Government to take decisive action against Serbia. (Issues of June 30; July 1, 2, 4, etc.)

In an editorial of July 2nd it asserted that "people are tired of this intolerable secrecy business of Count Berchtold. Austria-Hungary's people are loudly asking: 'What expiation is to be made for the monstrous Crime of Sarajevo?'" A little later it denounced "the hushing-up system [*Das Vertuschungssystem*] of Count Berchtold." On July 4th it held that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was remaining dumb in the face of unheard-of provocations, that it was meekly setting its hushing-up system in action to cover up the traces which might lead excited public opinion to those who were truly guilty. Again it complained (July 6) that nothing was to be heard of energetic measures against Belgrade, and asked how long Count Berchtold was going to allow "every day a piece of the Monarchy's power to crumble away."

Similarly, the Innsbrucker Nachrichten (July 8) despairingly said that there was little ground for hope that the authorities would use enough energy to counteract the unfortunate mistakes which Kallay,

Burian, and Bilinski had made in the management of Bosno-Herzegovinian affairs, so that the South Slav irredentism would lose its desire to play with fire. And the Militärische Rundschau proclaimed: "We have warned the authorities. We have demanded radical measures. They have not heard us because they have been partisans of the [policy of the] velvet glove and not of the iron hand."

Chauvinism there is in all this, of course. Far too much of it. But even chauvinism is not based on mere pugnacity; nor is it to be explained, in this case, merely as an expression of the greedy ambition of a large country to gobble up a small one. To understand the bitterly anti-Serbian attitude of a large part of the people of Austria-Hungary it is necessary, first of all, to bear in mind the gravity of the Crime of Sarajevo itself. Had the Prince of Wales been assassinated by a Sinn Feiner at the time of the Anglo-Irish crisis of 1914, it is not probable that English opinion would have remained calm and collected. Had the Vice-President of the United States, on a visit to the Texas Border at the time of strained relations between the United States and Mexico in 1913, been murdered by a Mexican, it is not probable that the American people would have regarded the act with scientific objectivity. But the provocation to war was even greater in the case of the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand than in these hypothetical cases, for the monarchical principle

seemed to be the chief means for holding together the heterogeneous nationalities of the Hapsburg realm. A blow at the monarchical principle, exemplified in the person of the heir to the throne, was a blow at the very existence of the Dual Monarchy itself.[2] Those historians, then, who have seen in the Crime of Sarajevo merely a convenient pretext used by Austria or Germany or both to unchain a war long-planned, underestimate the emotional effect of the deed, and misinterpret its historical significance.

In the next place, it should be remembered that the anger of the people of the Dual Monarchy was cumulative. The assassination seemed to be the climax of a long series of provocations. The origins of the trouble go back at least as far as 1878, when the Congress of Berlin allowed the Dual Monarchy to administer the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though these still remained nominally under Turkish control. Since the provinces were inhabited largely by Serbs, the rapidly growing nationalism of Serbia resented their administration by Austria. Not until the accession of the Karageorgevich dynasty in 1903, however, did this resentment become a really important factor. Then the new king, Peter, saw that a strong anti-Austrian policy was the only possible popular foreign policy. Pan-Serbian agitation grew

[2] Conrad von Hötzendorf even says: "Wer sich auf Serbiens Seite stellte, der wollte den Untergang der o-u Monarchie; zum mindesten forderte er ihn unbewusst."—Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, vol. iv, p. 31.

ever stronger, with Belgrade as its center. It was furthered by the schools, the Press, and patriotic societies. In 1908-1909, when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, the resentment of Serbia became more acute than ever. She protested to the Powers against the annexation, demanded for herself a port on the Adriatic, and strengthened her military forces. So tense did the situation become that Conrad von Hötzendorf then and there advocated going to war with her. Matters were temporarily adjusted in the spring of 1909, however, when Serbia promised to cease agitations and to live in good neighborly relations with the Dual Monarchy. But the promise was not kept and conditions soon became worse than ever. The Serbian Press attacked Austria viciously; the secret societies, such as the "Narodna Odbrana" and the so-called "Black Hand," grew more powerful and fostered dark plots. There followed a series of attempts to assassinate Austrian officials, which naturally aroused hot indignation in the Hapsburg Empire. During the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, Austria was alarmed at Serb successes, and especially at the ambition of King Peter's monarchy to secure a port on the Adriatic. Toward the end of the year 1912 Berchtold resisted pressure brought to bear on him to go to war with Serbia, seeking a solution through diplomacy. He agreed finally to the meeting of a conference of ambassadors to be held in London for the purpose of unraveling the Balkan

tangle. In August, 1913, however, Serbia defied the decrees of this conference by insisting on retaining Albanian territory that she had already been ordered to give up. The danger of war was again imminent, and it is said that Austria would have attacked her little neighbor had not Germany restrained her. In October Germany and Italy joined with Austria in demanding fulfillment of the London decrees and under this pressure and advice from the Entente Serbia yielded. But the Serbian Press continued its venomous attacks.

Of course Austria was largely to blame for the seething enmity that had grown up between the two countries and which put the preservation of peace at the mercy of an incident. It was natural that the Serbs should resent the action of the Congress of Berlin, permitting the Dual Monarchy to administer Bosnia and Herzegovina, still more natural that indignation should wax hot when Austria annexed the provinces. Austria, also, had put up high tariff barriers between herself and Serbia, which did grave economic harm to the little country and led to the so-called "pig war" (1905-1907), since the chief exports of Serbia were pigs. Austrian administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina was often stupid and sometimes grossly unjust to the Serbs of those provinces. It was quite natural, too, that Serbia should greatly resent Austria's attempts to block her expansion and particularly the success of the Dual Monarchy in de-

priving her of access to the sea after the Balkan wars. But it is of the essence of nationalism to ignore its own sins and to see only those of its enemies. Serbia and the Serbians had certainly committed grievous sins against the Dual Monarchy; and it should cause no surprise that a great many Austrians came to feel that the Serbian problem could be settled only by the sword.

In spite of the accumulated irritation of years, however, in spite of the angry demonstrations and riots in various parts of the Hapsburg Empire, in spite of the furious fulminations of the Reichspost and the Militärische Rundschau, it can not be maintained that during the first week or two after the assassination, or even later, Austro-Hungarian public opinion presented a front united for action against Serbia. In evidence of this the Vienna correspondent of the German Socialist newspaper, Vorwärts, reported on July 1st that the people of the Austrian capital were not greatly moved, that there was very little feeling of sorrow and sympathy. This, he said, was true not only of proletarian but of other circles, the reasons lying in the personality of the dead man, who had little of the lovable or the friendly in his character, with his strong clericalism and his spirit of absolutism. The Vienna correspondent of the Paris Matin, too, expressed the opinion on June 30th that people in Vienna were beginning to show their astonishment at the violence of the anti-Serbian manifesta-

tions, at the reprisals against innocent persons, at the tendency to hold official Serbia responsible for the horrible Crime of Sarajevo.

Certain newspapers voiced warnings against the assumption that the conspiracy to murder the Archduke originated in official circles at Belgrade, and against using this assumed guilt as a point of departure for violent action against the Slav state. The Vienna Zeit attributed the crime to "a few fanatical Serbian nationalists," to "some criminal individuals," not to the Serbian Government or people. About a week after the assassination the same journal, commenting on the official investigation of the murder, made the statement that "up to the fourth of July, no fact was known in high places, susceptible of proving the existence of a conspiracy prepared and organized with the consent of responsible personalities in a neighbouring state." The Zeit also protested against the attacks on the Serb element in Bosnia, warning that these entailed the risk of unchaining an odious war of religion, which would compromise the civilizing work of Austria there. It is to the interest of the Dual Monarchy, said the Zeit, not to alienate the Serbs within its boundaries, but to assimilate them.

Similarly, the Arbeiter-Zeitung (July 2), organ of the Vienna Socialists, in an article entitled "Die Kopflosigkeit in Sarajevo," denounced the senseless riots against the Serbs in the Bosnian city. The same newspaper (July 5) ridiculed the idea of so-called "patri-

ots" that Austria, in her crisis with Serbia, was faced with the question of "to be or not to be." On July 9th, in commenting on the theory that Serbia was responsible for the Crime of Sarajevo, the Arbeiter-Zeitung asserted that "whoever makes an accusation of so severe a character against a neighbour state must be able to produce sound proofs." But it did not draw the conclusion that even if the proofs were sound, an action of violence against Serbia should follow. "Either the investigation" it maintained, "will supply incontrovertible proofs, in which case their publication will fall crushingly on those who are unmasked, will carry with it the moral annihilation of the Belgrade authors of the crime and will give Austria a satisfaction such as provocative 'actions' dangerous to peace could never give; or if the proofs are lacking or are doubtful, then every demand that goes out from the Vienna Cabinet will only give the impression that it is seeking quarrels, and will secure to Serbia the support of those who wish her well."

The Neues Politisches Volksblatt (July 4) of Budapest, "liberal" in politics, went so far as to criticize the dead Archduke, who had generally been considered to be no friend of the Hungarians. "Archduke Francis Ferdinand was certainly liked in the country; but he was scarcely loved. The people of the Monarchy, the Czechs perhaps excepted, stood in relation to him, and he to them, as strangers. . . .

It was his inflexible will which first made possible the assassination."

The Volksblatt argued that incitement against Serbia, as it were in revenge for the Crime of Sarajevo, was a great political mistake. It held that if Austria-Hungary had the right sort of statesman to lead the way, he could make friends with the "overbearing" Serbia without humiliating her. Serbia would then consider it a duty of honor to cleanse her territory of the sort of insane propaganda that made murderers of unripe youths. Unfortunately, however, there seemed to be little prospect that the Austrian political leaders would have the perception to adopt this policy; rather it seemed as though Austria wished to pay back with interest the incitement of the Serbs against the Monarchy through a thorough-going incitement against them. If the people of the Hapsburg Empire were to strengthen the arrogance of the Serbs through irritation, the Volksblatt contended, if they should punish them for Prinzip and his associates, while threatening the bodies and lives of guiltless men, then Serbian chauvinism would soon become the order of the day, Prinzip and his ilk heroes and martyrs, and Austria-Hungary would lose her influence in the Balkans.

Between such bitterly anti-Serbian journals as the Reichspost and the Militärische Rundschau, on the one hand, and on the other, newspapers such as the Zeit and the Arbeiter-Zeitung, disposed to give

Serbia the benefit of all reasonable doubt and opposed to a forceful settlement of the Austro-Serbian problem, stood such influential organs of public opinion as the Neue Freie Presse of Vienna and the Pester Lloyd of Budapest. In the days immediately following the assassination the Neue Freie Presse did not hesitate to suggest the responsibility of Serbia for the Crime of Sarajevo, but at the same time advocated a policy of peace with that country. "Without full proof we may not accuse and blame," it stated in an editorial on June 29th, the day following the murder, "but every one has the conviction that behind this printer who threw the bomb, and behind the trade school scholar, who killed the Archduke and his wife, stand others on whom one cannot lay hold, who prepared these instruments and were the originators of this Balkan murder." Such results are to be expected, it argued, when hatred against a state, carefully nourished, cloaks murder in a national mantle, and looks on bloody crime as evidence of love of fatherland. But on July 2d it said that the fundamental lines of the Government's policy, peace with honor and harmony with neighboring states, would not be altered by reason of the murder. In another issue, published the same day, it asserted that "wars of revenge are to-day, when the great interests of the people are decisive, out of the question." [3]

[3] The semi-official Budapesti Hirlap stated, shortly after the murder, that "there is no ground for anxiety as to war. No concrete proofs have yet fixed upon Serbia guilt or complicity in the Sarajevo crime, although there are symptoms that the threads of the plot

The Pester Lloyd expressed sympathy for the popular indignation against Serbia, but was inclined to believe that this feeling would not be followed by an act of force against that country, and emphasized the importance of awaiting, in any event, the results of the investigation which the Austrian Government was conducting into the origins of the crime. "In public opinion," it stated editorially a few days after the assassination (July 2), "there is stirring passionate indignation against Serbia, set loose by the circumstance that both the assassins came to Belgrade from Sarajevo, and from Belgrade, according to definitely established reports, they have brought the impulse, as well as the murderous materials for their execrable project. The anger of public opinion is intelligible and commendable. . . . We believe, however, that a further concrete result will not follow from this. Expression is given, here and there, to the idea of a campaign of revenge, a punitive expedition against Serbia." The newspaper expressed the opinion that as psychological evidence of the state of public feeling this idea was significant, but that it ought not to be looked upon as an incitement, a first impulse to a new Balkan policy. "The desire for revenge is a feeling; not feelings, however, but inter-

run together in Belgrade. The result of the investigation must be awaited, when an exchange of diplomatic notes can begin between Vienna and the Serbian capital. There will, however, be no need to rattle the sabre. No one wishes to be involved in war without serious cause, and the Monarchy will know how to maintain its prestige without wishing to resort to arms."—Quoted in the London Times, July 7th.

ests must determine policy. Both assassins are Bosnian, not Serbian subjects, and carried out their evil deed on Bosnian soil. If the further development of the investigation should show that they were trained and hired on Serbian soil and from there sent forth, then the time would have come to treat with Serbia, to set a limit to these criminal deeds, and for that country to give guarantees that this base mischief would stop once for all. But whether such proofs will be found one cannot tell ahead of time." A few days later (July 8) this important Hungarian journal predicted confidently that the diplomatic step which the government of the Dual Monarchy was contemplating would certainly not turn out to be provocative; it would demand nothing of the Serbian rulers which could in any way injure the national self-respect of their country.

It is clear from this survey of leading Austro-Hungarian newspapers of varied political hues, that, in the days immediately following the assassination, public opinion in the Dual Monarchy was by no means united in favor of war with Serbia. Race feeling, it is true, ran high. Resentment against Serbia was strong and probably rather general, not solely on account of the Crime of Sarajevo, but as well because of the many earlier provocations coming from the Slav monarchy, of which the assassination seemed to be the climax. It revealed itself in the number and violence of the anti-Serbian demonstrations, in

the diatribes of newspapers such as the Reichspost, the Militärische Rundschau and the Neues Wiener Journal. Such journals as the Arbeiter-Zeitung and the Zeit did not share this feeling. But the Arbeiter-Zeitung was a Socialist organ and as such had naturally little sympathy with racial bellicosity. Among non-Socialist Vienna newspapers, the Zeit stood almost, perhaps completely, isolated in its "pro-Serbian" attitude. The Reichspost (July 2) accused it of catering to Serbian subscribers. What is most significant, however, is that anti-Serbian feeling was reflected in highly influential and ordinarily moderate newspapers such as the Pester Lloyd and the Neue Freie Presse.

But it is one thing to assume Serbian guilt and to express resentment thereat; it is quite another to advocate revenge. The more extreme elements might shriek for this; but again the attitude of the Neue Freie Presse, the Pester Lloyd and other important newspapers at the end of June and early in July speaks for the disinclination, at this time, of a large and solid part of the people in the Dual Monarchy to turn the Crime of Sarajevo into a *casus belli*. English observers testified to this disinclination. "The position taken up by the Austrian Press with regard to the revelations from Sarajevo on the plot," wrote the Vienna correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph on June 30th, "is quiet and measured. It is felt almost without exception that those opinions are

discredited that consider that the murder of the Archduke might be the excuse for new serious political complications, or even for war with Serbia." (July 1st issue.) The London Times, too, in its issue of July 2nd, took a comfortable view of the situation:

"We note with special satisfaction the self-restraint which the more responsible organs of public opinion are displaying in Vienna under circumstances that might easily have led them into violent and unjust denunciations. There have been some regrettable outbursts—notably in the military Reichspost—but our Correspondent has declared that no inclination has been shown by most of the newspapers to call for vengeance upon the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy as a whole, or to suggest that the murders were not the work of a small minority. The crime, it is acknowledged, must intensify the mistrust of the Serb race which is widely felt in the Dual Monarchy, but it is rightly declared that to make this tragedy the starting-point for a fresh period of friction with Serbia would be a deplorable mistake."

The Vienna Bourse, perhaps the most sensitive of all barometers of public opinion in the Dual Monarchy, in the days immediately following the assassination viewed the situation with some uneasiness, it is true, but without intense alarm. On the 29th of June the murder was, of course, the principal topic of discussion among the traders. From this discus-

sion developed the opinion that as a result of the crime the need for peace in the Monarchy had increased, and that immediate, far-reaching changes in the policy of the Government were scarcely to be expected. The calm of the public in face of the situation also lent support to the market. As a result, stock prices in general dropped but little. On the 30th much the same opinion prevailed. It was felt that the policy of the Monarchy, after as before the event, would be directed to the preservation of peace. A distinct tendency to weakness developed on July 1st, owing in part to attacks of certain Serbian newspapers on the Monarchy and to new anti-Serbian demonstrations in the south. This weakness continued the next day; but on the 3rd a somewhat more optimistic tone prevailed, influenced by confidence in the need for peace, and by the hope that relations between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would soon improve. (Neue Freie Presse, June 29, 30; July 1-4.) On Sunday, July 5th, a financial writer of the Neue Freie Presse, summing up the situation for the week following the assassination, admitted that the market had been feeble, but held that political anxiety was not the fundamental cause of this weakness. "The first news of the crime," he said, "did not cause the market to lose its composure for an instant. What the following days brought was depressing and grievous, but not sufficiently so to affect judgment regarding the course of events."

On the whole, however, the situation was clearly worse at the end of the first week than it had been immediately after the assassination. On June 30th, the Austro-Hungarian 4% rente stood at 81.20, on July 1st at 81.10, on July 2nd at 80.90, and on July 4th at 80.85. (Reichspost, July 1-5.) On the last day of the week Count Tschirschky, German Ambassador to the Dual Monarchy, sent word to von Bethmann-Hollweg that although the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs was using his influence to calm the Press, "the excitement which is the result of the fateful attack on the Archduke and heir to the throne and on the Duchess of Hohenburg is appearing more and more." And at the meeting of the Council of Ministers for Common Concerns on July 7th, Count Berchtold maintained that during the last few days the whole situation had changed. "It now shows a psychological character," he said, "and is decidedly more than ever pointing to a solution at the point of the sword."

CHAPTER III

THE DRIFT TOWARD WAR

IN the days that followed, the tension increased. The demonstrations against Serbia, it is true, died down or were brought under control. In Sarajevo, martial law had been proclaimed effectively after the first riots. (Matin, July 1.) In Vienna, the correspondent of the London Times reported on July 6th (issue of July 7), that anti-Serbian demonstrations had ceased, "for the present at all events." Manifestations in other parts of the Monarchy became less and less frequent.[1] Newspapers like the Arbeiter-Zeitung and the Zeit also showed no change of heart. The Zeit continued to speak for the Serbs; and when certain alleged conspirators in the Crime of Sarajevo were arrested, the Zeit protested against the "persecution of the Greater Serbians." The Neues Politisches Volksblatt affirmed on July 11th that "in the Monarchy no reasonable man seriously thinks of becoming involved in an armed conflict with Serbia. . . . We want no war, not even a victorious one.

[1] I find little evidence of demonstrations between July 10th and the time of the dispatch of the note to Serbia, though the Neue Freie Presse for July 15th reports that demonstrations had taken place in Dalmatia the previous day.

. . . Certainly we must demand satisfaction and guarantees for the future. But these demands need not lead to a breach of relations; they must be so put that they will be fulfilled." Furthermore, as was to be expected in the *mélange* of peoples that constituted the ramshackle empire of the House of Hapsburg, certain elements among the subordinate races found an anti-Serbian policy little to their liking. Thus there was a tendency to disaffection among the Czechs of Bohemia, and some of the people of Croatia and Slavonia.

On the other hand, the demand for action against the Serbs was becoming more definite. "Nervousness has increased more and more since the crime and has become general," said the Sarajevoes Tagblatt on July 12th. The Reichspost (July 8) quoted a number of angry utterances from various parts of the Empire. The Magyar newspaper, A Nap, for example, demanded, the second week after the assassination, that the Dual Monarchy use bayonets against the Serbs. The Budapesti Naplo, about the same time, cynically remarked that "the confusion and senselessness of our diplomacy" would before long lead the Dual Monarchy to offer apologies in Belgrade. In its issues of July 16th and 17th the Reichspost quoted the views of several Polish newspapers. The Kuryer Codzienny, criticizing the apparent failure of the Government to take drastic action against the Serbs, denounced the policy of

Austria as unmanly and cowardly. Such a policy, it said, could only injure the reputation of the State. The Wiek Novy, calling for war, sneered at the "sickly pacifism" of the Government. The Nowa Reforma affirmed that "Austrian diplomacy" must bring the question definitely to a solution. The Reichspost itself (July 22) argued that a feeble policy pursued by the Government would not only bring great satisfaction and encouragement to the Monarchy's enemies, but would shake the trust of its friends. Within the sphere of their influence the evident tendency of such utterances was to excite public feeling to fever-heat and to goad the country into war.

More significant, however, than the anger of the reactionary Reichspost and of the journals to which it turned for aid and comfort was the change in the tone of such a comparatively moderate newspaper as the Neue Freie Presse.[2] On July 2nd, as has been pointed out, this great organ of public opinion had stated that wars of revenge were out of the question. Five days later it argued that there was no use in Austria-Hungary's limiting herself to measures against the assassins, if hatred were spread, murders carried out, and all the methods of the Russian terrorists systematically employed, by the Greater Serbia movement. "Peace with Serbia and war

[2] A similar change of tone is observable in the Pester Lloyd. See its editorials July 1 to 23.

against the Greater Serbian movement," it proclaimed editorially a little later (July 9). ". . . If she wishes peace, which, as Count Tisza has said, the [Dual] Monarchy also needs, Serbia must carry out a complete separation and divorce between herself and the Greater Serbia movement." On the 13th it asserted that the Monarchy "must, in this crisis, concern itself with the sword of veterans" (*muss sich in dieser Krise mit dem Seitengewehr der Veteranen . . . beschäftigen*). Two days later it demanded that after the conclusion of the investigation of the crime, "a step for the clarification of the unusual relations" existing between the two governments should be undertaken. Finally, an editorial of July 19th, while not actually demanding war, clearly envisaged it. This article began with the statement: "Of the Austrians now living only a few have seen war." It pointed out that Count Tisza "has said that relations with Serbia must be clarified; just what this will mean cannot be told with certainty, but every one can form his judgment as to the probabilities."

Foreign observers testified to the growing irritation of public opinion during these July days. "In the Press, as in public opinion," the Frankfurter Zeitung noted on the 14th of the month, "exasperation over the Serbian provocations is given ever stronger expression. This exasperation is directed against the Foreign Office, regarding which those who have definitely made up their minds have feared

that it would not guard decisively enough the dignity of the country or that it would let itself be put off again, with cheap promises from Serbia, as in the year 1909."

The London Times, it is true, retained for some time an optimistic view of the situation. "There seems to be a desire," it commented on July 9th, "to counteract any agitation of public opinion such as might ensue from the perusal of the anti-Serbian articles appearing in some newspapers, including the Clerico-Military Reichspost." And the next day, referring to Count Tisza's speech, it said: "The tone of it was evidently pitched with the specific intention of tranquillizing the public, and the reserve with which the Hungarian Premier spoke has driven those newspapers which were demanding energetic action by the Monarchy in Belgrade into seeking in what he did not say an indication of the fulfillment of their desires." On the 12th, two days before the Frankfurter Zeitung made the comment, to which we have referred, on the growing exasperation in the Dual Monarchy, the Vienna correspondent of the Times cheerfully reported from his interpretation of the general feeling in that city, that "there is no need to apprehend serious complications between the Monarchy and Serbia." (Issue of July 13.) But on the 16th the venerable English newspaper was less optimistic: "Officially the attitude of the two Governments is correct, but the Press on both sides of the

frontier has been engaged in a campaign which may ultimately lead to disastrous results." On the 21st the Times affirmed that "the diplomatic and Press campaign undertaken by Austria-Hungary against Serbia is increasing in intensity." And on the 22nd it clearly visualized the coming trouble: "In the meantime the Austro-Hungarian Press continues its violent campaign against Serbia, and intimates that the Serbian Government will be obliged to choose between complete acceptance of Austro-Hungarian demands and war."

On the Bourse increasing irritation and alarm naturally recorded themselves in falling prices. On Tuesday, July 7th, the market suffered from a sharp fall in values, which in general reached levels lower than they had known since the time of the outbreak of the first Balkan war. (Neue Freie Presse, July 8.) It was on this day that the famous Council of Ministers was held, at which all but Count Tisza advocated warlike measures against Serbia. The calling of this Council had a depressing effect on the market. Apparently the Bourse had its suspicions of the Ballplatz. The next day there was some recovery; then came new declines. On the 11th of the month the French consul-general at Budapest reported to M. Viviani that "without exception stocks have fallen to an unaccountably low level; the Hungarian 4 per cents were quoted yesterday at 79.75, a rate which has never been quoted since they were first issued."

So, despite some brief recoveries, values went from bad to worse until the publication of the Note to Serbia wrought havoc on the Bourse.[3]

The explanation of this increasing nervousness and irritation, of the growing determination of certain sections of public opinion to have it out with Serbia, is to be found, at least in part, in two important influences working on the public mind between June 28th and July 23rd: first, the revelations of the Austro-Hungarian investigation of the crime, and second, the provocative attitude of the Serbian Press.

Immediately after the murder, the Ballplatz began researches into its origins; and as one bit of evidence after another was unearthed, it was published in the newspapers. The day after the assassination it was reported that a large sum of money had been found in the house where the assassin Prinzip had been living. A few days later the Neue Freie Presse stated that people in the Dual Monarchy had been aroused by the discovery and arrest of two other accomplices. The newspaper also pointed out that the preparation of bombs takes time, money, and knowledge. "Public opinion in the Monarchy, then," it continued, "demands an answer to the following simple questions:

"Who has given the money necessary to carry out the crime, and who is responsible for the equipment of the murderers? Answers to these questions are in-

[3] Market reports in the Neue Freie Presse from day to day.

dispensable, in order that the Monarchy may know whether it is a question not merely of criminal law, but also of international law."

"It is known," affirmed the Budapesti Hirlap the next day, "that the bombs came from the Serbian arsenal of Kragujevac, where Cabrinovitch, Prinzip and the other conspirators obtained them." According to the Neue Freie Presse the statement of Grabes, who had been arrested in connection with the crime, implicated in the plot the Serbian general, Jankovitch, president of the Narodna Odbrana. The general spoke to a chosen group of young Bosnian students on "the great mission." "Greater Serbia needs you," he proclaimed. Later on, details of the plot were explained by Major Milan Pribicevitch, who furnished the weapons and the money. "The young Serbian murderers and their instigators, then," asserted the Neues Wiener Journal on July 10th, "stand not far from the Serbian Court, and logic can come to no other conclusion than this: the nest of murderers it to be found in Belgrade, and public opinion demands the fumigation of this lurking-hole of criminals."

Despite revelations such as these, summed up later in the ultimatum to Serbia and set forth at greater length in the official *dossier* sent to the Powers, the Ballplatz was never able to establish a complete case against the Belgrade government. Recently, the Serbian Government's foreknowledge of the plot has

been alleged chiefly because of certain statements of Jovanovitch, in 1914 Serbian Minister of Education. But his evidence has been called in question. Count Berchtold's faithful secret agent, Wiesner, who was sent to Sarajevo to investigate the crime, did, indeed, turn up evidence of some importance; but, as is well known, he was obliged to report that "there is nothing to prove, or even to cause suspicion of the Serbian Government's cognizance of steps leading to the crime or of its supplying the weapons. On the contrary, there are indications that this is to be regarded as out of the question." This report Berchtold suppressed.

Nevertheless the evidence which the investigation did bring forth did not point to Vienna, to Sofia, to Paris, to Sarajevo itself, or to any one of a hundred other places where such a crime might have originated. It did point to Belgrade. It did point to a widespread Serbian plot. It did implicate Serbian officials and Serbian organizations. And what Austro-Hungarian opinion lacked in direct proof it supplied in conjecture and in not wholly unjustifiable assumptions, based on past experience with the Serbs. So the evidence in hand seemed enough to justify a change of front on the part of many of those who had at first suspended judgment, enough to confirm the belief of those already convinced, and to convince the half-convinced of the necessity of taking severe measures

against Austria's recalcitrant neighbor on the other side of the Danube.

Moreover, the overwrought emotions of the people of Austria-Hungary, rasped from day to day by the published revelations of the investigation, were further goaded by unwise expressions of sentiment in Serbia, and especially by highly provocative utterances of the Serbian Press. Formal sympathy for the Dual Monarchy after the Crime of Sarajevo was of course courteously expressed by King Peter's government and by the Press. Belgrade, on the day of the murder, had been joyously celebrating the national festival of the "Vidovdan." When the news of the assassination reached the Serbian capital, all public celebration ceased almost immediately. Music stopped. The order for the kermess, which was to have taken place in the evening, was countermanded. But, if reports received in Austria are to be credited, sorrow was not the only sentiment expressed in Belgrade at the time. "According to eye-witnesses people embraced each other in delight and jubilant remarks were heard, such as 'Serves them right.' 'We expected it for a long time!' 'That's the revenge for the annexation.' " And the acting consul at Nish sent word to Count Berchtold that the news was received there with satisfaction and even with joy.

Almost at once the Serbian newspapers began to throw mud at the Dual Monarchy. "Fate willed it," said the Piemont, "that the Austro-Hungarian heir

to the throne, in spite of all the measures of security taken by the police of Sarajevo, should fall by the hand of a Herzegovinian, against whose brothers the military manœuvres were directed." The same newspaper spoke of Prinzip as the "young martyr." The Odjek asserted that if there had not been a lack of insight in Austrian policy, the Archduke would not have been sent to Sarajevo on a national festival day to exhibit a brutal manifestation of force. "This brutal act was a brutal challenge and must awaken brutal feelings of resistance, of hatred and of revenge." The same newspaper reasoned that Serbia would be held responsible for the assassination, inasmuch as Vienna sought to attribute to Serbian origin "all the evils which gnaw at the vitals of the worm-eaten monarchy." Another newspaper made the statement that "Austria-Hungary, because of her persecution of guiltless Serbs, ought to be placed under international control, since it is much less consolidated than Turkey." The Dual Monarchy was referred to as an "anarchistic state," Vienna as a "city of criminals" (*Verbrecherstadt*). The Pravda asserted that only the tears of the Archduke's children were genuine; all others were crocodile tears. The Tribuna, in an article entitled "Nothing from Austria-Hungary," proposed the boycott of all goods coming from the Dual Monarchy.

Some of the English newspapers expressed decided disapproval of this pin-pricking. The Daily Graphic,

for example, in an editorial referred to the "scandalous cynicism and discourtesy of the Serbian Press, including even the semi-official Samonprava." It is said that no one could wonder if the articles published, "incited the Austrians to retaliation," and it suggested that "the Belgrade Government would be well advised to take prompt measures to disavow its tactless mouthpieces." The London Times, too, denounced the Serbian Press campaign in vigorous terms.

"The reckless and provocative language which a good many Serbian newspapers are alleged to have used," said the Times (July 16), "both before and after the crime that has shocked Europe, cannot do anything but mischief to the cause they have at heart. It exasperates opinion across the Danube and it estranges the sympathies of all civilized peoples. Some of these articles not only charge the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia with all manner of enormities, but openly advocate the destruction of the Dual Monarchy as a service to humanity. The latest suggestion made in one of them is that M. de Hartwig's death [4] in the Austro-Hungarian legation at Belgrade the other day was due to poison. Ravings of that kind move the contempt as well as the disgust of cultivated peoples, whatever their political sympathies may be."

Had the Serbian newspapers deliberately deter-

[4] Hartwig was the Russian ambassador to Serbia.

mined to solidify Austro-Hungarian opinion against the Serbian people and Government, they could scarcely have chosen a more effective method. The King of Roumania expressed his belief that the unscrupulous and disorderly nagging by the Serbian Press was responsible for all the trouble; it was this that kept public opinion in the Dual Monarchy constantly irritated. At the famous Council of Ministers on July 7th, Count Tisza, though standing resolutely against war with Serbia, nevertheless admitted that during the few days the situation had altered by reason of the facts established by the investigation and of the attitude of the Serbian Press; he therefore considered the possibility of warlike action against Serbia nearer than he had believed it immediately after the assassination. On July 14th he told Tschirschky that though he had at first advised caution, he was becoming more and more convinced that the Monarchy would have to put an end to the intolerable conditions in the southeast, and he advised war. He said that "the tone of the Serbian Press and of the Serbian diplomats was so presumptuous as simply not to be borne." As the German newspaper Vorwärts put it a little later (July 23), the Austrian chauvinists were finding in Serbia's boasts, which found expression especially in the vulgar language of the Belgrade newspapers, the best allies conceivable.

For the virulence of this Press campaign, however, actions and attitudes in the Dual Monarchy itself

must be held partially responsible. The ill-treatment of Serbians in various parts of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the assassination naturally angered their fellow-nationals in the realm of King Peter. To many in the Hapsburg Empire such ill-treatment seemed but a natural, if regrettable, consequence of the brutal murder of the heir to the throne. In Serbia it quite naturally seemed outrageous to visit punishment for the assassins' acts on innocent people. The Mali Journal, a Serbian newspaper, asserted on July 1st that the anti-Serbian demonstrations in Bosnia and Agram were organized by Government officials. "The fact that it could come to vandalism of the mob against the Serbs," another newspaper argued, "is sufficient for the diagnosis of the incurable sickness of the Monarchy." It added that no one in Europe could condone a policy, which, as an atonement for an event of two minutes, permitted an anarchy of several days. The Stampa proclaimed that the bloodthirsty Austria-Hungary had wished to drink Serbian blood and had drunk it. As the Frankfurter Zeitung summed it up on July 3rd: "The whole Serbian Press raises anew united protest against the brutal persecution of guiltless Serbian people in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Croatia."

So, too, the campaign of Austro-Hungarian journals against Serbia anent the Crime of Sarajevo, of course provoked the Serbian Press. A day or two after the assassination the Belgrade correspondent of

the Paris Journal (July 3rd issue) reported that indignation was strong in the Serbian capital against those Austro-Hungarian newspapers which intimated that the deed was the result of a Serbian plot. In a protest sent to the London Times from "an official Serbian source," against this attitude of the Austrian newspapers, it was asserted that "their fundamental purpose was entirely clear; they wished as far as possible to ruin the credit which Serbia won in Europe during the last war." An article in the Serbian Government organ, Samonprava, some two weeks later, pointed out that over against the Greater Serbian propaganda was to be placed the Greater Austrian propaganda. This latter was by no means academic; for it had led to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Serbian Government, according to its own statement, had attempted to restrain its own newspapers; but the Austro-Hungarian journals continued to give them provocation.

"Cast a glance at your own Press," said Stefanovitch, head of the Serbian Press-bureau, in answer to Austrian complaints of the articles appearing in Serbian newspapers. "All [sic] the newspapers of Austria-Hungary declared, not on the third, not on the fifth, but on the first day [after the assassination] that Serbia was guilty of the murder. Since then there have appeared in the Austrian and Hungarian newspapers articles which brought the blood to our faces. Pashitch, Protitch and I have implored the Serbian

Press, day in and day out, to adopt a reserved, patient tone. But even patience has its limits. To-day even I can no longer restrain our Press, which is paying back the Monarchy in its own coin."

Thus irritation working on irritation, in an atmosphere of mutual recrimination, public opinion in both countries grew more and more excited and angry as the day for sending the ultimatum to Serbia drew near. The reaction of people in the Dual Monarchy to the Note will be discussed in the next chapter; but it is evident that by July 23rd the popular mind was ready for strong measures. Whether the Government was virtually forced by public opinion, however, to a course of action leading almost certainly to war, is another question. It may be, indeed, that those in control of affairs felt that the provocations coming from across the border were so many and so continuous that some time or other the inhabitants of the Hapsburg Empire would demand a reckoning. But for several reasons it seems unlikely that the Ballplatz adopted its drastic policy after the assassination, as a result of direct popular pressure. In the first place, as the interview with Berchtold to which reference was made at the beginning of the last chapter clearly shows, Conrad von Hötzendorf had made up his mind immediately after the assassination that warlike action was necessary; and Conrad is known to have been a powerful influence at the Ballplatz. Furthermore, Berchtold, in this interview, does not seem

to have been troubled with a fear that popular pressure would force a drastic step; rather his chief objection appears to have been that public opinion was not ready for it. In the next place, Count Tisza, in a report to the Emperor Francis Joseph on July 1st, stated that "the first opportunity which offered for speaking to Count Berchtold was after my audience with Your Majesty, and I did not till then learn of his intention to make the horrible deed of Sarajevo the occasion for reckoning with Serbia." Apparently Berchtold had quickly overcome his own objections. Moreover, the letter written by Francis Joseph to the German Kaiser on July 2nd, while it did not envisage the idea of war in precise terms, certainly suggested it. "My Government's efforts," wrote the Emperor, "must in future be directed to isolating Serbia and reducing its size." Evidently a war policy was in the making at a time when certain moderate and influential newspapers were deprecating or opposing the use of force against Serbia, when the Bourse was of opinion that the Crime of Sarajevo would not be made a point of departure from the Dual Monarchy's traditional policy of peace.

Other evidence reinforces the theory that the Ballplatz led rather than followed public opinion during these July days. When Conrad asked the Emperor on July 5th whether Austria would make war on Serbia if Germany promised its moral support to the Dual Monarchy in this issue, Francis Joseph replied cate-

gorically in the affirmative. When the Council of Ministers met on July 7th, all save Count Tisza advocated forceful measures against Serbia; but Tisza would scarcely have stood in opposition had he at that time believed that public opinion would render war virtually inevitable, for he would not have considered such opposition practical. And Tisza was eminently a practical statesman. Moreover Tschirschky, the German Ambassador, a little while later seems to have believed that the Austrian Government was deliberately stimulating anti-Serbian feeling; for he reported to the German Foreign Office that the Vienna Press, under the influence of the Ballplatz, was giving "the widest possible circulation to the articles in the Serbian Press by their complete reproduction." Again, had Berchtold desired to deflect public opinion from the idea of war with Serbia, it is hardly conceivable that he would have suppressed Wiesner's report, in which it was stated that the evidence seemed to show that the complicity of the Serbian Government in the Crime of Sarajevo was "out of the question."

Finally, against the hypothesis that public opinion forced the Ballplatz to adopt the policy that led to the ultimatum stands the testimony of Count Hoyos, Berchtold's *Chef de Cabinet* at the time of the crisis. Count Berchtold, maintains Hoyos, would have been ready to set aside all those fundamental factors which impelled to war and would have been willing to put

himself in opposition to the entire public opinion of Austria and Hungary if such a policy had been advised by the German Government.

The essential historical significance, then, of the state of public opinion in the Dual Monarchy from June 28th to July 23rd lies in the fact that its atmosphere was one in which the Ballplatz could easily and effectively develop its policy of striking a blow at Serbia. Not that public opinion was from the first overwhelmingly in favor of war; it has been clearly demonstrated that it was not. But the Crime of Sarajevo dramatized anti-Serbian feeling. The ever-glowing embers of resentment for past provocations were fanned into vivid flame. Belief in Serbian guilt was widespread, much more widespread than the demand that war should be the consequence of such guilt. It may be, indeed, that had the Government decided to humiliate Serbia at once, it could have done so without very troublesome opposition at home. There is a latent chauvinism in human nature which comes to the surface rather easily in a crisis following continued provocation, and on which a government can count in pursuing a warlike policy. When the flags begin to wave and the drums begin to beat, the tendency is strong to join the chorus of applause. And the greater part of such opposition as persists can often be dragooned into silence. But the Government took no such sudden step; and certainly a large part, if not the bulk, of public opinion was not displeased

that it had not done so. As the days passed, however, the idea grew that Serbia ought to be given a lesson, in order to secure guarantees that the Greater Serbian movement, with its anti-Austrian implications, should cease troubling the Dual Monarchy. It may be that this idea was stimulated and fostered by the Government; not because the Ballplatz was exceptionally chauvinistic, but because it had decided that the Serbian problem should be settled once for all. At any rate, the growing conviction of public opinion was strengthened by the day-to-day revelations of the results of the Government's investigation and by the bitter attacks of the Serbian newspapers, to which the Austro-Hungarian Press gave wide publicity. So when the Ballplatz, which had been maturing its plans behind the scenes, prepared to launch the Note of July 23rd, it could count on a public opinion attuned to its purpose.

CHAPTER IV

THE PSYCHOTIC EXPLOSION IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

THE Note addressed by the Ballplatz to the Belgrade Government on July 23rd was uncompromising in its severity. Serbia's sovereign rights could not have survived its integral acceptance. "It made demands," says Count Montgelas, "which were not compatible with the dignity of an independent state." Austria required a response within forty-eight hours, and shortly before the expiration of that time-limit had received her reply. The Serbian Government rejected those demands that seemed to infringe directly on the sovereign rights of the Slavic state: that Austrian officials be allowed to supervise and prevent Pan-Serbian intrigues; and that the Serbian Government allow Austrian officials to participate in a judicial inquiry into the causes of the Crime of Sarajevo. Furthermore, in relation to certain other demands, reservations were made which the Ballplatz considered evasive. It pronounced the Note unsatisfactory, and on July 28th declared war on Serbia. On the 29th the Austrian Army bombarded Belgrade. The next day the Tsar's Government ordered general mobilization of the Russian forces, and on Au-

gust 1st Germany declared war on Russia. Thus the fire that Austria and Serbia had lighted began to spread over Europe. As Bismarck had once predicted it would do, "a damned quarrel in the Balkans" had paved the way for a world war.

The present chapter will consider, then, the relation of Austro-Hungarian public opinion not only to the later phases of the Austro-Serbian crisis but also to the general European situation. It will deal with the reaction of this opinion: (1) to the Note sent to Serbia; (2) to the Belgrade Government's reply; and (3) to what it believed to be the attitude of the other Powers, individually and collectively, to the Austro-Serbian problem. In conclusion, (4) the question will be considered whether or not the condition of Austro-Hungarian public opinion at the end of July would have then permitted a peaceful solution of the crisis. If a categorical answer can not be given to this question, it is hoped that it will at least be possible to strike a balance of probabilities.

It would be too much to say that the Note to Serbia was greeted with universal applause in the Hapsburg Empire, in spite of the readiness of public opinion, by that time, for drastic measures. The French Ambassador at the Ballplatz sent word to M. Bienvenu-Martin on July 24th that opinion was "startled by the sudden and exaggerated nature of the Austrian demands." While there was a tendency for race rivalries to submerge as the crisis approached a climax,

certain racial groups revealed their discontent with the Government's policy. In Vienna, for example, the Czech and South Slav associations organized meetings to protest against the eventuality of conflict. Had it not been for the censorship of the Press, which the authorities began to put in operation even before the Note was sent to Serbia, this opposition would undoubtedly have manifested itself more definitely and more strongly. A dispatch from Prague on July 23rd to a German journal states that six Czech newspapers had been that day confiscated because of reports they had printed concerning Austrian war preparations. An edition of the Prager Tagblatt was confiscated on July 25th, and in another edition this journal reported the confiscation of two Czech newspapers that day.[1]

Socialist opposition to the Government's policy of the mailed fist was emphatic. "Such demands," said the Arbeiter-Zeitung in commenting on the Note, "one state has never before made of another. . . . And every one of these demands is made in a manner all too well adapted to rouse to the uttermost the 'amour propre' of the Serbian state; every one of these demands is a denial of the independence of Serbia." The German Social Democratic representatives in the lower house of the Austrian Parliament published a ringing manifesto against the war which

[1] Prager Tagblatt, July 25. The Berlin Post reported on July 28th that many Czechs liable to military duty had come into Prussia from Moravia and Bohemia to escape military duty.

they saw looming up before them, dark and sinister. The manifesto concluded with the following words:

> Peace is the most precious good of men, the highest need of peoples.
>
> We refuse every responsibility for this war; solemnly and decisively we charge with it those who, on the one side as on the other, have plotted it and wished to unchain it! And in this we know ourselves to be united with the class-conscious workers of the whole world and not least with the Social Democrats of Serbia! Solemnly we pledge ourselves to the cultural work of international Socialism, to which we remain devoted in life and united even till death. (Arbeiter-Zeitung, July 25.)

Dissatisfaction with the Government's policy, however, was relatively unimportant. The influence of the Social Democrats was much less than their vehemence might seem to imply. The dominant attitude toward the Note was one of hearty approval. "The demands of the Monarchy are serious," admitted the Neue Freie Presse (July 24), "but how could they be otherwise, when a country has for years aimed continually to injure its neighbour in its most sensitive nerve, where life itself can be attacked?" The lower house of the Hungarian Parliament, which as late as July 23rd was "a wrestling-place of apparently inextinguishable party hatreds," found itself the next morning "united in the spirit of patriotic self-sacrifice." (Pester Lloyd, July 24.) Even in Bohemia, Czech newspapers raised their

voices in commendation of the Government's course. The Narodni Listy of Prague, while expressing its hope that a peaceful solution of the crisis might be found, said that Serbia must understand that nothing remained to her but to give satisfaction. The Hlas Národa, of the same city, stated that it was the duty of the Czech nation to avoid all sympathy for Serbia. And Dr. Dillon, the well-known writer on world politics, reported in the London Daily Telegraph for July 25th that, "having traveled from the extreme north of the monarchy to Vienna, and conversed with various representatives on the way, I am in a position to affirm that almost everybody hopes fervently that the long-threatening storm will burst, not because the national sentiment is grown suddenly bellicose, but because people are sick to death of the periodic crises which throw public and private life out of gear, paralyze trade and commerce, inflict enormous losses on the wealth-creating classes, and are then settled for a couple of months or years, only to break out anew."

In many quarters relief was expressed that the Government in this great crisis had shown itself firm. Many people in Austria-Hungary had undoubtedly suffered from a sort of nationalistic inferiority complex, due to the feeling that all was not well within the Dual Monarchy, and that it was not holding its own as a Great Power. Such persons had looked on Count Berchtold, not as a "reckless adventurer," but

as the timid exponent of a "hushing-up system." From this inferiority complex the *démarche* of the Ballplatz seemed to offer an escape. "God be thanked, as an Austrian one can now stand erect again," said a high Austrian official. "Count Berchtold's Note," affirmed the Pester Lloyd (July 25), "is a record of this, that this Monarchy has again found a valuable treasure, which it seemed to have lost forever: belief in itself." "A sigh of relief runs through our people," said the Reichspost (July 24). "From all lips comes but one expression 'At last! At last!' It is well known that discontent with the policy of our foreign office had become universal among our people and that in the salon as in the simple suburban inn one heard the bitterest judgments expressed regarding an attitude which was held to be one of hesitating irresolution."

So, too, the correspondent of the Swiss Journal de Genève wrote from the Austrian capital on July 26th (issue of July 29): "The publication of the Note to Serbia has produced in Vienna an impression which is, so to speak, comforting. For a long time those in charge of affairs had been reproached for their lack of energy toward Belgrade, and Count Berchtold had naturally served as scapegoat. How many times, during and since the last Balkan crisis, was he criticized on all sides, as much by the general public as by the Press!

"Everywhere, in the streets, in the cafés, in the

tramways one could hear bits of conversation from which came this refrain, 'At last we have a Government. That was what we needed. It is too bad that we did not regulate our account with the Serbs two years ago.' Those who spoke thus were people of all conditions, those belonging to the bourgeoisie as well as to the lower classes."

And the correspondent added that this unanimity existed not only in Vienna but throughout the Empire. Race rivalries, he said, had temporarily disappeared.

No wonder, then, that Austro-Hungarian newspapers exaltedly proclaimed the country united on the Serbian issue. The Neues Wiener Journal (July 24) affirmed that the Note was the expression of the feeling of the people of the whole Monarchy. "Not alone does the Austro-Hungarian Government demand an expiation . . ." said the Sarajevoer Tagblatt (July 25), "no, a people of over fifty millions cries for it and surely has never been so united in thought as to-day in the demand for expiation of the crime and punishment of the guilty." The Neues Politisches Volksblatt, which on July 4th had expressed its belief "that the incitement against Serbia as it were in revenge for the Crime of Sarajevo is a great political mistake," and had advocated the deliberate cultivation of friendship with that country, now, on July 25th, affirmed that "to-day everybody recognizes that it is a vital interest of the

country that the démarche have the result it demands." Even the formerly pro-Serbian Zeit had now rallied to the support of the Government's policy. It said that Serbia would be well advised if she accepted in a proper spirit the Note, which was to be "either taken or left." In view of such general acclaim, opposition to the *démarche* seemed negligible.

Whether all this enthusiasm corresponded to a genuine desire for war with Serbia is a different matter. Who can search the secret places of the heart to answer categorically such a question? Hope was expressed in a number of newspapers that the neighboring state would yield and thus avoid war. "The bourgeois papers without exception," said the Frankfurter Zeitung (July 24), "express the wish and the hope that Serbia will quickly accept the conditions of Austria." The Vienna correspondent of the Paris Matin (issue of July 25), attempting to distinguish between the attitude of the Press, which so clearly supported the ultimatum, and that of the general public, reported that since every one reserved his opinions and his sentiments it was difficult to say whether the Government would find among the people the warlike enthusiasm on which it counted. The Arbeiter-Zeitung of the same date, while acknowledging the virtual unanimity of the Press in regard to the Note, held that this unanimity was not conclusive evidence of the unity of the people, since the censorship was in operation. "Every writer sees over

his shoulder the power of the state." And when it was mistakenly reported at one time that Serbia had yielded completely to the ultimatum, thus avoiding war, there was undoubtedly some rejoicing. In Budapest a torchlight procession celebrated the assumed diplomatic victory. (Pester Lloyd, July 26.)

On the other hand, the British Ambassador at Vienna telegraphed Sir Edward Grey on July 25th that the "language of the Press this morning leaves the impression that the surrender of Serbia is neither expected nor really desired." Some months later he repeated his assertion, adding that "when, on the following afternoon, it was at first rumoured in Vienna that it [the Note] had been unconditionally accepted, there was a moment of keen disappointment." Dr. Dillon was of like opinion. "The average man in the Dual Monarchy," he said in the London Daily Telegraph July 27th, "was afraid that the reply [to the Note] might be an acquiescence, and he said so. His hope, which never hardened into belief, was that Baron Giesl would receive a non-possumus for his answer." Apparently Dr. Dillon had found the people less reserved than had the correspondent of the Matin, possibly because they were more willing to express their opinions to an Englishman than to a Frenchman.

It is not necessary, however, to attempt to decide whether or not the majority of the people in the Dual Monarchy at heart desired war with Serbia. The es-

sential point is that the bulk of public opinion in Austria-Hungary was now determined to do away once for all with the Serbian menace, if not by diplomatic action, then by force. It would have none of compromise. Serbia's answer must be either "yes" or "no." In the parlance of American salesmen, she must "sign on the dotted line"—or fight.

When, on July 25th, the Serbian answer was received, the flood-gates were opened. In the world of the Press it was taken for granted that the reply was entirely unacceptable, compromise impossible, war inevitable. The Neue Freie Presse (July 27) pointed out that the response was full of reservations and that Serbia was clearly not ready to undertake a fundamental change in her policy. The Pester Lloyd said on the same day that the Note was intended to convey the false impression that the Serbian Government was ready, in large measure, to fulfill the demands of Austria, but that in point of fact it was filled with a spirit of insincerity which made it clear that the Serbian Government had no earnest intention of putting an end to its culpable tolerance of the intrigues against the Dual Monarchy. According to the Deutsches Volksblatt, "Serbia was invited yesterday to establish normal relations with Austria-Hungary. The Monarchy frankly held out its hand; Serbia has despised its gesture; the consequences now fall back on that country." "The Serbs are only seeking bad

reasons," it was elsewhere asserted, "and this being the state of things, the Austro-Hungarian Government can under no circumstances retreat." The Reichspost (July 26) commented on the unbelievable patience of Austria-Hungary, and then said that since Serbia had answered the Note in an unfriendly manner, the Dual Monarchy could only resort to arms. "Serbia's fateful hour has struck," said the Pester Lloyd (July 26), ". . . Serbia willed the war. Her will be done."

The feeling of the people found vent in excited, jubilant demonstrations. When the news of the rejection of the demands reached Vienna the evening of July 25th, crowds gathered on the Ringstrasse and burst into patriotic songs, interspersed with cries of "Down with Serbia! Down with Russia!" Later they marched through the streets of the city, stopping in front of the Serbian Embassy to voice their anger, halting again at the doors of the German Consulate, where they sang the "Wacht am Rhein." In Budapest, likewise, a great patriotic manifestation was organized. In spite of the rain, a crowd of several thousand persons pressed through the streets, singing, cheering for war, crying out: "Down with Serbia!" In Prague, in Lemberg, in Salzburg, it was much the same thing. (Neue Freie Presse, and Matin, July 26.) From one city, town, and village of the Empire after another, during the next few days came reports

of demonstrations favoring war with Serbia.[2] The "unconscious wish" for war had apparently become conscious and dominant. The ecstasy of hysteria ruled almost everywhere. "This country has gone wild with joy at the prospect of war with Serbia," Sir Maurice de Bunsen telegraphed Sir Edward Grey on July 27th, "and its postponement or prevention would undoubtedly be a great disappointment." And the Vienna correspondent of the Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten reported two days later, after war had been declared on Serbia, that "the enthusiastic support, which the declaration of war finds in all classes of the people and among all nationalities, surpasses all expectations."

Intent as the people of the Dual Monarchy were, however, on what they considered their own private quarrel with Serbia, they could not completely disregard the attitude of the Great Powers toward the situation. Let us go back, then, for a moment, to glance at Austro-Hungarian interpretations of European public opinion from the time of the assassination to the issue of the ultimatum to Serbia. At that time the possibility of a European conflict seemed

[2] Pester Lloyd, July 27-31 reported demonstrations in Esstergom, Alsokubin, Nagykanizsa, Ujvidek, Budweis, Szenicze, Szarvas, Csongrad, Pozsony, Miskolcz, Locse, Pozsega, Pecs, Rimassombat, Sarajevo, Szeged, Rózsahegy, Sperjes, Szassrégen, Pápa, Igló, Makó, Prague, Czernowitz, Salzburg, Laibach, Triest, Kecskemet, Kolozsvar, Sopron, Leva, Brünn, Lemberg, Zara, etc.; Neue Freie Presse, July 27-29, reported demonstrations in Klagenfurt, Teplitz, Bad Ischl, Graz, Schönnbrunn, Joachimsthal, Krakau, etc.

remote, the impending storm but a small, hazy cloud on the political horizon. Here and there, indeed, a voice was raised in warning; but in general the organs of public opinion in the Dual Monarchy expressed a trustful confidence in European sympathy with the Austrian cause. The day after the assassination the opinion prevailed on the Bourse that the moral indignation in Europe was general and that the tendencies directed against the Monarchy would thereby be restrained. "If the purpose was to bring the Monarchy to destruction," said the Neue Freie Presse (June 29), "it must soon appear that this very shedding of blood, this senseless uncalled-for deed, must be felt in Europe as an urgent warning toward peace. The princes and rulers of the Great Powers know that to-morrow can be inflicted on them what to-day has happened to the heir to the Monarchy." "We cannot easily believe," the same newspaper later commented (July 10), "that the Great Powers would not stand in sympathy with the just desire for a clarification of the relations between the Monarchy and Serbia." It argued that all peoples had been repeatedly involved in the suffering inflicted by Greater Serbian intrigues, that the almost annual crises between the Monarchy and Serbia had already made great inroads into European prosperity, and that with regard to the Crime of Sarajevo and the previous attempts at murder, the Powers of the Entente could

hardly think otherwise than those of the Triple Alliance.

The Neues Politisches Volksblatt professed an even stronger belief that the Powers were standing with Austria in the crisis. "In directing circles," it said (July 3), "it is known that public opinion in Europe stands completely on the side of the Monarchy." It maintained that Germany was naturally holding firmly to the alliance, that Italy would loyally support the Monarchy in her diplomatic campaign, that in England there was only abhorrence for the crime. "If the Monarchy were eventually forced to break off diplomatic relations with Serbia, England would doubtless immediately follow her example. Russia, also, will certainly give no armed protection to a policy of terrorism, and France, too, will not allow herself to be involved in an adventure for Serbia's sake." This newspaper even went so far as to say that "we should not be surprised if the European Powers were to undertake a punitive expedition in order to show how little they identify themselves with a policy of extermination, a policy which hires murderers." It concluded, however, that probably this expedition would not be undertaken after all, since the Serbs were not Turks or Boxers, but (it says with sarcasm) "Christian brothers."

Various arguments were adduced to support the belief that in case of trouble with Serbia Austria would be allowed a free hand in dealing with her.

The fact of the Triple Alliance was, of course, the chief basis for confidence in the backing of Germany and Italy. (Neue Freie Presse, July 10.) But there was a further feeling, which was justified by later events, that there was a strong popular sympathy in Germany for the Austrian cause. "The whole German people is on our side," the Neue Freie Presse stated (July 10). The strength of Italian friendship was clearly overestimated.[3] As for England and France, some of the Austrian newspapers squeezed comfort from certain events and expressions of opinion in those countries. The Neues Wiener Journal (July 1), for example, spoke of the Daily Chronicle's "sharp accusations against Serbia and Russia" in connection with the Crime of Sarajevo, and of the opinion of the Pall Mall Gazette that "the plot was apparently hatched in Belgrade." The Pester Lloyd, shortly before the dispatch of the ultimatum, reported (July 21) a statement from its Belgrade correspondent that during the past few weeks voices had been loudly raised in England in favor of Austria's right to clarify her relations with Serbia. Editorially, this newspaper said that this report was a very important indication that English opinion could be consid-

[3] On July 15th the German Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs telegraphed to the German Ambassador at Vienna: "Just as Italian public opinion is in general touched with Austrophobia, it has always proved itself up to the present as Serbophile. So that there is no doubt in my mind that in case of an Austro-Serbian conflict, it would take a pronounced stand by the side of Serbia." —Kautsky Documents, No. 46, p. 110.

ered as standing with German opinion in the Austro-Serbian issue. And the Neue Freie Presse (July 18) interpreted certain sentiments expressed in English journals to mean that "an overwhelming English opinion" demanded that the Powers keep their hands off the Austro-Serb affair.

In France, toward the middle of July, M. Humbert revealed to the French Senate certain alarming deficiencies in French military preparation. M. Poincaré, then President of the Republic, was at that time about to visit Russia. So the Neue Freie Presse (July 15) drew the conclusion that it was no accident that the revelations were made just before M. Poincaré started on his voyage. Their meaning, asserted the newspaper, was that the French Senate, before the meeting in Russia, wished to declare itself, with the greatest decision, for peace. The French President would carry to the Court of the Tsar the understanding that France would never engage in a war "for the freedom of assassination and the enlargement of Serbia." On July 21st the Pester Lloyd pointed out that both houses of the French Parliament had appointed committees to report on the military deficiencies the following autumn; it drew from this the conclusion that French politicians were unwilling to be involved in the complications of the Greater Serbia propaganda. And the Reichspost (July 18) argued that the menace of the Entente to European

peace was now much less to be feared than before the revelations in the French Senate.

This sunny interpretation of European opinion, however, was darkened by the shadow of the Russian Bear. It was much easier for public opinion in the Dual Monarchy to persuade itself of the benevolent intentions of France and England than of those of the Muscovite Power. Immediately after the assassination the suspicion was voiced in certain quarters that Russia had had something to do with the crime. The Reichspost on June 29th quoted an officer of high rank as stating that the act had been carried out with the connivance of Serbs and Russians. "Nothing will shake the conviction of the army on this point. There is a connection between the military measures of Russia and the word sent to the Russians from Belgrade that grave events would take place this summer in the annexed provinces." A few days later the Reichspost returned to the attack with a story of a dinner given in Belgrade, the very night of the assassination, by the Russian Ambassador to Serbia. Belgrade itself observed the proprieties, said the newspaper. Public places were closed by order of the city prefect and darkness reigned throughout the capital. "All the more striking was it that in the residence of the Russian Ambassador, Hartwig, a dinner was given in the evening, which lasted late into the night. The bright lights shone for a great distance from the open windows of the Embassy and out into the still

night rang the sounds of carousing guests. . . .[4] Even the Neue Freie Presse (July 1), though its attitude later became more guarded, in the first hours of grief and indignation hinted at Russian complicity. "The whole malignity of Pan-Slavism has been . . . let loose against the Monarchy and the conspiracy in Sarajevo is very widespread."[5] And the Pester Lloyd, some two weeks later (July 15), expressed its fear that official Russia, though in general animated by a spirit of good-will in foreign policy, was at that time under the control of dark and dangerous influences of the Hartwig-Izvolsky type.

Despite depressing fears, however, there was hope that even Russia would look at the Serbian issue through Austrian eyes. The theory underlying this hope was that the Tsar's government was grievously shocked by the Crime of Sarajevo, resented it as an attack on the monarchical principle, and would therefore draw closer to the Dual Monarchy. The Neue Freie Presse stated on July 7th that it had learned from a special source that "all circles in Russia are united in condemnation of the Crime of Sarajevo. The view frequently expressed in Austria-Hungary

[4] Issue of July 1. See also an article by S. Pichon in Le Monde Illustré, quoted in the Matin, July 10.

[5] On July 8, von Tschirschky had a conversation with a correspondent of the Neue Freie Presse, during which the journalist said that "he had already made use of his influence with M. Benedikt to the extent of persuading him not to permit the Neue Freie Presse to fall into the popular howling about possible plans of attack that was raised during the Balkan crisis."—Kautsky Documents, p. 91.

that Russia would protest if Austria-Hungary were to demand of Serbia an investigation in Belgrade lacks any foundation. The monarchical principle is so greatly cherished in the empire of the Tsar that it appears quite natural that Russia would never disapprove of such a step on the part of Austria-Hungary." [6] The next day the same newspaper said that once again, after a long interval, a bridge had been built between St. Petersburg and Vienna. "The monarchical principle! . . . Would it not be mortally wounded if the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy were humiliated? . . . Europe has only three emperors who embody the traditions of royal power of other days and who, despite the changes of times, have still remained rulers in the earlier sense of the word."

Another journal, a little later, asserted that in the Austro-Serbian crisis the whole civilized world was standing firmly with Austria-Hungary, even Russia not excepted; for in St. Petersburg, as elsewhere, no sympathies were cherished for the murderers of princes. (Neues Politisches Volksblatt, July 11.) The Sarajevoer Tagblatt of the same date affirmed that a considerable portion of the Russian Press was speaking quite openly and definitely against the assassins and their accomplices, that the St. Petersburg Viedomosti had said that national and political feelings

[6] The "special source" from which the Neue Freie Presse got its information was the Russian Embassy at Vienna.—Kautsky Documents, No. 27, p. 91.

stood speechless before the terrible tragedy and that it spoke of Austria-Hungary as a monarchy persecuted by the strokes of fate. The Pester Lloyd (July 15), too, despite its fears of the "Hartwig-Izvolsky type of influence" on the Russian Government, nevertheless drew comfort from the thought that "nowhere in the world—our Monarchy naturally excepted—has the shameful prince-murder left such a lasting shock as in the palace of the Tsar." And a little later (July 21) this great organ of public opinion in Hungary said that the toasts exchanged between the Tsar and M. Poincaré, on the occasion of the latter's visit to Russia, indicated that that country did not wish, and was not in a position, to rush into complications for the sake of Serbia.

Later events, of course, proved such hopes as these to have rested on shifting sands, but they were not, in reality, as unreasonable as they might appear. Both Russia and Austria were steeped in the traditions of the Holy Alliance, traditions which held sacred the monarchical principle. No other European country had suffered from the assassination of its rulers as had Russia. If even in these days of bitter post-war antagonisms sympathy for Fascism or Communism can sometimes transcend national boundaries, was it wholly illogical, on the eve of the Great War, before Nationalism had revealed its full strength, to think that a principle as ancient and revered as Monarchism might do so?

There were those, however, who saw that Austro-Hungarian opinion was counting too much on the sympathy of other Powers. The Vienna correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung (July 20) reported to his newspaper that he did not agree with that part of the Austrian Press which believed that the countries of the Entente would not interfere in the difficulty between Austria and Serbia. Serbia, he held, had always been an important factor in the calculations of the Entente. The Arbeiter-Zeitung, the most realistic, in this connection, of the Austrian newspapers, pointed out (July 9) that when the Dual Monarchy, under Aerenthal and again during the Balkan wars, came in conflict with Serbia, Russia had stood definitely as Austria's enemy, but that Germany did not feel the call to take upon herself the burden of a world war because of Austria's Balkan quarrels; so Germany saved the peace, yes, forced it. If some of the Vienna and Budapest newspapers, continued the journal, are persuaded that the Russian Tsar will remember the principle of the solidarity of monarchs and refrain from giving help to the authors of "prince-murder" (*Fürstenmord*), they should remember that King Peter himself owed his throne to *Fürstenmord*—and yet the relations of Russia with Serbia had never been so close as since there ruled in Serbia a race which had won its way to power through blood.

Later the Arbeiter-Zeitung (July 21), referring

to the tendency of Austrian newspapers to hold that England was standing with Austria-Hungary in the crisis, argued that in England people had no sympathy with a policy of adventure and prestige, a policy that would attempt to stamp out the Greater Serbia idea outside the boundaries of the Dual Monarchy. Referring also to the opinion expressed in the Dual Monarchy that Europe would not plunge into a sea of blood in order to allow the partners of murder (i.e. the Serbians) freedom for doing evil, this organ of the Social Democratic party said that Russia would not look at the issue from that point of view, but rather as a question of her prestige in the Balkans. It maintained, too, that for various reasons the Dual Monarchy could not count on the friendliness of Italy. An article in the London Times, published shortly before the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, caused a momentarily unpleasant sensation in Vienna, because of the opinion therein expressed that the localization of a conflict with Serbia would be impossible. The article was quickly discounted, however, because it was thought that it would not have an influence in high quarters in England.

Even after the ultimatum was sent to Serbia, the delusion persisted that European public opinion was generally favorable to the Austro-Hungarian cause, or at least was disinclined to meddle in the quarrel. The morning after the dispatch of the Note, the Neue Freie Presse (July 24) set forth what it held to

be the attitude of the various Powers. Germany, it said, is heart and soul on Austria's side; she will demand the localization of the conflict. Italy will do her duty as ally; her former sympathy for Serbia has cooled. England has been the first to speak for localization. France will move in the channnel of her Russian ally; but her inward desire is for the maintenance of universal peace. The publicity given to the weakness of her military preparation shows that she is not eager for war. France will advise Serbia in the direction of peace; if peace is impossible, she will support the idea of localization of the war, working to that end in Belgrade and St. Petersburg. With Russia rests the question whether she will interfere in the Serbian conflict and thus give the impetus to a war of the European Powers. The peaceful attitude of the Tsar is known and since there is no question of conquest, Russia should work for peace in Belgrade.

Two days later the Pester Lloyd (July 26) made a similarly hopeful analysis. The impression prevails in London, it said, that Russia will not decide for further intervention. The London Press has come out, with great emphasis, for localization; and an utterance of the Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Ackland, gives expression to the hope that it will be possible to prevent the intervention of a third party in the conflict. From France no reports are at present under discussion. But those strange reports which were brought out in both houses on the eve of

Poincaré's departure for Russia were considered everywhere in Europe and by the public opinion of France herself as evidence that the French Republic had no desire, with an inefficiently prepared army, to involve herself in the hazards of a great war for the sake of Serbia. An article in the Rjetch has stated that Russia is not ready for a European war; if voices are thus raised in Russia itself against war, it may be accepted that this current is strong enough to overcome the warlike feeling there.

The Zeit appeared even more confident of European sympathy than either the Neue Freie Presse or the Pester Lloyd. "There lie before us a great number of utterances of the international Press," it said. ". . . With satisfaction we can note, that in the conflict which has been forced upon us, the European newspapers, almost without exception, range themselves on the side of Austria-Hungary." For the Zeit to write thus, as late as July 25th, argues an optimism on its part either blind or disingenuous.

Especial encouragement was derived at this time from what was interpreted as England's attitude. The Pester Lloyd on July 25th reported that, with the exception of the Morning Post, which condemned Austria-Hungary's procedure as arbitrary, all the London newspapers, including the Liberal sheets, expressed sympathy for the Monarchy in its attitude toward a state which had become the center of intrigues against Austria-Hungary. They advised

Serbia to yield to the Dual Monarchy's demands, in order that a European war might be avoided. When Sir Edward Grey desperately sought means to avert the oncoming world catastrophe, Austro-Hungarian opinion received his proposals with a certain measure of respectful attention and not without sympathy, but apparently with no thought of yielding on the vital issue of war with Serbia. It is true that the Neues Wiener Journal (July 29) gruffly said: "The English intrigue has rebounded against Germany's fidelity to the alliance." But the Reichspost expressed a warm appreciation of Sir Edward's efforts, deriving from them comfort for the Austrian cause. On July 30th it said: "England to-day has the peace of Europe in her hands, and she administers this precious treasure with dignity and care. The English Minister of Foreign Affairs has, in the whirl of events swiftly following one another, given expression to the wish that the conflict may be localized; this is precisely the desire of the Triple Alliance. The formula proposed by Sir Grey [sic] for the adjournment of warlike action against Serbia has been overtaken by events and necessities, but the most important purpose of the English proposal, the localization of the conflict and the avoidance of interference on the part of another European Power, remains, now as before, active, and it is a great satisfaction to public opinion to perceive that England and Germany, in large measure united, are working together for the attainment of this goal."

In a later edition, the same day, the Reichspost published an editorial on "English Chivalry" (*Englische Ritterlichkeit*). The article praised England for her efforts to keep the peace and to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict, as well as for her alleged sympathy for the Austro-Hungarian cause. "The wish and the will to avoid the threatening world war and to localize the Austro-Serbian conflict," said the newspaper, "are united, in the statesmen of England, with the conviction of the justice of the cause of Austria-Hungary. . . . The sympathy, which the nation and government of England show in the present crisis of the Monarchy, has awakened here a resounding echo, and Austria-Hungary will never forget what support she has received in her hard days of decision from this attitude of England."

As the threatening storm loomed darker and darker in the sky, the feeling against Russia became more and more evident. The choice between peace among the Powers and a European war, it was felt, lay not with Austria-Hungary, but with the Empire of the Tsar. Serious realization of Russia's determination to stand in shining armor by the side of her little Slavic protegé, however, was slow in coming. Public opinion took council of its hopes. The Pester Lloyd, on July 25th, airily dismissed the statement of a Russian newspaper that the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia had rendered very great the danger of war (between Austria and Russia). It made the remark

that this was a Pan-Slavist view and not necessarily that of the Government, that a telegram from St. Petersburg said that the Russian Government would try to find a peaceful solution of the problem. The Arbeiter-Zeitung, indeed, sounded the warning on July 25th that, "we have not once considered that the Pan-Slav current, if it swelled up strongly, might finally divert from its course the official policy of the Tsar." But the next day, possibly as a result of the censor's pressure, this newspaper asserted that, threatening as the tone of Russia had become, it was almost impossible to believe that for the sake of her wretched prestige she would plunge Europe into the calamity of a world war. Another newspaper, on the 27th, said that Russia was in the habit of protecting the Balkan States after the manner of Mephistopheles, first leading them on to adventure and then leaving them in the lurch. That is what she had done with Bulgaria and Roumania. That is what she would do with Serbia. According to a French observer who was in Austria during a part of the crisis Austria expected only a platonic protest and a semblance of action from Russia.

The keen mind of Georges Clémenceau inclined to the opinion that the Austrians failed to realize the seriousness of Russia's attitude. He records a talk which he had with an Austrian journalist during the crisis, anent the possible attitude of Russia. The

Austrian asserted that Russia would not dare to interfere between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia.

"And on what do you base this idea?" inquired M. Clémenceau.

"On the fact that she has always yielded."

"And do you not think that that is one reason more why she cannot yield at this moment?"

"Do you think so? That would be very annoying. Well, then it will be necessary to find some other solution, I do not know what, it does not matter how."

And in commenting on the interview M. Clémenceau said: "I should not be surprised if this were the prevalent state of opinion in Vienna."

Furthermore, even when the Russian danger became more definite, the hope persisted that the Tsar's government would not have the backing of France and England.[7] As late as July 30th the Neue Freie Presse asserted that England would have none of a war against Austria and Germany, that the French Chamber had a majority sworn to peace as an article of belief, and that Russia, not perhaps in treaties or armaments, but in political opinions had not been so isolated for decades. On July 31st, the Pester Lloyd affirmed that the great majority of the French people was opposed to shedding French blood for Serbia, that this strong opposition was showing itself not merely in the Paris Press and the demonstrations of

[7] Pester Lloyd, July 29th, carried an article headed: "Die englische Presse für ein Zusammengehen aller Mächte gegen Russland"

the Socialists, but in financial circles, where the statements before the French Senate concerning the inadequacy of the military forces of the country had not been forgotten.

In spite of this happy-go-lucky optimism on the very brink of the World War, however, Austro-Hungarian opinion could not, of course, remain wholly blind to the danger from the east. But growing perception of Russia's firmness seems to have resulted in little or no disposition to yield on the Serbian issue. The general feeling was that Russia, not Austria, could and ought to give way, allowing the Monarchy a free hand in a conflict from which it sought to gain, not annexations, but relief from a Serbian menace that was believed to have become intolerable. The Reichspost declared on July 25th that even if it had been known from the first that Russia would place herself on the side of the guilty, Austria-Hungary could not have refused to ward off the Greater Serbian incendiarism. The Neue Freie Presse asserted on July 28th that interference between the Monarchy and Serbia by a Great Power could not be permitted. "A policy which would make it necessary for us to invoke the favor of the St. Petersburg Cabinet, simply in order to be able to secure quiet and justice in the Balkans, would dry up the vital power of the Monarchy. A state which does not defend itself from such submissiveness, must allow its beard to be pulled, its face to be spat upon." The same day,

in a later edition, this newspaper affirmed that there was only one way to preserve world peace, and that was for Russia to accept the original standpoint of the English Foreign Secretary that so long as the strife was limited to Austria-Hungary and Serbia, the other Great Powers had no right to mingle in it. "We declared war on Serbia, not because we wished to declare it, but because we had to do so," said the Pester Lloyd on August 1. "The Austrians seem astonished," reported a French observer, "that they are not allowed to carry on tranquilly their quarrel with the Serbs."

Thus the people of Austria-Hungary plunged into a war which was to end only with the destruction of the Dual Monarchy. M. Poincaré has asserted that a word from Germany would have been enough to have led Count Berchtold to content himself with a diplomatic victory, that he would then have been appeased with the Serbian reply to the ultimatum. But in the light of revisionist scholarship, this point of view can not logically be maintained. For it is now clearly established that, beginning with July 27th, the German Government made frantic efforts to hold in check its recalcitrant ally and thus to ward off the impending European catastrophe. It was on July 27th that the German Chancellor, renouncing the policy of leaving Austria entirely to her own decisions in the Serbian crisis, attempted to persuade the Ballplatz to listen favorably to Sir Edward Grey's proposal

that the reply of Belgrade to the ultimatum be regarded either "as satisfactory or as a basis for discussion." The next day, after Austria had declared war on Serbia, Germany urged her not to go beyond Belgrade in her military operations, and to repeat her assurance that she had no intention of annexing territory. Again, on the 29th, Germany brought pressure to bear on the Dual Monarchy in several ways, among others by requesting that the Austrian Government try to settle the difficulty with St. Petersburg through direct conversations and, in another message, advising the Ballplatz to accept the mediation of Germany, Italy, France, and England. The same night Tschirschky was asked to inform Berchtold "very firmly and seriously" that "we are prepared to fulfil the obligations of our alliance, but we cannot allow Vienna to draw us lightly, and without regard to our advice, into a world-wide conflagration." On the 30th, the German Kaiser made a personal appeal to Francis Joseph for information as to his decision regarding the Austrian proposals.

In the face of these appeals, the Ballplatz maintained a seemingly astonishing intransigence. To the English proposal, sent on and recommended by Bethmann-Hollweg, that the Serbian Note be used as a basis for compromise, the Austrian Government replied that it had come too late. To the proposal for the "Halt in Belgrade" there came at first no answer at all; it was only after great delay that Berchtold

finally replied that he was willing to repeat to Russia his assurance of Austria's territorial disinterestedness, but that he could not answer yet the proposal not to carry the war beyond Belgrade. On the 30th the Austrian Government did agree to carry on direct conversations with St. Petersburg; but M. Renouvin is of the opinion, and his opinion seems justified by the evidence he presents, that in so agreeing Berchtold was not actuated by any sincere hope that these conversations would lead to a peaceful solution of the question at issue.

Count Montgelas advances two possible reasons for the delays and the apparent obstinacy of the Austrian Government. One is that it was necessary for Berchtold to consult Tisza. "It was the curse of the Dual Monarchy that its foreign policy had to be decided upon in two places at the same time." The other is that the idea of the "Halt in Belgrade" was unacceptable from the military point of view; for Conrad had planned not a direct but a roundabout attack and "would have had to traverse half the northern part of Serbia . . . before he could reach his objective." M. Renouvin, accepting Count Montgelas' view that military considerations probably affected Austria's decision, suggests as well two other possible reasons for the unwillingness of the Dual Monarchy to accept the plan of a "Halt in Belgrade." One of these was Berchtold's desire to finish once for all with the Serb menace. The other was Austrian national pride; for if the Dual Monarchy had agreed

at the last moment to yield, he argues, would not Germany, despite the counsels of Bethmann, have believed her "brilliant second" incapable of energy, and would she not have planned in the future a *rapprochement* with England?

Whatever force such reasoning may have, however, it seems to me that a more fundamental explanation of Austria's seeming intransigence is to be found in the state of public opinion in the Dual Monarchy at that time. On July 28th Berchtold informed Schebeko, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, that his Government "could no longer recede or enter into any discussion of the terms of the Austro-Hungarian Note." He explained "that the crisis had become so acute, and that public opinion had been incited to such a pitch of excitement, that the Government, even if they wished it, could no longer consent to such a course. This was all the more impossible . . . inasmuch as the Serbian reply itself furnished proof of the insincerity of Serbia's promises for the future." [8]

[8] Russian Orange Book, No. 1. Scott, Diplomatic Documents, etc., vol. ii, p. 1361. The same day Count Berchtold communicated to Count Szápáry, the Russian ambassador at St. Petersburg the substance of this interview with Schebeko, in which the latter had transmitted to him Sazonov's proposal "that the exchange of ideas and opinions, so happily begun, might be continued through your Excellency [Szápáry], and that instructions should be forthwith sent to your Excellency.

"In my answer [said Berchtold] I explained that I could not accede to such a proposal. There could be no negotiations on the text of an answer which we had found unacceptable. No one in our country would understand or approve. There can be no question of negotiations, when, as the Ambassador must be aware, public opinion was already a prey to terrible excitement in Hungary as well as in Austria—and besides we had to-day declared war to [sic] Serbia."—Austrian Red Book, 1919, vol. ii, p. 158 (No. 95).

And on July 30th, Tschirschky was assured both by Count Forgach and Count Hoyos that "restriction of the military operations was, in their opinion, out of the question, in view of the feeling in the Army and among the people."

That the situation had gotten out of hand is indicated less, however, by such individual statements than by what has been shown of the state of Austro-Hungarian opinion itself during the last few days of the crisis. Such self-restraint as had persisted after the assassination was now cast almost entirely to the winds. Public opinion, unreasonable, angry, suspicious, intoxicated with excitement, called clamorously for war with the alleged author of its woes. Of the effect of such action on the general European situation it took all too little account. Germany it knew to be friendly. Italy it mistakenly assumed to be so. Opinion in England and France it misunderstood and optimistically misinterpreted, drawing especial encouragement from the supposed sympathy of England. Russia it disliked and suspected; but it underestimated the danger of Russian intervention, through over-emphasis on the monarchical principle, the foundation of the assumed "bridge" between St. Petersburg and Vienna. No other great European country had suffered from the assassination and attempted assassination of its rulers as had Russia; and there was a hope that even that country must sympathize with an Austria vicariously avenging crimes

against the Tsars. Had public opinion in the Dual Monarchy, after the assassination, had a clear perception of the seriousness with which the European Powers would regard a war with Serbia, it is not improbable that it would have exerted a much stronger influence against the framing of a Note as rigorous as that of July 23rd. But by the time the Serbian reply had been received, it is doubtful whether this same public opinion would have retreated even if it had been aware that an attack on Serbia would entail a European conflict. By that time self-control was giving way, and reason was yielding to primitive passions.

Individuals, no doubt, questioned the wisdom of this leap in the dark. Individuals, no doubt, felt a foreboding horror of what was to follow. But the spirit of public opinion on the verge of a war is the spirit of a bully; it will brook no opposition at home. So doubts and fears hesitate to express themselves; the easier course is to join the general chauvinistic chorus. Earlier in the crisis the Government might perhaps have held in check the swelling current of public opinion; it has been shown that the Ballplatz does not seem to have formed its policy immediately after the assassination, as a result of the pressure of public opinion. By the time that the German Government had begun its belated efforts to restrain the Ballplatz, however, it is improbable that the Government could have prevented the angry march of

events. To have attempted seriously to do so would have been to risk its own destruction. The shaky structure of the Hapsburg Monarchy, undermined as it was by racial antagonisms, could scarcely have withstood the bathos of such a reversal of policy at the last moment. By the time the German interference had begun, the "psychotic explosion" had come. MacCurdy has expressed the opinion that when this stage in a quarrel between two countries has been reached, "the precipitating factor seems of relative insignificance and the idea of preventing the catastrophe by avoidance of the last 'cause' is preposterous." If his diagnosis is correct, the Dual Monarchy, in the last few days of the crisis, had gone too far to withdraw. As the Pester Lloyd put it on July 29th, Austria-Hungary had burned her bridges, and no power on earth could now change her course, "not even our own will."

CHAPTER V

GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION AFTER THE ASSASSINATION

TWO contrasting theories as to the attitude of the German people toward the World War, widely diffused in the Allied countries during the conflict itself, have now passed into the folk-lore of nationalism. One is that the Germans were essentially a militaristic people, more brutal and aggressive by nature than their enemies, readily accepting the sacrifices entailed by war in order to attain more power for the Fatherland and for themselves. The other is that the Germans had no great desire to fight, but that, all too docile, they were dragooned by an unscrupulous, chauvinistic government into a war which that government had long planned in order to satisfy its ambition for world power, and which with Machiavellian skill it precipitated at the moment apparently most favorable for the realization of its diabolical projects. This second theory President Wilson virtually voiced, just before America's entrance into the conflict, when he said:

"We have no quarrel with the German people. We have no feeling towards them but one of sympathy and friendship. It was not upon their impulse that

their government acted in entering this war. It was not with their previous knowledge or approval. It was a war determined upon as wars used to be determined upon in the old, unhappy days when peoples were nowhere consulted by their rulers and wars were provoked and waged in the interest of dynasties or of little groups of ambitious men who were accustomed to use their fellow men as pawns and tools."

The evidence available does not sustain either theory. The contention that the German Government deliberately plotted a European war, choosing its moment and using the Crime of Sarajevo as a pretext, has been broken down by the revelations of the archives and the researches of historians. As for the other theory, it will be shown in the present and succeeding chapter that the German people as a whole, in entering the conflict, were not actuated by a brutal will to war or will to power. There was, indeed, a strong feeling in Germany against Serbia after the assassination, and a disposition, in certain quarters, to hold Serbia, and even Russia, accountable for the crime. But public opinion as a whole, in the period that preceded the Austrian Note to Serbia, when German and Austrian policies on the Serbian issue were in the making, did not deduce from its suspicions the idea that war ought to be made on Serbia, nor did it bring overwhelming pressure to bear on the German Government to allow Austria a

free hand in dealing with her Slav neighbor. On the other hand, when the Ballplatz sent its ultimatum to Belgrade, the tendency of German public opinion was to endorse the Note, though there was some opposition to this tendency and no inconsiderable criticism of the Note's terms. The chief feeling, however, during the last trying days was that Germany must stand by Austria, and that if European peace was to be maintained, the Austro-Serbian conflict must be localized; for if Russia attacked the Dual Monarchy, Germany would inevitably be drawn in. The belief that localization was practicable was strengthened by a too optimistic interpretation of the attitude of the Entente Powers. There were chauvinists, of course, who raised their raucous voices in the moment of crisis. But the public opinion dominant in Germany at this time does not seem to have been bellicose. Rather it seems to have felt itself forced into war by the inexorable march of events.

As in Austria, so in Germany, the theory that Serbia was responsible for the Crime of Sarajevo spouted spontaneously immediately after the assassination, and spread rapidly. A Dresden newspaper asserted on June 30th that the seed of hatred that had been sown among the Serbs of the Dual Monarchy after the annexation of Bosnia had shot up in Belgrade in the most horrible manner. The conservative Tägliche Rundschau, Nationalist in politics, on June 30th summed up the evidence for its belief

in Serbian guilt as follows: (1) The bombs came from Belgrade; (2) the assassins lived in Belgrade; (3) Budapest received its first news of the crime from Belgrade; (4) on the day of Vidovdan the national feeling of the Serbs was customarily excited by chauvinistic newspapers; (5) on Thursday of the previous week the Serbian newspaper, Nowosti, wrote, in regard to the visit of the Archduke, that "the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne should look at Bosnia and Herzegovina thoroughly this time, for it is the last time he will find occasion to do so." Even the liberal Berliner Tageblatt, perhaps the most influential of all German newspapers, found in the hatred of the Serbs for Austria-Hungary the basis of the deed, and said that it was due the dignity of the Dual Monarchy that she take diplomatic steps to secure guarantees for the future loyalty of her Serbian neighbor.

There is ample evidence to show that anti-Serbian feeling was strong and widespread. "The hostility of public opinion towards us is growing," reported the Serbian Chargé d'Affaires at Berlin on June 30th, to his government. The Parisian Socialist journal, L'Humanité, virtually confirmed this point of view in a statement emanating from Berlin on July 1st, that "the newspapers affirm ever more energetically the immediate responsibility of Serbia for the events of Sarajevo." (Issue of July 2.) Likewise the correspondent of the Paris Temps (of the same date)

reported that the Berlin newspapers, with the exception of Vorwärts and the Morgenpost, were continuing to publish articles violently hostile to the Serbs. He attributed this campaign not to the influence of the German Government, but rather to the presence of a number of Austrians on the staffs of the great Berlin newspapers. And the Berlin correspondent of the Westminster Gazette telegraphed (July 2) that "the Austrian Press, backed by most newspapers here, has gone considerably farther in identifying the assassinations with Serbia, the Serbian people, even with the 'Grosserbische Propaganda,' than the facts which have so far transpired justify. Cool heads here doubt whether Austria will blunder into making diplomatic protests on the basis of what is so far mainly inference."

Certain newspapers did not hesitate to suggest that members of the Serbian Government might have had something to do with the crime. The Vossische Zeitung implied a connection between the champions of the Great Serbia movement and the assassins, since (it said) Herr Pashitch knew that something would come to pass at the time of the visit of the Archduke. It was not King Peter, his son, nor Herr Pashitch, according to Germania, who hired the murderers, but they allowed this frightful conspiracy to be prepared under their very eyes and let it ripen there. The Tägliche Rundschau (June 30) affirmed that the evidence it had adduced, and to which reference

has here been made, constituted a heavy indictment, the point of which was directed against Serbianism, if not indeed against responsible Serbian officials. "It is said," continued the journal, "that the threads of the conspiracy stretch on the one hand even to Serbian Government circles, and on the other to a member of the Serbian royal house, who enjoys no general sympathy." More moderately, the Frankfurter Zeitung (July 1) pointed out that it was "believed in Austria and Hungary, not without cause, that the Great Serbia agitation, out of which the crime has come, has been in no way restrained by the Serbian Government and could even count on a certain patronage from that Government."

Not satisfied with assuming Serbian responsibility, certain organs of public opinion fed their suspicions on Russia. Thus the Tag asserted that "on the banks of the Neva they have encouraged the dangerous Pan-Slavist agitation, the purpose of which is the destruction of the Danubian Monarchy and the weakening of German power." The Vossische Zeitung, too, laid the responsibility at Russia's door, declaring that "the assassination is the last fruit of Russian incitements against Austria, and of the 'artificially nourished doctrine that this state is ripe for destruction and must be destroyed.'" The Tägliche Rundschau (July 5) argued that if a folk-movement were to be made responsible for the bloody deed of Sarajevo, "then one must have the courage to call the

child by its right name and not accuse Serbia alone, but recognize the part played by Pan-Slavism, by the war party at St. Petersburg in the horrible murder. Russia is to-day the peace destroyer of Europe." And the Lokal Anzeiger, without directly accusing Russia of a share in the Sarajevo Crime, pointed out that even in conservative German circles, "always disposed, up to the present," to work in favor of the Russo-German insurance policy, the threatening danger from Russia was now recognized.

Along with over hasty assumption of Serbian guilt and ill-founded suggestions of Russian responsibility, there went a disposition, in certain quarters, to scold the Ballplatz for alleged weakness and vacillation in the past, and to advise firmness in handling the South Slav problem in future. According to one newspaper, the assassination was the consequence of the inactivity, the indolence, the spirit of conciliation, that had led Austria to accept without a murmur all sorts of plots and disturbances. The Kölnische Volks-Zeitung (July 4) said that it could not understand why the peoples of the southeast of Europe could not be brought completely under the strong scepter of Hapsburg cultural work. "We can only wish," continued the journal, "that Austria may pluck up her courage and become the schoolmaster of the East." Another newspaper asked whether Austria was going to allow the Slav danger to increase until it stifled Germanism, or whether she would group the elements really sup-

porting the State, the Germans, the Italians, and the Moslem peoples, in a supreme struggle against the Slavs. "For us other Germans, it is a question of knowing whether the dike which checks the inundation of the Slavic flood is still solid. But the superintendent of the dikes has just been killed."

The Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (July 15) expressed the hope that in the existing Serbian issue Austria would speak "earnest, unambiguous, strong words"; instead of which, it said, one captious idea or definition of *démarches* and diplomatic "steps" follows another in the Vienna Press. "The megalomania of the little state [of Serbia]," said the journal, "interprets this as lack of courage. . . . Austria cannot possibly put up quietly any longer with the immeasurable hatred on the part of Serbianism, its poisonous threats and slanders." If Austria is to exist as a strong state, according to another newspaper, she ought to adopt a policy more vigorous than that which she has practised during the last generation. The Ballplatz, the Kreuz-Zeitung flatly affirmed, is the greatest enemy of the Dual Monarchy; its continued hesitations have often placed Austria's ally, Germany, in an extremely delicate situation.

From the evidence thus far presented, it would be easy to infer a public opinion in Germany bitterly anti-Serbian, strongly anti-Russian, unduly suspicious, irritated with the Ballpaltz for alleged weakness, urging a policy of the mailed fist in the Serbian

issue. But to make such an inference would be to go entirely too far. Some of the organs of public opinion, for example, warned against too ready an assumption of Serbian guilt. The Morgenpost early protested against the claim calmly made in Austria that the assassination at Sarajevo was the result of Pan-Serbian propaganda, since there was no proof to sustain the allegation. The semi-official Lokal Anzeiger, at the very moment that the German Government was taking its decision to give Austria *carte blanche* in dealing with the crisis, admitted that it did not wish to say that the Serbian Government was an accomplice of the crime, and that only the excitement of first grief could lead to such an assumption. As the days passed and the Ballplatz failed to establish a direct connection between the government at Belgrade and the plot to assassinate the Archduke, this failure naturally caused comment in certain organs of public opinion. "Then Serbia is innocent," wrote Maximilian Harden in the Zukunft, after discussing the evidence revealed by the investigation. The Frankfurter Zeitung, likewise, pointed out that the researches in Serbia were not revealing, and would not in future reveal, any connection between the assassination and the Serbian Government. The Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, too, which on July 8th had spoken of "Serbian brutality," a few days later (July 12) advised against taking too seriously the "incomprehensible frivolity" of the Serbian Press. "In our

judgment," it said, "it is going too far to hold the Government . . . responsible for the absurd excesses of certain journalists, in spite of many indications which point in this direction. In much the same way work catch phrases, which frequently are without basis. In this class belongs the assertion of a Vienna newspaper that the Serbian Press is officially influenced and that therefore its excesses fall back on the Government. That is certainly a strong statement. Whoever has followed the political evolution of Serbia with any attention must know how weak the authority of its Government is, and likewise that it is not in a position to influence Parliament, Press and army, but rather is but a plaything in their hands."

As for the German newspaper irritation with the Austrian Government's hesitations and vacillations, and the advice to the Ballplatz to handle the South Slav question firmly, one must be careful not to read too much into such expressions of opinion. As the Berlin correspondent of the London Times wrote on the morrow of the assassination, the German Press seemed to be bewildered by the crime, and made more than ever conscious of "the flaws in the Austro-German alliance" and of the problems growing out of these flaws. (Issue of June 30.) The criticisms of the Ballplatz were in part due, then, to a natural desire to know just where the Austrian Government stood, just what its policy in the Serbian issue would be. Some of the very newspapers that found fault with

Austria for its lack of firmness, deprecated too forceful handling of the existing issue. Thus the conservative Deutsche Tageszeitung, which had belabored the Ballplatz for its failure to adopt a vigorous policy, voiced a warning against making the damnable deed of Sarajevo the point of departure for a change in the Dual Monarchy's Balkan policy. The Kölnische Volks-Zeitung, which had expressed the hope that Austria might pluck up her courage and become the schoolmaster of the east, said (July 4) that "on this fearful occasion" (the assassination), the Germans must feel their way carefully in order not to exchange a morally justifiable nationalism for "the excrescence of a sickly chauvinism."

If such journals as the Deutsche Tageszeitung and the Kölnische Volks-Zeitung could urge caution, somewhat inconsistently, in the concrete Serbian issue, it will not seem surprising to find self-restraint advised by more moderate newspapers. Thus the Berliner Tageblatt, which had said that it was due the dignity of the Dual Monarchy that she take diplomatic steps to secure guarantees for the future loyalty of Serbia, took alarm at a rumor of an Austrian demand that Serbia investigate the origins of the Crime of Sarajevo. Its alarm arose not so much from the alleged demand itself as from the report that the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs had come to his decision after consultation with the Minister of War and the Chief of the General Staff. The Tageblatt

(July 1) held that this severe request might easily inflame the Serbs, excited as they already were by the anti-Serbian demonstrations of the last few days; that the Austrian Government would do harm to that attitude of receptiveness on the part of Serbia, which it lay in its own interests to develop; and that fighting would immediately begin if Serbia failed to return a peaceable answer. "So it would have been perhaps more suitable to have immediately made justifiable demands, and only afterward, if these were refused, to put the hand to the sword-hilt." The Frankfurter Zeitung, on the same date, warned that it would be very imprudent were the Austrian Government, out of anger against the Serbian megalomania, to resort to forcible measures of revenge against the Slavic state. The Morgenpost expressed the hope that the Government of Vienna had not lost its head and that the incitements of those who wished to push the Dual Monarchy to a war with Serbia would encounter a cold skepticism. Other German newspapers voiced similar warnings. Finally, as one would expect from its political coloring, the Socialist Vorwärts said that it was to be hoped that the dangerous excitement that had taken possession of the Austrian people would not also gain control of Government circles.

From all this it seems reasonable to conclude that the German Government marched somewhat in advance of German public opinion in allowing Austria-Hungary a free hand in dealing with Serbia. On July

5th Emperor William declared to the Austrian Ambassador that Austria could count on the full support of Germany. He said, too, that if the Dual Monarchy had really decided on military action against Serbia, he would regret it if she did not make use of the present moment, so favorable to her. The next day the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, informed the Austrian Ambassador that Austria might judge what should be done to clarify her relations with Serbia, and that whatever the decision of the Dual Monarchy might be, she could count on Germany's standing behind her as ally and friend. In making this decision, the German leaders took the risk of war with Russia, and therefore of a European war. But the statesmen of the Great Powers were accustomed to playing with fire; the risk had been taken by them all at one time or another and war thus far had been averted. And the German Government does not seem to have thought that the risk of a general conflict was great at this time. The idea of an Austro-Serbian war, however, was clearly visualized; and the commitment to Austria was made at a time when influential organs of public opinion were advising Austria against rashness. For the decisions of July 5th and 6th, then, the German Emperor, the Chancellor and their associates must bear individual responsibility.

On the other hand, it is clear that in taking this stand the German rulers were not completely out of

touch with popular sentiment. Perhaps the cardinal element in the state of public opinion in the German Empire after the assassination was the dominant anti-Serbian feeling. It may well be that the German Government, in giving the Ballplatz a blank cheque, derived encouragement from this sentiment against Serbia, and felt that, if it should be necessary, the German people could be counted on, when the time came, to endorse the cheque. Had the public opinion of Germany, on the morrow of the tragedy of Sarajevo, taken a decided stand against an unwarranted assumption of Serbian guilt; had it protested firmly against any German entanglement with the issue, it is quite conceivable that the Government would have withheld its commitment to the Dual Monarchy. Furthermore, anti-Serbian opinion in Germany inevitably strengthened the confidence of those Austrians who wished to handle the Slavic state without gloves. The gibes at Austrian vacillations, too, may well have stiffened resolution in the Dual Monarchy. At any rate, German public opinion, so far as it adopted this anti-Serbian attitude, was unconsciously moving toward the European catastrophe, though it had not even made up its mind to an Austro-Serbian war.

Between July 5th and July 23rd the German Government appears to have dropped hints to prepare opinion within and outside Germany for a diplomatic step by Austria that might result in war. Thus on

July 5th the semi-official Lokal Anzeiger published a statement, probably emanating from the Government, that, after the results of the official inquiry had appeared, the time would have come to demand an accounting, not only from the immediate authors of the assassination, but also from those who incited them to the deed. On July 9th the same newspaper, in what the Morning Post's Berlin correspondent called "a remarkable and apparently inspired article," asserted that every step undertaken in Vienna against the guilty would have full moral support in Germany, and that in this matter, "official Germany would certainly not lag behind." The article also affirmed "the solidarity of Europe against the Greater Serbian propaganda." [1] On July 19th, while revealing its own policy more definitely, the German Government made clear for the first time the alarming possibilities inherent in the whole situation. In an article now known to have been officially inspired, the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung expressed the hope that "a serious crisis will be averted by the Serbian Government's giving way in good time. In any case the interests of Europe as a whole, which have asserted themselves hitherto throughout the long Balkan crisis in the maintenance of peace among the Great Powers, make it appear desirable and necessary

[1] Morning Post, July 10; Reichspost, July 10. Vorwärts, July 12, refers to what it terms an official article in the Kölnische Zeitung to the effect that Germany would stand unconditionally with her ally.

that any discussion which may ensue between Austria-Hungary and Serbia should remain localized." Here was not only an unmistakable suggestion of an Austro-Serbian war, but a definite warning to Europe, in the event of such war, to keep its hands off. In spite of the hints that had previously been dropped, the article took German opinion by surprise. On July 15th the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung had stated that there was no further ground for disquietude, that it could be confidently asserted that the Vienna Bourse had been excited by false political reports, and that in truth a critical turn in Austro-Serbian relations had not set in. But the disquieting statement in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung caused an immediate, sharp reaction in the prices of securities, almost a panic on the Berlin Bourse.

It would require extended study to determine in detail the evolution of German public opinion as the time for the dispatch of the Austrian Note to Serbia approached. Evidently it was not fully prepared for so drastic a step. But there are indications that at least a part of German opinion was more ready to sympathize with severe treatment of Serbia than it had been immediately after the assassination. The Frankfurter Zeitung, as has been pointed out, had stated on July 1st that Austria would be very imprudent, if, out of anger against Serbian megalomania, she were to proceed to forcible measures of revenge. But on July 19th, this influential and ordinarily moderate organ

of public opinion expressed its belief that a final settlement between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, based on peace, could be brought about only if Serbia unreservedly renounced her "Piedmontese" ambitions and gave the Austro-Hungarian monarchy guarantees of friendly and neighborly relations; if, on the other hand, the Serbian Government were either too feeble to force such a renunciation from her nationalistically excited people, or felt herself strong enough, in the hope of powerful support, to be able to reject the Austrian demands, war was likely to result. "By its warm support of Austria-Hungary," reported the German Minister at Belgrade to the Chancellor on July 21st, "and by its unanimous [sic] demand for the granting of guarantees on the part of Serbia against the dangers of the Greater-Serbia agitations, the Press of the German Empire has created an extraordinary impression here." It may be that some of the newspapers were taking their cue from the official Press. At any rate, German public opinion was more and more entangling itself in a quarrel whose ulterior consequences were destined to be far more disastrous than it realized.

CHAPTER VI

GERMAN PUBLIC OPINION ENTANGLED BY AUSTRIAN POLICY

DESPITE sympathy with the Austrian cause, despite foreknowledge that the Dual Monarchy contemplated some sort of diplomatic step to clarify its relations with Serbia, the ultimatum of July 23rd gave German public opinion a distinct shock. "German opinion does not approve unanimously the attitude of Austria," telegraphed the Berlin correspondent of the Matin (July 25th issue). And the Berlin correspondent of the London Times (July 25) reported that the harshness of the Note had caused surprise in the German capital. This opinion is confirmed by the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, which stated (July 24) that the terms of the Note had caused sharp surprise, and that they pointed toward war, since the Note contained categorical demands with which, under present circumstances, the Serbian Government could scarcely comply.

In Austria, it has been shown, public criticism of the ultimatum came chiefly from certain racial minorities and from the Social Democrats. The ordinarily moderate newspapers, such as the Neue Freie Presse and the Pester Lloyd, approved of the Note; even

the Zeit had swung over to the side of the Government. In Germany, on the other hand, there was distinct criticism of the demands from moderate and comparatively moderate organs of public opinion. The Vossische Zeitung, for example, found fault with the ultimatum on the ground that almost every point of the propositions set forth by Austria constituted an encroachment on the sovereign rights of the Serbian state. The Morgenpost said that the Note was sharper in form and content than people had been led to expect. Austria's demands constituted nothing less than a surrender of Serbia's sovereignty; apparently the Dual Monarchy had decided, under any circumstances, to let weapons speak. She had involved her ally too readily in her responsibility. The Frankfurter Zeitung (July 24) criticized the "harsh and dictatorial" tone of the Note, and held that it was such as only a deeply humiliated state could accept—after a lost war or to avoid a hopeless war. Referring to a soothing speech made by Count Tisza just before the publication of the Note, the same newspaper said that the Count had "evidently made his explanation of day before yesterday more to quiet public opinion than out of love of truth." Finally, the Frankfurter Zeitung criticized the document because of its probable effect on the European situation. Austria, it argued, had weakened her cause morally in the eyes of Europe; for the assertions made in the Note would not everywhere be regarded as proved.

On the other hand, Serbia, which, during the past few weeks had been sitting on the sinners' bench, would benefit. Herr Pashitch would not fail to represent the whole business as the outgrowth of Austria's ambition for expansion, a point of view which would be echoed in more than one place.

The most outspoken opposition to the Note and to unquestioning German support of the Austrian cause, however, came from two elements usually totally opposed to each other, now strangely allied: the Social-Democrats and a part of the conservative "Right." The correspondent of the Matin (July 25) reported that in "Pan-German" circles Austria was reproached with attempting to use the existing occasion to repair the mistakes she had been making for years. The employment of the word "Pan-German" in this connection might convey a mistaken impression. Miss Wertheimer has shown how loosely this term was used [1]—perhaps as loosely, one might add, as "Bolshevist" at the present time. Even if it be admitted, however, that the term might reasonably be applied in its looser sense to the Right wing of the nationalist Press, and it was sometimes so employed even in Germany, it can not be said that the "Pan-German" Press, as a whole, took a stand against the terms of the Note. The Kreuz-Zeitung, for example, sustained the Austrian course. What does seem remarkable, however, is that certain newspapers, loosely

[1] Wertheimer, The Pan-German League, pp. 182, 186, 195.

called Pan-German, did take this stand. Thus the Berliner Post said:

"In regard to this no one is any longer in doubt, who knows the form and content of this Note, that it brings things to a head and will lead to the worst results.

"Is it a Note? No. It is an ultimatum. And indeed an ultimatum in its sharpest form. Within four and twenty hours Austria demands the answer. The answer? No. The complete submission, the full humiliation of Serbia. People have hitherto often enough (and with justice) scoffed at Austria's lack of energy. Here one has proof of energy operating in a terrible fashion. The Note sets forth just about the most extreme things a government can utter, and one does not say such things if one has not definitely decided on war. . . .

"If in fact the Austrian Government has gone forward entirely on its own responsibility and has neglected getting in touch with Berlin in a question extremely important for the whole European situation, then the responsibility for its step which this time, in truth, leaves nothing further to be desired in the matter of energy, falls back on it alone.

"Austria-Hungary goes forward independently? Good. Then let her also go farther independently. We can wait." [2]

[2] Post, July 24. The Post further says, after giving an extract from the note,

"It is characteristic of the complete political naïveté of the Ber-

Equally emphatic was the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung, which published (July 24) an editorial entitled: "Hapsburgische Gewaltpolitik." According to this editorial, "the Hapsburg demands against Serbia are very sharp. One could declare them justified if the major premise were proved. This major premise asserts: the whole crime was hatched in Belgrade, the murderers trained, armed and financed there." The editorial recalled the Friedjung and Prochaska cases and then said that "of the monstrous accusations and 'Leitmotivs' of Austria-Hungary even up to the present day not one single fact has been proved. It has

liner Tageblatt that it finds in such sentences 'nothing offensive.' Every sentence is a blow with the fist in the face of the Serbian kingdom. We understand and fully appreciate the deep indignation and the desperate grief which formulated these sentences. We are also fully convinced of the bona fides of the Austro-Hungarian Government that the murder of Sarajevo is to be traced back to Serbian intrigues. But we must also ask: 'On what does the Austro-Hungarian Government properly base its severe accusations?' The assertion is alleged to be true and is accepted as true that even a Serbian major had a hand in the plot, that Serbian boundary officials also were bribed and were involved in the fearful plot and then the attempt is made to inculpate a whole people, or a government as representative of the people, in the guilt of the murder. . . . The brief bits of evidence which she [Austria] sets forth are doubtless very compromising for Serbia, but one ought also to hear the Serbian Government in this cause.

"For any sort of a proper vindication the Austrian Government now leaves the Serbian Government no time at all.

"Austria realizes that it is a question of her prestige. She has already yielded too often to Serbia and has repeatedly had to incur the reproach of sluggishness. Now she seeks with one bold spring to recover what she has let slip during long years. . . . There is no longer any doubt possible that Austria desires a settlement with Serbia through war, and it may be asked how far this wish is reciprocated."

not been proved before an impartial court that the murder was hatched in Belgrade by Serbs, it has not been proved that a Ciganowitch and a Major Tankositch stole bombs and Brownings and gave them to the criminals. It has not been proved that the bombs came from the Serbian arsenal. It has not been proved that a Ciganowitch gave instructions to the murderers as to how to kill. Hitherto nothing has been proved, but that two *Austrian subjects,* by name Prinzip and Cabrinovitch committed the crime of murder against Francis Ferdinand, and—we add this too—it may be that they did this not only on account of a centrifugal policy hostile to the Germans, but as well on account of the frivolous policy which the Hapsburgs have pursued in Bosnia." The editorial said further that "the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum is nothing but a war pretext, but this time a dangerous one." It spoke of the influence of the Ultramontanes and added: "Their war-cry is Catholicism, their solution the army, not, however, the Austro-Hungarian, but—the German army. . . . To-day there remains only one other thing to declare: to wage war for the sake of the Hapsburg policy of conquest we are not pledged." The editorial concluded with this same idea. "One thing is certain: Austria-Hungary will not draw the German Empire into a war of conquest."

This firm attitude of the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung is the more significant in that this newspaper

was published in Essen and was supposed to be under the influence of the Krupps. It affords an interesting commentary on the oft-repeated and never-proved theory that wars are made by munition-makers for the sake of their own private profit.

From the very beginning of the Austro-Serbian crisis the Socialists had protested against any commitments on the part of Germany that might lead to war. Now, after the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum their protests became more vehement. "Because the blood of Francis Ferdinand and his wife have flowed, as the result of the shots of a crazy fanatic," exclaimed Vorwärts, "shall the blood of thousands of peasants flow? Shall an insane crime be overshadowed by a far more insane crime?" The same newspaper (July 25) pointed out that, up to the last few days, the German war and preparedness Press, remembering Austria's former irresolution and tendency to yield, had cherished strong doubts as to whether she would show toward Serbia "the energy demanded by the facts." Now this Press had learned better, for the Note was characterized by sharpness, even by brutality. If the German Government had had a hand in the Note, there would be no criticism sharp enough with which to scourge its conduct.

From the headquarters of the Social Democratic party in Berlin was issued a burning manifesto. It ran thus:

PROCLAMATION

The fields in the Balkans are still wet with the blood of thousands of murdered people, the ruins of destroyed cities and devastated villages still smoke, unemployed men still roam about in hunger, widowed women and orphaned children wander throughout the land, and once again the war madness, born of Austria, sets itself to carry death and destruction over the whole of Europe.

Certainly we condemn the agitation of the Greater Serbian Nationalists, but the frivolous war-provocation of the Austro-Hungarian Government calls forth the sharpest protest. The demands of this Government are as brutal as have ever been made in the history of the world on an independent state, and they can only be intended to provoke war.

The class-conscious proletariat of Germany raises in the name of humanity and civilization flaming protest against the criminal agitation of those who incite to war. It demands categorically of the German Government that it exercise all its influence on the Austrian Government to keep peace, and in case the shameful war is not to be avoided, to abstain from any military interference. Not a drop of the blood of a single German soldier must be sacrificed to the thirst for power of the Austrian men of force, to the imperialistic vested interests.

Party comrades, we demand of you immediately, in mass assemblies of the class-conscious proletariat, to express your unshakable will to peace.[3]

Mass meetings of protest against war followed in Berlin, Frankfort, Hamburg, Solingen, Stuttgart, Chemnitz, and a number of other places. In these

[3] Vorwärts, July 25, extra edition.

assemblies, great numbers of people raised their voices against German support of Austria's policy of force.

Such protests against involving Germany in war seem, at first sight, to come much more naturally from Social Democrats than from "Pan-German" organs of opinion. It was to be expected that the Social Democrats, anti-militarist in their policy, accepting the theory of international brotherhood, should oppose German commitments to Austria that pointed toward war. But the "Pan-German" journals to which reference has been made were certainly not believers in peace at any price; on the contrary they bore a reputation for chauvinism. But the reason for their attitude is not far to seek. It was the promotion of purely *German* interests at which they chiefly aimed. "Only one motive always rules us," said the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung (July 26), "solicitude for the German people of the Empire and of the world." Such newspapers and their clientele had no mind to jeopardize German interests for the sake of the discordant mixture of nationalities that constituted the Hapsburg Empire. They had no desire to see a new addition of Slavs to that Empire. Whatever their faults, they were in this instance the soundest and sanest of realists.

Unfortunately, however, neither the Social Democrats nor those "Pan-German" journals of which we have just spoken, reflected majority opinion in

the German Empire. Over against denunciations of Austria's diplomatic step should be set the opinions of newspapers which found the Note apparently quite to their liking. "In a quiet and earnest tone, which can carry nothing offensive to the Serbian Government," said the highly influential Berliner Tageblatt (July 24), which claimed to be a Liberal newspaper, "the Austrian Government sets forth its demands, and in general if one considers without prejudice the result of the investigation of Sarajevo and the incitements of the Serbian propaganda in Austria, the demands of Austria may be certain of unlimited approval. . . . The demands which Austria-Hungary makes leave no room for diplomatic negotiations. Either Serbia will accept them completely by six o'clock Sunday, or the Monarchy will immediately proceed to other measures. As much as every sensible and moral man must desire the preservation of peace, it must nevertheless be recognized that Austria-Hungary could act in no other way. And at least among its allies it can count on the fullest moral and active support of the action now begun." "In distinctiveness and sharpness the Austrian demands leave nothing to be desired," said the Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (July 25), expressing hearty approval of the Note. The Deutsche Zeitung (July 24), a small "Pan-German" newspaper with a thoroughly chauvinistic outlook, rejoiced that the Austrian Government, this time, in contrast with its earlier con-

duct, had gone straight to its goal. "Rather the end with terror than terror without end [*Lieber das Ende mit Schrecken als den Schrecken ohne Ende*], that is the 'leitmotiv' of the present action of our ally." The Kölnische Zeitung demanded that Serbia yield to such just demands in order to avoid a conflict.

Undoubtedly the general tendency of German public opinion was to sustain Austria, though not to endorse the Note to Serbia *in toto*. Thus the Vossische Zeitung, although it criticized the ultimatum as encroaching on the sovereign rights of the Serbian State, nevertheless asserted that Germany had placed herself on the side of Austria to raise a wall to prevent the spread of the fire. According to the Berliner Post (July 25), by far the greater part of the German Press, and of that of Berlin first of all, in its judgment of the Austrian Note held quite mechanically to the alliance relation between Germany and Austria-Hungary and took its place beside Austria without any examination of the underlying circumstances. The Frankfurter Zeitung said (July 25) that the Berlin papers "are harmoniously conscious of the development now beginning," and that, with but one exception (sic) "in differing degrees, they praise, hold good, find just, and even greet joyfully, Austria-Hungary's procedure for a reckoning with Serbia." The Berlin correspondent of the Westminster Gazette (July 27) spoke of the very general support of the Austrian course by the Ger-

man Press, but, mindful of German criticism of the Note, pointed out that this support was, nevertheless, "without unqualified approval of Austrian policy." Perhaps the best summary of the attitude of German public opinion at this point is that of the Berlin correspondent of the London Times (July 25), who asserted that Austria-Hungary had "the full support of the [German] Government, and of the greater part of public opinion, because she cannot now go back."

Thus German public opinion waded deeper into the morass of the Austro-Serbian quarrel. Having revealed a strong anti-Serbian bias after the assassination, and having thus encouraged Austrian resentment against her Slavic neighbor, it was, so to speak, emotionally logical for public opinion to sustain the diplomatic step embodied in the ultimatum, even though it expressed doubt or frank disapproval of the harsher demands of the Note. The "Pan-German" Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung saw how Germany was becoming entangled in the Austrian cause; so it would have the Reich cut loose entirely from the Dual Monarchy's desperate adventure while there was yet time. But the bulk of German opinion, very possibly believing, as the correspondent of the London Times suggested, that Austria had now gone too far to retreat, and having committed itself rather definitely to the Austrian cause, saw in a localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict the most feasible means

of preserving the general European peace. "The suspicion that Germany desires the outbreak of a world war," telegraphed its Vienna correspondent to the Westminster Gazette (July 30), "is quite unfounded, and contrary to our experience since the formation of that Empire. Germany, however, clearly realizes that it would be useless, for the purpose of localizing the war, to bring any pressure to bear upon Austria-Hungary or to demand from her in any way that she should allow the settlement of her difference with Serbia to be taken out of her own hands." To avert a European catastrophe, it was felt that Germany must maintain a "firm" attitude. As the Berliner Tageblatt (July 27) put it, the Austrian Note might be a masterpiece or a piece of bungling, the key to Paradise or the beginning of enduring calamities—all discussion of this served not the least purpose. If the false impression should develop that a wavering was running through the ranks, that public opinion in Germany was not standing decisively with Austria, then would Russia's desire to interfere be greatly strengthened. As the Vossische Zeitung had said, Germany had placed herself on the side of Austria in order to raise a wall to prevent the spread of the fire. Other Powers must be warned to keep their hands off.

Whether the Entente Powers would keep their hands off was, of course, an all-important question to German public opinion. Estimates of the probable

attitude of these countries toward the crisis reveal a mixture of optimism and nervous apprehension. Russia was naturally the chief cause of anxiety; but anxiety did not become acute until after Austria's *démarche* of July 23rd. For some three weeks after the assassination, in fact, the papers had relatively little to say of the possibility of outside interference in the Austro-Serbian crisis. The Kreuz-Zeitung touched on the question on July 1st, suggesting that if Russia were to support Serbia in a demand for better treatment of the Serbian nationals dwelling within the Dual Monarchy, a new political crisis could easily develop. But the Berliner Tageblatt said that Russia would not "undertake any war for the protection of the murderer of a prince. Tsar Nicholas would be the last to do this." After the announcement in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung on July 19th that Germany hoped any discussion that might arise between Austria and Serbia would be localized, nervousness on the Bourse was increased by reason of uncertainty as to the attitude Russia would take. The Kreuz-Zeitung, the next day (July 20), said that Herr Pashitch no doubt would expect the help of Russia, but that Serbia's experience in the last crisis indicated that there was but little ground for such hope.

After Austria had startled the world with her ultimatum to Serbia, newspapers more and more expressed their uneasiness. Thus the Frankfurter Zei-

tung, on July 24th, warned that "the danger exists that Russia, the author of the Serbian policy, will mingle in the strife, and then further terrible results will follow of themselves." The Morgenpost, the same day, anticipating war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, asked whether it would be possible to limit "this apparently unavoidable war" to these two countries. Two days later the "Pan-German" Deutsche Zeitung expressed the opinion that Russia, after all the preceding arrogance of her policy and her Press, could not stand still if Serbia were to be brought to the modesty necessary for Europe.

Nevertheless, a not inconsiderable optimism in regard to Russia's attitude persisted for a short time after the publication of the Austrian ultimatum. The Berlin correspondent of the London Times reported on July 24th (issue of July 25) that for a number of reasons the opinion prevailed in the Press that the strife would be localized. "The most general view is . . . that the dispute is genuinely an Austro-Serbian one and will be localized for that and not for extraneous reasons." The Frankfurter Zeitung (July 26), in spite of its doubts, cited four influences which might deter Russia from going to war with Serbia: (1) that the Russian army was not as well prepared as the Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, had asserted; (2) that there was famine in wide stretches of the Russian Empire; (3) that the financial situation was

not as good as it had been the previous year; and (4) that internal unrest, which was only awaiting an occasion for revolution, had shown itself very clearly during the past few weeks. The Berliner Börsen-Zeitung, on July 25th, doubted whether "even in Paris and Petersburg" they would take the part of criminals. Other newspapers suggested as influences likely to deter Russia, the deficiencies in France's military preparations, and memories of revolutionary dangers and of sad experiences resembling the Crime of Sarajevo. Of course, as the days passed, the idea that Russia might remain neutral yielded to growing suspicion, alarm, and finally complete disillusionment. But at first, at any rate, the danger from Russia was underestimated by the German Press, just as it was underestimated by the Emperor William on July 5th, when he took his memorable decision to give Austria a free hand.

If the likelihood of Russian intervention in the crisis was insufficiently realized, quite naturally the possibility of trouble from France and England was underrated. There was always in Germany, of course, an underlying suspicion of France, ready to rise to the surface as occasion served. So Germania, commenting on a speech in the French Senate at the time of the revelation of France's military deficiencies, pointed out that in France they were now talking, not of the defense of the country, but of advancing to the Moselle or to the Rhine. The journal ex-

pressed alarm at this change of feeling in the neighboring country, which it held to be the result of increasing armaments and exaggerated nationalism. Referring to the French attitude toward the Austro-Serb crisis, the Kreuz-Zeitung said a few days later that the French considered the Serbs spiritual brothers, groaning under the yoke of the Pan-Germans, and that they would not be greatly displeased to see a conflict break out between the two countries. After the dispatch of the Austrian Note, certain newspapers asserted that whatever course Russia took, France would follow in her wake.

Nevertheless, it was maintained that France would shrink from the idea of a European war. "It must not be supposed," said the Kreuz-Zeitung in the article to which reference has just been made, "that the French have aggressive intentions. They do not desire war, but if, as a result of circumstances the Triplice were implicated, they would not let this occasion escape them." On July 24th the Tägliche Rundschau, citing Senator Humbert's revelations of military weakness, said that despite the charlatans of the French Press it was doubtful whether France would intervene in the crisis. The disinclination of the great banks in Paris to mingle in the adventure, the unwillingness of the French to take the part of criminals, the alleged fact that official circles in Paris had given Russia no encouragement, were all advanced by the German newspapers as reasons for

hoping that France would not take up arms. On July 28th the Frankfurter Zeitung pointed out that in Paris, whose Press had of recent years been given over to chauvinistic excitement, there seemed to be a consciousness of the seriousness of a war in which France would be involved with Germany. As late as July 30th it was asserted in the same newspaper that "without treading too much on the high spirit of the French, one can without further consideration assert that they would be heartily glad if this cup might now pass from them." But the Post affirmed categorically the same evening that there was no doubt in Germany that France would attack that country as soon as Russia declared herself ready for war. The thirst for revenge for 1870, said the paper, had been so immensely strengthened lately by the Press, the ministries had stood so firm in this matter, that in regard to the conduct of France there could not be the slightest doubt.

That England might enter the war if the Austro-Serbian conflict could not be localized was here and there suggested. Thus the Frankfurter Zeitung (July 27) argued that if Russia took up weapons, Germany would do so, then Italy and France, and in that event it was doubtful whether even England could remain neutral. But the possibility of England's intervention seemed remote. In Germany, as in Austria, there was a strong feeling that England was sympathetic with the German thesis that the

Austro-Serbian conflict should be localized. Thus an article in the London Times for July 16th, criticizing "the reckless and provocative language" of certain Serbian newspapers, and advising the Belgrade Government to undertake of its own volition an inquiry into the causes of the murder of Sarajevo, was interpreted in Berlin as an English warning to Serbia. The article strengthened confidence on the Bourse. On July 25th, the Berliner Börsen-Zeitung affirmed that it could be taken for granted that England would not restrain the action of Austria-Hungary. About the same time (July 27) the Berlin correspondent of the Westminster Gazette reported that feeling for England was friendly and that the British Foreign Office, at the right time, could exert "a really determining influence, especially if it dissociates itself clearly from attempts to intervene against Austria. It is assumed," said the correspondent, "that such is British policy." On July 27th the opinion was telegraphed from Berlin to the Neue Freie Presse in Vienna that so far as the views of the English Government were known, it wished before all, the localization of the Austro-Serbian conflict. (Issue of July 28.) Finally, as though to clinch the theory that England would not intervene against the Central Powers, it was argued that that country was too much occupied with the Home Rule crisis to take part in a general war.

If such optimistic miscalculation seems strange to

us, it must be remembered that we are wise after the event. To the greater part of German public opinion, with its pro-Austrian and anti-Serbian bias, it seemed natural and reasonable that the Dual Monarchy should wish to clarify its relations with Serbia, especially as it was widely believed that Austria had no thought of annexations. The tendency in Germany, as in the Hapsburg Empire, was to think of the issue in its narrower aspects, as a question of doing away with a danger to the Dual Monarchy and indirectly a danger to Germany, rather than as a question of imperialism, of the balance of power, or of the play of alliances. Furthermore, Europe had skated successfully over thin ice for years. One international crisis after another had come and gone and the general peace of Europe had not been broken. The Balkan wars had been localized, why not the Austro-Serbian conflict? Then, too, if the correspondent of the London Times, to whose report reference has been made, judged correctly, it was widely believed in Germany that after the Note Austria had gone too far to retreat. Under such circumstances the wisest course seemed to be for Germany to stand firmly by her side to "prevent the fire from spreading." Finally, it must be remembered that before the Great War it seemed to many intelligent people, the world over, that such a catastrophe was simply too terrible and too stupendous ever to happen.

This theory of localization dominated the reaction

of the greater part of German public opinion to Sir Edward Grey's proposals that the four Powers not directly concerned should mediate in Vienna and St. Petersburg, and then that a conference representing these Powers should be held in London to mediate in the crisis. It was questioned whether a conference of the four great Powers would be the most appropriate means of settling the difficulty; for it was argued that the details of the Austro-Serbian conflict could not be brought before such a conference, since this conflict concerned these two countries alone. The conservative Tägliche Rundschau said (July 28) that naturally no attempt at mediation would be rejected in Berlin, and that no one was better adapted to play the part of mediator than the English Minister, since England had declared herself "disinterested." Only, it must be understood, said the newspaper, that Germany could not share in any mediation action that would hinder Austria again in her action, and that in any way favored the organization of crime which the Serbian state and its policy represented. The Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (July 29) welcomed the idea of a conference, but only if it were cast in a form that held no "man-traps" for Austria. It was elsewhere argued, also, that a conference would mean rather a postponement than a solution of the difficulty.

Grave doubt was expressed as to whether Austria would consent to any such proposals. It was main-

tained that the experience of the last few years had made it clear that the attempt to solve the question by conference would be unacceptable to Austria. The Berliner Tageblatt (July 29) found the chief difficulty in Sir Edward Grey's condition that until the end of the conference hostilities should cease, arguing that it was questionable whether Austria-Hungary would consent to an adjournment of military operations. A preference was expressed for a settlement through direct conversations between Vienna and St. Petersburg, the method that, as is well known, was favored by the German Government. Some newspapers were less polite. The conservative Deutsche Tageszeitung severely criticized the proposals, saying that they stood in contrast with the sensible attitude that the British Government had hitherto maintained, and lent support to the Russian threat against Austria-Hungary. Germania went so far as to say that it ought to be clear in London as elsewhere that Austria could not be prevented from chastising Serbia.

The Frankfurter Zeitung (July 28), however, held that Germany should not take the standpoint that the mediatory action instituted by England was of no value. Furthermore, the Berlin correspondent of the Manchester Guardian (July 29) reported that "apart from a few Chauvinist journals obvious anxiety was shown in official quarters and in the Press lest Germany's reply to Sir E. Grey should be interpreted in England as a refusal to exert every effort

to maintain peace." But in general it is evident that the English proposals were not accorded a hearty welcome by German public opinion. In taking this position it is probable that German sentiment was influenced by its mistaken optimism as to the attitude of the Entente Powers. Evidently, too, there was a certain belief that the proposals were not very practical. But in its attitude German opinion was governed too much by nationalistic prejudices, by considerations of political strategy. Whether or not it could at this point have influenced the train of events, at any rate, in not attempting to do so, through a warm acclaim of Sir Edward Grey's proposals, it made a great mistake.

For all this unwillingness to meet Sir Edward Grey half-way, however, for all this insistence on localization of the conflict, there persisted in Germany no little discontent with the embarrassing Austrian cousin. The Post and the Rheinische-Westfälische Zeitung continued their attacks on her for having drawn Germany into a situation from which advantage to German interests was little likely to result. So also did Vorwärts. This was to be expected. But it was more significant that a journal like the Frankfurter Zeitung, reflecting large sections of bourgeois opinion, should have expressed dissatisfaction with Austrian intransigence. "It cannot be Germany's task," it declared on July 28th, "to let herself be satisfied with what they hold good at the Ballplatz.

Officially she will not share in a mediation which Austria refuses. But as a friend she has the right and the duty to exercise her influence on the resolutions of her ally, in such a way as to serve the cause of general peace, without at the same time prejudicing the life interests of Austria." The next day, after Austria had declared war on Serbia, the Frankfurter Zeitung said that it was a bad thing that this war had begun and that the Austrian statesmen who had held this decision necessary in spite of the inclination to yield evinced by Serbia, had incurred a very heavy responsibility, not only toward their own land but toward all of Europe. So, too, the Morgenpost declared that Germany must demand that her "Nibelungen" fidelity be not "misused to a point where it would become a crime against her own people and against the highest possessions of humanity." On July 27th the Prussian Minister at Karlsruhe reported to the German Chancellor that according to his observations there was "no real enthusiasm for a war in support of our nearly half-Slav ally."

On the other hand, German public opinion in general, whatever dissatisfaction with the Austrian course it might feel secretly or express openly, evinced a readiness to stand by Austria, "jusqu'au bout." As the Tägliche Rundschau (July 24), expressed it, "the affair concerns Germany directly in no way at all, but in every way and to the very last, in case Austria and Serbia are not left to themselves." An-

other newspaper said that it ought to be known on the banks of the Neva as at Paris that an attack on Austria would mean war on Germany. The Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (August 1) affirmed that it was not only a duty of honor, but also a vital interest for Germany, as Bismarck had shown, to prevent an annihilation of Austria by Pan-Slavism. Even the Frankfurter Zeitung (July 28), displeased as it was with the Austrian course, said that Germany's rôle was marked out for her: she wished peace to be preserved, but she must fulfil her duty as ally if Austria-Hungary were attacked by another Great Power. The London Times correspondent at Berlin reported immediately after the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum that "Austria-Hungary has the full support of the German Government and of most German opinion," and that "in the event of European complications she can safely count on this support." (Issue of July 25.) About the same time the correspondent of the Paris Matin (July 25) stated that almost all the German Press approved without restriction the attitude of Austria-Hungary, and declared itself ready to follow her, if need be, into an international conflict. And the Berlin representative of the Westminster Gazette (July 27) went so far as to say, two days later, that "German advice to Vienna to delay operations would be taken as a breach of faith. It would further be resented by the German public, which is in

an uncompromisingly pro-Austrian mood, and quite ready to go to war to prevent intervention."

As this last statement indicates, people in Germany were growing more and more restive. While the newspapers were discussing the question of localization, the war fever was mounting to the heads of the more irresponsible elements of the population. The news of the Serbian reply to Austria's ultimatum late in the afternoon of July 25th was the signal for turbulent demonstrations in Berlin and other cities.[4] In Munich the landlord of the Café Fahrig, out of consideration for some Serbs who had taken a table in his restaurant, had forbidden the orchestra to play national songs. When the public learned of this it made a great row; and the café, with all its furniture, was demolished.[5] In Berlin, great crowds marched through the streets for hours, vaunting their patriotism, uproariously voicing their sympathy for the Dual Monarchy. Austrophile speeches were made before the statues of Bismarck and Moltke. There were manifestations of friendship in front of the embassies of Austria and of Italy; and there were hostile demonstrations in front of the Serbian and Russian legations. The exhibition of unfriendliness toward Russia called forth rebukes in the Press; and it is said that

[4] The Berlin correspondent of the Matin reported manifestations in Hanover, Breslau, Freiburg, and Hamburg.

[5] Berliner Tageblatt, July 27, Monday edition. The demonstration occurred the evening of July 25.

through a representative of the Foreign Office the German Government expressed its regret for the proceeding. According to reports, those who took part in these manifestations belonged "overwhelmingly to the educated classes." They were young people, according to Vorwärts (July 26), dressed in the latest, the very latest fashion, who displayed on the streets their thirst for adventure, their chauvinism and their tipsiness. Some thousands of them filled the principal streets of the city, "marched in closed ranks hither and yon, hours long, roared and shrieked and acted like thoroughly ill-bred louts,—and no one disturbed them." It is not a pretty picture, this; but it is just the sort of demonstration to be expected of young people trained in the German schools to boastful nationalism.

In Frankfort the opinion was generally expressed that it was time that Austria dealt with Serbia. In the restaurants, in the cafés, the trams, everywhere were heard words of sympathy for Austria. The excitement of the populace may be illustrated by an incident. In an out-of-the-way street in the older part of the city, a young man angrily crumpled up a newspaper "extra," and declared, in somewhat confused language, that he was for the Serbs. He said that he had traveled in Serbia, and that the Serbs were a cultured people. Not so the Austrians. "Oho," said an older bystander, "I know the Austrians better." The friend of the Serbs repeated his assertion, adding

that the Austrians of Bohemia were a worthless lot. "Yes, my friend," said the other, "but you mean the Czechs. They are no Germans, no Austrians." The younger man, however, repeated that he was for the Serbs. Whereupon a passer-by who had overheard him called out: "Well, don't say so too loudly to-day, or some one will smash your skull." Great outcry; and the friend of Serbia melted away.

As the days passed and the tension increased, war hysteria fed on growing fear. Disquieting reports came from across the eastern border. It is now known that as soon as she heard the terms of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, Russia began to take steps looking toward mobilization; that on the 26th measures preparatory to war were ordered; and that on the 30th the final order for general mobilization was signed. The German public did not know all this at the time, but it was understood in informed circles that Russia was taking military measures of a serious character, which were leading straight toward war. Germany's mobilization, on the other hand, came "surprisingly late." It was not until July 31st that the "state of imminent danger of war" (*Zustand drohender Kriegsgefahr*) was ordered, and not until 5 P. M. of August 1st, an hour before the declaration of war on Russia, that the order for general mobilization of the German forces was given.

During the last two or three days before the outbreak of the general conflict, then, there came from

the organs of public opinion a clamorous and increasingly insistent demand that the German Government mobilize the army. On July 29th the Frankfurter Zeitung, one of the sanest and most moderate of the German newspapers, pointed out that the process of mobilization in Russia was very slow and that it was hard to tell where preparatory measures, measures for security, partial mobilization, left off, and general mobilization began. There was, therefore, no occasion for the deep anxiety which was affecting a part of the public. But the next day, the same journal, taking counsel of its fears, argued that Germany could not afford to wait until Russia had completed her mobilization; for even if the Muscovite Empire planned no attack on Germany, the latter country's relations with her ally were such that a mobilization directed against Austria necessarily concerned Germany as well. The same day (July 30) the Berliner Tageblatt said that eventually Russia's preparations would have to be answered with German preparations, in order that Germany might not be brought into too unfavorable a military situation; but the Tageblatt did not suggest the need of immediate mobilization. It is clear from all this that by July 30th, influential sections of public opinion were losing hope that peace could be preserved, and, fearful of invasion, were beginning to think in terms of military advantage. The Vossische Zeitung that day voiced the impression that the avalanche could not

be halted, though diplomacy ought to strive, in a last hope, to safeguard peace.

The loudest demands for mobilization naturally came from the right wing of the German Press, from newspapers of the "Pan-German" type. As early as July 27th the chauvinistic Deutsche Zeitung argued that, should Russia proceed to mobilization, should it even resort to this measure merely in order to make a demonstration, the order for the mobilization of the whole German army ought to follow on the heels of the Russian order. "We must not concede our powerful neighbour the advantage of even one second." [6] The morning of the 30th this newspaper said that Russia was assembling strong troops on the eastern frontier, asked how long counter-measures would be delayed, and argued that, just as Russia had done, Germany could officially and publicly speak of each measure of mobilization as a mere measure of precaution. The evening of the same day it said categorically: "Further hesitation means national disaster." On July 30th, too, the Kreuz-Zeitung spoke of the danger that Russia might be trying through diplomatic negotiations to make delays while preparing for war, thus offsetting the advantage that Germany would normally have over her in the matter of rapidity of mobilization. But rather

[6] Deutsche Tageszeitung, July 27, morning edition. This newspaper also says, none too sadly, "But once the armies are put on a war footing, one knows how hard it is again to bring about a peaceful demobilization."

surprisingly for a "Pan-German" newspaper at this critical moment, the Kreuz-Zeitung pointed out that "should the mobilization against Austria be immediately answered with a mobilization order on our part, then the danger would arise that the situation might become so tense as scarcely to permit of retreat." The journal also deplored the disquietude of public opinion over the question and said that the proper time for decision could safely be left to the authorities. On the 31st the Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung said that "it would be disastrous if we let ourselves be moved by words not to carry on our preparations so quickly. . . . Every delay would cost us an endless amount of blood."

Toward the last the ugly rumor spread that the Kaiser was afraid to issue the mobilization order. The Kreuz-Zeitung, on July 31st, spoke of the prevalence of the suspicion that in leading places there was not that measure of decision and enjoyment of responsibility which the German people had greeted so joyfully in the action of the Austrian Government. The Kreuz-Zeitung itself professed not to share such fears. The Deutsche Zeitung (July 30) asserted that "vacillation seems to have set up its headquarters in Berlin." The Tägliche Rundschau said (July 31) that "for the sake of truth [we] must record that the universal non-comprehension of such boundless patience is condensed into unpleasant reports in regard to the personal attitude of the Kaiser toward the

last, most inexorable necessity." The Post (July 31), quoting this statement of the Tägliche Rundschau, hotly protested against the idea "that the Kaiser would not be man enough to sign the order of mobilization with a firm hand the instant he holds it necessary." Almost as this last statement was being written the Kaiser's order proclaiming the state of imminent danger of war was published; and the Post's editor wrote:

"The Kaiser has spoken. He calls the German people to arms. Hurrah, long live the Kaiser!"

Nevertheless, for all the anti-Serbian feeling that showed itself in Germany immediately after the Crime of Sarajevo, for all the welcome accorded the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, for all the song-singing and flag-waving and the final demands for mobilization, there seems on the eve of the conflict to have been much less of the war-spirit in Germany than in Austria. In an article of July 25th, said to be "clearly officially inspired," the Kölnische Zeitung said that if in the next few days the Social Democrats were to stage demonstrations against war, these would meet with a certain sympathy on the part of the bourgeoisie, "for with us no one wishes war." Somewhat sourly commenting on this article, Vorwärts (July 27) said that no doubt in place of inflated chauvinism a marked "Katzenjammer" had already set in. The Berliner Tageblatt (July 29), too, expressed sympathy with the demonstrations for peace. On July

27th, as has already been pointed out, the Prussian Minister at Karlsruhe expressed the opinion that there was no real enthusiasm in that city in support of Germany's nearly half-Slav ally. The same day the Berlin correspondent of the London Times telegraphed that the "flag-waving and song-singing . . . have become so tiresome as hardly to deserve the rebukes uttered by practically the whole Press." [7]

More significant still, the Berlin correspondent of the Paris Matin sent home one dispatch after another in which he commented on the desire for peace in Germany. "As for Germany," he telegraphed on July 26th, "she does not wish war. Her Government, at least, does not wish it. If Germany mobilizes, she will do so reluctantly. She will do so because Russia has obliged her to. Her Press is not bellicose." On the 27th he repeated his opinion. "Germany certainly does not wish war," he sent word the next day, "her Press to-day clearly expresses this sentiment." On the 29th he asserted emphatically that Germany wished war "less to-day than yesterday, less yesterday than the day before." He pointed out that the German Empire was enjoying magnificent industrial and commercial prosperity. "Is she going to risk all this," he asked, "because the Serbs have wronged

[7] London Times, July 28. The Berliner Tageblatt, July 27, said in this connection: "Before all things . . . it appears necessary that the youths and men, who, these last two nights, have made such excited uproar through the Berlin streets, should be induced to go to bed."

Austria?" On July 30th the Lokal Anzeiger published an incorrect report, quickly denied, that Germany was mobilizing. The Matin's correspondent wrote of the impression made by this report on the people in the streets of the German capital: "Sadness and anxiety were on all faces. Not a patriotic cry was uttered, and when, half an hour later, the word was sent forth that the news of mobilization was false, the relief was enormous, the reaction and joy immediate." (Matin, July 27-31.)

Another Frenchman in Berlin, more skeptical than the Matin's correspondent of the pacific tendencies of the Germans, reported them on July 29th, not as bellicose, indeed, but rather as believing the moment favorable to them, and so resigning themselves without great effort to the idea of the sacrifice awaiting them. A special correspondent of the Westminster Gazette telegraphed from Vienna on July 30th that the suspicion that Germany desired the outbreak of a world war was quite unfounded. And the correspondent of the London Daily Telegraph and the Manchester Guardian (both July 30) reported that he had gathered the impression "from persons in authority that Germany is really drifting into war against her will." Lord Grey has said in his memoirs that "the German people at large did not desire war, but . . . they had not that fear and dread of war that would prompt resistance to the idea of it. When war actually came, it was acclaimed with an en-

thusiasm that existed in no other country." It would be interesting to know on what evidence Lord Grey bases his statements in regard to German enthusiasm and lack of dread of war. They are not confirmed by the present study.

It is impossible, of course, to analyze with accuracy the complex of emotions in Germany on the eve of the great conflict. Fear must have played an important part; but its influence can not be measured, for fear has a habit of hiding its head or of disguising itself in the gaudy garments of bravado. It would seem that fear was chiefly responsible for the loud demand for mobilization during the last few days of the crisis. Obviously, if war were inevitable, the demand would be justified. Socialists, of course, opposed war on principle, while certain conservative nationalists objected to fighting for Austro-Hungarian rather than purely German interests. Militarists, army officers bent on promotion, young persons thirsting for adventure, old men vicariously pugnacious, ill-balanced individuals of various types, naturally succumbed readily to chauvinism. But so far as one can judge from the evidence, and especially from the statements of responsible foreign observers, such as the correspondents of the Matin and the Manchester Guardian, the bulk of public opinion was not bellicose.

How, then, explain the apparent intransigence of the most influential part of the Press and probably of

the majority of the German people? Why, for example, did leading newspapers turn a cold shoulder to the proposals of Sir Edward Grey? There is one key, I think, to an understanding of majority opinion throughout the crisis: the *Nibelungentreue*. In other words, the dominant feeling was that Germany must be true to Austria. According to the terms of the alliance between the two countries, Germany was bound to come to the aid of the Dual Monarchy in case the latter were attacked by Russia. The shock of the Crime of Sarajevo strengthened the sympathy between the two countries, especially since, except for Russia, they were the only two great states of Europe still adhering to the monarchical principle in its older form. Common antagonism to the Slav, too, tightened the bonds. Many Germans of the Kaiser's Empire felt that the Germans of Austria were upholding the cause of German nationality against the Slavic flood which threatened to engulf it. The nationalism that had been fostered in school, church, and the Press intensified this feeling. So, despite the vehement opposition of the Social Democrats and some thoroughly conservative newspapers, as well as a certain dissatisfaction with the acts of the Ballplatz, shown in other circles, the bulk of German public opinion backed up Austrian policy, apparently without much thought that it could do otherwise. German opinion, then, is deserving of criticism, in the first place because it permitted itself to be governed too

much by anti-Serbian prejudice, and in the second place because it allowed itself to follow too blindly in the wake of Austria. By taking a firm stand against any Austrian steps that might lead to war with Serbia, it could have brought pressure to bear on the Dual Monarchy to content itself with a diplomatic victory. Whether or not it could have influenced the course of events, it could at least have made the effort. There was nothing in the *Nibelungentreue* to prevent this. Toward the last, however, it is doubtful whether anything could have held Austria back. Every effort at that time, then, to localize the conflict was an effort to keep the general peace. And to the policy of localization German public opinion subscribed heart and soul.

In general, German public opinion was in accord with the German Government. Directly after the assassination, public opinion, like the Government, assumed too readily a Serbian conspiracy whose threads led to Belgrade. Public opinion was not, indeed, responsible for the decisions of July 5th and 6th, but in such a generally sympathetic atmosphere it must have been easier for the Government to take the course it did. Like the Government, public opinion in general sustained the Austrian ultimatum, though with some surprise at its harshness, and in some quarters distinct disapproval of certain demands. Like the Government, public opinion was disinclined to listen receptively to Sir Edward Grey's proposals to

bring the Austro-Serbian issue before an Areopagus of the Powers. Like the Government, it wished to avoid a European war and looked to a localization of the conflict to preserve the general peace. In sum, public opinion, like the Government, was entangled by the *Nibelungentreue*, and though struggling toward the last against the current, finally drifted helplessly into war.

CHAPTER VII

THE PSYCHOTIC EXPLOSION IN RUSSIA

TWO quite different sets of ideas influenced the Russian Government and people on the eve of the Great War. The nucleus of the first set was the monarchical principle, on which, as has been pointed out, many people in Austria and Germany counted to keep Russia out of the Austro-Serbian conflict. These people felt that Russia must be profoundly shocked by the Crime of Sarajevo. They believed that she had so suffered from assassination and attempted assassination of her own rulers that she would understand the determination of Austria to take drastic measures against Serbia and sympathize with it. As the Berliner Tageblatt expressed it shortly after the assassination, Russia would not "undertake any war for the protection of the murderer of a prince. Tsar Nicholas would be the last to do this."

The nucleus of the second set of ideas was Russian nationalism. For various reasons Russian nationalism indignantly resented the thought of an Austrian attack on Serbia. In Pan-Slavist circles Russia was held to be the natural and traditional protector of the

Slavs in the Balkans, brothers of the Russians in race and religion. If we may believe Russian statements to that effect, Pan-Slavism was no mere cloak of hypocrisy for an aggressive policy of expansion, as cynical "realists" in countries other than Russia have sometimes held it to be. According to Baron Korff, it had a strong sentimental aspect. And the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sazonov, has said that the whole history of Russian foreign policy for the last hundred and fifty years has been the history of the emancipation of Slavic and Christian peoples. "Our policy is explained from the sentimental point of view," he maintained, "by relations of sympathy and of solidarity of races and religions." The religious link Baron Korff believes to have been less important than the racial. "The religious element," he says, "was prominent only at times and always for a short while, as, for example, in 1876-1877, when a holy war was preached among Russians and Slavs, which resulted finally in the liberation of the Balkan peoples. . . . The racial element among the Slavs, all belonging to the same historic group of people, played a much more important rôle. . . . Here we find the really sound foundation for Pan-Slavism."

Russian nationalism revealed itself also in anti-German prejudice. Since the time of Peter the Great Germans had been prominent and sometimes powerful at the Russian Court, in the bureaucracy, in the army and navy, in commerce, and in various other

walks of life. Their influence was much resented. Moreover, it was believed by many that Germany had on more than one occasion thwarted the legitimate ambitions of Russian foreign policy and through interference in the internal affairs of Russia had wrought serious injury to that country. Bismarck's attempt to play the honest broker at the Congress of Berlin had helped to deprive Russia of the fruits of the Russo-Turkish War, and to turn over the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. In certain circles it was held that the Kaiser had pushed the Tsar into the disastrous Russo-Japanese War, in order to divert Russian ambitions from the Near East to the Far East, leaving the Near East freer for the designs of the Central Powers. It was believed, too, that after the Russo-Japanese War Germany had persuaded the Tsar's government to accept a commercial treaty unfavorable to Russian interests. Nor was it forgotten that the Kaiser had stood "in shining armor" beside Austria in the crisis of 1908 and 1909, when the Hapsburg Empire had annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. Again it was held that German diplomacy during the Balkan wars had been inimical to Russia and to those Balkan states over which Russia wished to extend her protecting arm. Indeed, Baron Korff goes so far as to say that the Pan-Slav movement itself "was prompted much more by hatred of Germans than by love of Slavs."

The most significant factor in Russian nationalism,

however, was hostility to Austria. In part this was due, of course, to racial antagonism, inasmuch as the dominant groups in the Haspburg Empire were Germans and Magyars, while the subordinate groups were Slavs. In part it was due to the clash of imperialistic ambitions, inasmuch as each country tended to look on the Balkans as its proper field for expansion. In part it was a question of the balance of power, inasmuch as it was believed in Russia that any Austrian acquisition of territory in the Balkans must throw the balance of power against the Tsar's Empire. Lastly, it was in part due to the memory of past diplomatic defeats which rankled bitterly in the hearts of many Russians and in some cases led to intense hatred. The most humiliating of these defeats and the one that aroused the strongest feeling in Russia was that of 1908 and 1909, when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1912, the Russian Ambassador to England, Count Benckendorff, said: "If I am not mistaken, public opinion in Russia appears to be guided above all by the thought of revenge for 1909."

It would be easy to exaggerate the importance of some of these factors in Russian nationalism. Baron Korff maintains that the Pan-Slav movement had no very strong hold on the Russian people, and that its significance was exaggerated outside the country. If there was a considerable prejudice against the Germans, there was always, too, in Russia, a strong "pro-

German" sentiment.[1] But the Austro-Serbian crisis of 1914 focussed the different kinds of nationalistic feeling on a single issue. As a menace to the orthodox Serb, Austria's policy aroused strong religious antagonism in Russia against the Roman Catholic Dual Monarchy. As a threat against a Slavic state, it aroused the sentiment of racial solidarity. Prejudice against Germany was stimulated wherever it was assumed that Germany was egging Austria on. Moreover, it was naturally assumed that a localized war with Serbia would end in Austrian annexations of Serbian territory, whatever assurances to the contrary the Dual Monarchy might give. The balance of power would be disturbed. Russia's future would be threatened. The Tsar's government would have suffered a humiliation greater than that of 1909. In retrospect it is easy to see that, aside from a direct attack, few issues could so have aroused Russian public opinion as an Austrian attack on Serbia. As will be shown in the present chapter, these sentiments of Russian nationalism were to prove far stronger in the diplomatic crisis of 1914 than loyalty to the monarchical principle.

The first reaction in Russia to the assassination of the Archduke was one of horror at the crime and sympathy with the House of Hapsburg. "The Tsar-

[1] The daughter of a Russian official living in the Baltic provinces before the war, told the present writer that she had been taught in school to pray both for the Tsar and the Kaiser.

ina . . . wept without ceasing," according to a report which came to the Neue Freie Presse (June 30) from St. Petersburg. "Quel abominable crime!" wrote the Russian Foreign Minister, Sazonov, on the card he presented at the Austrian Embassy when calling to express his sympathy. The Novoïe Vremya (June 29) published a number of telegrams expressing sympathy for the victims and the royal family, as well as indignation against the assassins. These feelings the Novoïe Vremya itself appeared to share. "Archduke Francis Ferdinand fell as a victim of Serbian hatred for Austrian rule," said the Liberal newspaper, Den. "The fanaticism which guided the hand of the murderers is the fanaticism of hatred," declared the Rietch. The St. Petersburg correspondent of the Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten (July 3) reported to his newspaper that in the Russian Court there prevailed no doubt that the murderous deed was hatched in Belgrade, and that if it was not said that the Serbian Government had anything to do with the deed, yet it was not doubted that the Serbian military had had a hand in it. The Neue Freie Presse (July 7), as has been pointed out, took comfort from the information that had come to it from a special Russian source that the monarchical principle was so cherished in the Tsar's Empire that Russia would not be likely to disapprove of an Austrian demand on Serbia for an investigation in Belgrade. No doubt some of the tears shed were crocodile tears, and some

of the sympathy was expressed merely out of deference to the conventions. But there is no doubt, too, that the murder gave Russian public opinion a profound shock. "The assassination at Sarajevo," reported the German Ambassador at the Tsar's Court to von Bethmann-Hollweg on July 13th, "has, it seems, made a deep impression here also, and condemnation of the shameless deed was expressed far and wide at the earliest moment."

The Crime of Sarajevo, however, called forth other emotions in Russia than horror at the deed and sympathy for the stricken. The murdered heir to the Austrian throne had not been popular in the Tsar's Empire, and deference to the conventions of mourning did not prevent criticism of him. The Novoïe Vremya (June 29) expressed the opinion that the Archduke had been an enemy of Russia, that he was a convinced clerical and under the influence of the Jesuits. The Rietch, while it admitted the menace of Serbian agitation against Austria, nevertheless said that "the responsibility must lie with those who, like the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, persistently sowed discord between Roman Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs." The same newspaper asserted that to Serbian patriots the Archduke was a symbol of the Austrian policy of conquest. The Petersbourgski Kuryer maintained that Francis Ferdinand had strengthened the hopes of military circles and of chauvinists hostile to Slavism, and that it was be-

lieved that his advent to the throne would have marked the beginning of war against Russia. Likewise the Bourse Gazette pointed out that he had cast a menacing shadow by reason of his expansionist ideas, and that the greater part of his energy had been directed principally against Russia. In general, as the St. Petersburg correspondent of the London Times (July 1) pointed out, the Russian Press represented the Archduke as "a Russophobe who twice recently brought his country to the verge of war." Therefore, in spite of all the horror at the crime, the news of his death was received in Russia with a certain sense of relief, and it was hoped that his removal would mark a turning-point for the better in what was alleged to be the dangerous, aggressive policy of the Dual Monarchy.

Anti-Austrian feeling in Russia, however, speedily found a new cause for complaint against the Dual Monarchy in the anti-Serbian demonstrations and riots that followed the assassination. The Petersbourgski Kuryer accused the Austrians of profiting from the assassination of the Archduke to conduct a campaign against Serbians, and asserted that the real responsibility for the Crime of Sarajevo must fall, not on Serbia, but on those who had urged Austria on against Bosnia and against Serbia. Some newspapers looked on the manifestations as religious persecution. The Bourse Gazette asserted that militant clericalism had just lost its strongest support and was

playing its last trump card. The Novoïe Vremya affirmed that the Jesuits wished the Serbs to be considered assassins. The same journal said that the Austrian police had let out of prison all the dangerous elements—the Tziganes and the Jews—who had caused the devastation, and alleged that the Austrian officials in Bosnia had abused their rights in order to favor the Moslems and Catholics at the expense of the Orthodox, and in particular the Serbs. (Issues of July 1, 7 and 13.) "In the name of considerations of humanity," exclaimed the Petersbourgski Kuryer, in exasperation, "Russia ought to fulfill her duty toward her brothers who find themselves under the yoke." So, too, the St. Petersburg Gazette affirmed that Austria was hurling defiance at half of Orthodox Europe, and that these "pogroms" made a foremost consideration the liberation of the Serbs and other Slav nationalities from the German yoke.

The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg, Count Pourtalès, was gravely impressed during these July days with the bitterness of feeling in Russia against the Dual Monarchy. "The deep hatred of Austria-Hungary that is felt here," he said in commenting on Russia's attitude after the assassination, "very soon began to assert itself, even during [sic] this sad event, and the indignation at the revenge exercised against the Serbs in the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy superseded within a few days all expressions of sympathy for the aged Emperor Francis Joseph and his

realm. . . . All expressions of opinion concerning Austria-Hungary heard even in official circles testify to a boundless contempt for the conditions ruling there." In view of such pessimism, it is not surprising to find the Russian journal Golos Moskwy despondently referring to the "illusions" of those newspapers which had taken the view that after the death of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, Russia's relations with Austria-Hungary would improve.

If Count Pourtalès had had any confidence in his own interpretation of the feeling in Russia against the Dual Monarchy, he ought logically to have anticipated an indignant protest from Russian public opinion against such stern Austrian demands on Serbia as were to be embodied in the Note of July 23rd. In the early part of July the newspaper Rousskoïe Slovo had said that Serbia could not renounce her independent political existence, and that if the Vienna Cabinet should persist in its demands, bad complications, war not excluded, would be unavoidable. "In the struggle for her freedom," continued the journal, "Serbia will not stand alone." About the middle of the month word came from an official source in the Tsar's Empire that "Russia hopes that Austria-Hungary will make no demand which threatens the national independence of Serbia. Moderate demands Russia will support." In certain circles in England trouble from Russia was foreshadowed should the Austrian demands prove too severe. Sir Edward

Grey warned Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador in London, that if Austria's grievances were well-founded and the reparation she demanded was in Serbia's power, she might hope that Russia would advise moderation, but that the danger lay "in the flaring up of Slav excitement in Russian public opinion." And the London Times (July 22) said that "an expedition into Serbia, or even demands upon Serbia, which could be plausibly represented as made from political ambition, would create a Slav movement in Russia which might force the hand of the Government, as Slav movements have done in the past. Slav sentiment is the one chord to which Russian feeling invariably responds, and it is folly to pretend that this feeling would not be deeply stirred by an Austro-Hungarian attack upon an Orthodox Slav State which was not demonstrably free from dubious motives."

After the dispatch of the Austrian Note to Serbia, however, Count Pourtalès, in spite of his previous pessimistic analysis of the Russian attitude toward the Dual Monarchy and of gloomy fears that had been expressed in other quarters, at first interpreted with optimism the reaction of Russian public opinion to the ultimatum. "Local public opinion," he reported to Bethmann-Hollweg on July 25th, "has thus far shown itself remarkably indifferent to the Austro-Serbian conflict." He admitted, indeed, that, as the Russian Press indicated, there might be a change within a few days. But on July 27th he again

reported "there is almost no war enthusiasm, on the contrary a feeling of depression, as yesterday evening there were again violent street fights between revolutionaries and police, and the mood of a sick Tom-cat prevailed at court and in the army, as, coming to their senses, they are getting a scare about what they have done and may do yet with their premature mobilization."

Furthermore, Count Pourtalès and others who hoped that Russia would not interfere in the Austro-Serbian issue drew comfort from the attitude of certain Russian newspapers. The German Ambassador referred to the Semschtschina, which, while criticizing the Austrian Note, said that it was "far from wishing to spur Serbia on." It affirmed that the Russian Government was "obligated to hold Serbia in check in so far as possible, at the same time attempting to influence Austria." More significant was the attitude of the Rietch, to which Pourtalès also referred, organ of the Constitutional Democratic Party, and under the strong leadership of Professor Miliukoff. The Rietch held that the Austro-Serbian conflict should be localized, that Russia ought to keep her hands off. When Sazonov asked Austria to grant Serbia more time to reply to the ultimatum, the Rietch argued that the Russian Government by this act had given encouragement to the little Slav state and that if war broke out, Russia would have to bear a heavy share of responsibility for causing it. So, in

defence of the theory that large sections of public opinion in the Tsar's Empire were disinclined to intervene in the Austro-Serbian conflict, Austrian and German newspapers frequently cited the Rietch.

In point of fact, however, there was little ground for optimism. The Rietch reflected but a very small part of Russian opinion and later it changed its attitude. Pourtalès misinterpreted the general feeling. So far as Russian feeling can be measured, there is overwhelming evidence to show that the bulk of it was determined not to let Austria go *jusqu'au bout* with Serbia. This attitude began to reveal itself definitely immediately after the publication of the Austrian ultimatum. The highly influential Novoïe Vremya (July 25 and following days), for example, said emphatically that Russia ought to stand by Serbia, and sustain the common interests of the Slavs. It fulminated against the Dual Monarchy, the Ballplatz and the Note, in articles colored with indignant emotion and permeated with chauvinism. "Even after a conquest by Austrian troops," asserted another organ of opinion, "the lot of Serbia could not be more tragic than if it were to capitulate before the Austrian ultimatum." It added that the real trouble lay, not with Serbia, but in the attempt of Berlin to dictate its will to the great and little powers. The Petersbourgski Kuryer argued that Austria's ultimatum proved either that she wished war with Russia or that she no longer considered Russia a Great Power.

France and Russia, continued the journal, have made enough sacrifices for peace and it is impossible for them to do more. Even now, Russia has not fulfilled her whole duty toward Serbia, apart from the Balkan war; if she continues she will have her turn of humiliation. The Bourse Gazette asserted that Russia stood in a quite different position from that of 1908 and that she would permit no attack on Serbia's independence or territorial integrity. "Russia will not hesitate at armed intervention to defend Slavism," said the St. Petersburg Gazette.

Statements of much the same character might be quoted from other newspapers. The Petersbourgski Kuryer went so far as to say that "the sole response worthy of Russia would be mobilization on the Austrian frontier." Similarly, the Swjet called for immediate mobilization.

Observers from other countries bear witness to the stern resolution of Russian public opinion during these dark decisive days. "The German Ambassador at St. Petersburg," relates Sir George Buchanan, "had all along been under the impression that the Russian public had not been greatly stirred by the Austro-Serbian conflict and that only a small clique of chauvinists were [sic] endeavouring to give it an acute character. As he happened to be lunching with me at the Embassy on the 28th, I took the opportunity of opening his eyes to the growing danger of the situation." "Public opinion," telegraphed the St.

Petersburg correspondent of the London Times on July 24th, "is incensed at what is considered the outrageous, humiliating, brutal, and unjustifiable language of the Austrian ultimatum. Russian national sentiment would undoubtedly support the Government if mobilization were decided." (Issue of July 25.) "People of all classes are enthusiastic at the idea of a war against the forces of Germanism," reported the correspondent of the London Morning Post. "Every Russian would welcome the opportunity of paying off a long score of arrears against the combined forces of Germanism." (July 27 and 28.)

The testimony of these Englishmen to Russia's resolution is sustained by the impressions of certain Frenchmen and Germans, who were either in Russia at the time or in close touch with the general situation. "Public opinion in Russia would not allow Austria to offer violence to Serbia," reported Paléologue, the French Ambassador at St. Petersburg, to Bienvenu-Martin. "Throughout all Russia public sentiment is exasperated," he recorded in his diary July 27th. The correspondent of the Paris Temps telegraphed on July 27th that opinion in all parts of Russia was showing as much calm as resolution in eventually defending the Slav cause. (Issue of July 28.) Similarly the Matin's correspondent reported that it should be emphasized that the Russian Government, "absolutely in accord, in this respect, with public opinion," would consider aggression against

Serbia as an attack on Russia. Later, he sent word that war would be very popular in all circles in Russia, and that the workmen, who but a few days before had been carrying on violent strikes, had been suddenly transformed from revolutionaries into patriots. (Matin, July 27 and 29.) Bienvenu-Martin summed up the impressions of these French observers in the statement that "Russian opinion makes clear that it is both politically and morally impossible for Russia to allow Serbia to be crushed." As for the German commentators, the correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung (July 24) made it clear to his newspaper the very day of the ultimatum that, in the event of a sharpening of the conflict, Russia, for the sake of her own prestige, would not leave Serbia unprotected; how far she would go would depend on the development of events. On the evening of the 24th the German capitalist, Ballin, met Winston Churchill at dinner in London. Ballin recalled Bismarck's prediction that "the great European War would come out of some damned foolish thing in the Balkans," and wondered whether his prediction would now come true. He said that "it all depended on the Tsar. A few years before there would have been no danger, as the Tsar was too frightened for his throne, but now again he was feeling himself more secure upon his throne, and the Russian people besides would feel very hardly anything done against Serbia." A few days later the St. Petersburg cor-

respondent of the Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten sent word that "even circles which stand far from chauvinism, declare that Russia cannot permit a repetition of the Austrian action of 1909." [2]

"Patriotic" demonstrations were a natural outcome of the exasperation prevailing in Russia. On July 26th, crowds gathered in St. Petersburg and marched through the streets, crying out: "Down with Germany!" "Long live Serbia!" "Long live the Russian army!" From Moscow similar manifestations were reported. During one of these a crowd attempted to force an entrance into the Austro-Hungarian consulate and the police had to intervene. "In Moscow," telegraphed a correspondent of the London Morning Post (July 28), "any one overheard speaking German in places of public resort yesterday was compelled to be silent or leave. At Sestroretsk the concert programme this evening consisted entirely of the works of Wagner. On the demand of the public every German piece was cancelled and the works of Russian composers substituted." Embarrassed, ap-

[2] Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten, July 28. Many newspapers in other countries speak of the firm stand taken by the Russian Press after the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum. "All the Russian newspapers, with the exception of the Rietch, pledge the Government to sustain Serbia with energy and firmness." L'Humanité, July 26, "Austria's demands on Serbia are said to constitute the most outrageous insult ever offered to any independent State. All Russian journals, of every shade of opinion, thus far agree that the enforcement of such demands must mean war with this country." Daily Telegraph, July 27 (from its St. Petersburg correspondent); Matin, July 26; L'Homme Libre, July 26; Temps, July 28; Journal de Genève, July 28.

parently, by the numerous demonstrations in St. Petersburg and other cities, the Russian Government felt impelled to try to calm public opinion. It therefore voiced the hope that the expression of popular feeling "would surely not take the coloring of hostility to those Powers with whom Russia is at peace and with whom it wishes to remain at peace."

To avoid the general war whose threatening shadow darkened the political horizon, the organs of Russian public opinion had various suggestions. Some looked to the Emperor William. The Rietch proposed that the Tsar and the Emperor William should exchange personal communications. The Novoïe Vremya asserted that a word from the German Kaiser ought to make Austria withdraw her note. The Rousskoïe Slovo (July 25) suggested three possible means of avoiding the conflict: (1) Serbia ought to reply to Austria correctly, but certain parts of the ultimatum she ought not to accept. Austrian mobilization would follow. Then mobilization would be announced in Russia and in certain other states. Thus the conflict would be avoided; (2) all the Powers should unite to bring pressure to bear on Vienna; (3) Russia should demand that Austria accept international arbitration. None of these newspapers suggested that Russia should surrender support of Serbia.

All this was before the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28th. All these suggestions,

all the demonstrations and other evidence cited thus far to show the unyielding attitude of Russia, preceded the publication in Russia of the news that Austria had decided to resort to force. What the effect of the Austrian declaration was on public opinion in the Tsar's Empire can easily be imagined. Into the kindling fire of Russian resentment was thrown this fresh inflammable fuel. Anger blazed high. "An ignoble war has been declared to [sic] a weak country," telegraphed the Tsar to the German Kaiser on July 29th. "The indignation in Russia shared fully by me, is enormous. I foresee that very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure brought upon me, and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war." Observers testify to the unswerving determination of Russian public opinion in this issue and to the growing enthusiasm for war. "An extraordinary wave of enthusiasm is sweeping over the country," telegraphed the correspondent of the London Times on July 30th. "The French and British Embassies here are repeatedly surrounded by cheering crowds. If it is war, it will be a popular war." The clash of social classes, of parties, of nationalities yielded to the feeling of fraternity in a common cause. In the Red Square in Moscow, on July 31st, took place a great manifestation of sympathy for the Slav race everywhere. The bulk of the participants were workmen, the leaders members of the upper classes. Nationalism had triumphed over class antagonism. Be-

fore the Austrian declaration of war, the St. Petersburg correspondent of the London Times (July 29) had said that "news of an Austro-Hungarian occupation of Belgrade would inflame [Russian] public opinion." He knew whereof he spoke.

In his excellent book, The Case for the Central Powers, Count Montgelas discusses the attitude of various Powers after July 23rd, toward the question of localizing the Austro-Serbian conflict. In support of the theory that it was reasonable to suppose it might have been localized, he cites documentary evidence from Germany, England, and France. Germany, he points out, sent a Note to the Entente Powers, expressing her earnest desire to localize the dispute and calling attention to the " 'incalculable consequences' " which would ensue, " 'owing to the natural play of alliances,' " if any other Power were to intervene. In London, he says, "the opinion was that Austria had received provocation." Therefore, Sir Edward Grey's view, as stated to the German Ambassador on July 24th and 25th, was that the Austro-Serbian affair "did not concern him, and that he had no title to intervene between Austria and Serbia, but that it would be a different matter if 'the dispute became one between Austria and Russia, and thus affected the peace of Europe.' " On the 27th he said to the Austrian Ambassador that if the Austrian Government " 'could make war on Serbia, and at the same time satisfy Russia, well and good.' " On the

28th he even went so far as to affirm that " 'there must, of course, be some humiliation of Serbia.' " Even Sazonov, Count Montgelas shows, believed that " 'up to the last moment before her démarche in Belgrade, Austria had thought herself justified in hoping that England would make no objections to what she demanded, and that her decision was, to a certain extent, based on this belief.' " In France, Count Montgelas points out, Bienvenu-Martin said that the French Government " 'honestly shared the wish that the conflict should remain localized, and would exert themselves to that end, with a view to the maintenance of European peace.' " The German Embassy, too, reported on the 25th that the German statement with regard to localizing the dispute had made a great impression in Paris. Finally, the French Minister of Justice confidentially admitted on July 26th that " 'Sazonov's view that only the Powers as a whole could pronounce upon Serbia's conduct could hardly be legally upheld.' "

"It will be seen," Count Montgelas concludes, "that the Russian view of the impossibility of localizing the conflict was not shared in London. As lately as on the 26th King George believed that it was possible. As equally satisfactory news from Paris was received at the Wilhelmstrasse, and nothing was known of Poincaré's conversations with Sazonov, there was no reason for giving up the original plan [of localization] at once. The opinion that it was an

illusion bordering on madness to believe for a moment in the possibility of localizing the conflict, cannot be upheld in the face of all this evidence. It is still more effectually refuted by the fact that, thanks to German mediation, there was finally a prospect of reaching an understanding, which was only frustrated by the efforts of the Russian military party, secretly supported by France."

Count Montgelas chooses his words with some care. It would be difficult to refute his contention that it was by no means "an illusion bordering on madness to believe for a moment in the possibility of localizing the conflict"; for it is clear from the evidence he cites that the theory of localization was at first treated not without seriousness either in France or in England, to say nothing of Germany.

Count Montgelas is on less certain ground, however, when he maintains that "there was finally a prospect of reaching an understanding, which was only frustrated by the efforts of the Russian military party, secretly supported by France," and when he asserts later that "an understanding had almost been reached by the methods Germany had been the first to propose, namely, direct discussions between Vienna and St. Petersburg, and limiting the military operations against Serbia, when the Russian mobilization suddenly tore the threads asunder." It will be noted that the statements of diplomats, cited by Count Montgelas to show that the possibility of localiza-

tion was taken seriously in France and England, were made before the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia. Furthermore, his evidence takes no account of the state of public opinion in Russia. If Russian public opinion was as indignant and determined as the evidence cited in this chapter leads us to believe it was, it is difficult to see how the Russian Government could have avoided military intervention, once Austria had resorted to arms against Serbia. This does not necessarily mean, of course, that the Russian people were exceptionally chauvinistic. But, as was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, the issue aroused strong feelings of religious solidarity, of racial solidarity. It sharply reminded Russians that it was the honored tradition of their country to serve as protector of the Slavs of the Balkans. It stimulated national hostility to the Germans of Germany and Austria. It pointed to the supposed duty of defending the principle of the balance of power in the interests of Russia against the Central Powers. It offered the choice of revenge for the diplomatic defeat of 1908-1909 and a new humiliation at the hands of the Ballplatz. In view of all this, and in view of the fact, well known to public opinion, that the Russian army was far stronger and better organized than in previous crises, it does not seem surprising that public opinion called for a resort to arms and that the Government was in sympathy with its demands.

Furthermore, there is another possible reason of

vital importance why the Russian Government failed to offer adequate resistance to the pressure of public opinion, in spite of the terrible prospect confronting Europe. If it yielded on the Serbian issue, the Government risked not merely the derision and denunciation of public opinion, but even the danger of being overthrown. During the crisis Sazonov told Buchanan and Paléologue that the German Government had stated its willingness to guarantee that Serbian integrity would be respected by Austria. "To this he had replied that this might be so, but nevertheless Serbia would become an Austrian vassal, just as, in similar circumstances Bokhara had become a Russian vassal. *There would be a revolution in Russia if she were to tolerate such a state of affairs.*" [3]

An interview which the present writer was fortunate enough to have with A. F. Kerensky, formerly at the head of the Russian revolutionary government, sustains this point of view. It ran, in part, as follows:

> Question: Was it possible to localize the war?
>
> Answer (Mr. Kerensky): No, absolutely impossible. Russia's interests in the Balkans would never have permitted it.
>
> Question: Why, then, did Russia permit the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908?
>
> Answer: The Government was too weak, at that time, too ill-prepared for war to do anything else. But the annexation left in Russia a strong feeling of indignation.

[3] Italics mine.

Had the Russian Government yielded in 1914 *and refused to intervene on the side of Serbia, public opinion in all circles would have been so irritated at the feebleness of this conduct, that the result might easily have been the Government's overthrow.*[4]

In view of all this, it can hardly be maintained that Count Montgelas has established his contention that "an understanding had almost been reached . . . when the Russian mobilization suddenly tore the threads asunder." To the present writer it seems highly improbable that "conversations," attempts at mediation, or other desperate, last-minute efforts to keep the peace, could have prevented the outbreak of the great conflict, after Austria's fateful declaration of war on Serbia. By July 28th the die had been cast. Apparently nothing less than Austrian withdrawal from Serbia would have appeased Russian public opinion. And in all probability Austrian public opinion would never have consented to that.

[4] Translated from the French. Italics mine.

CHAPTER VIII

FEAR, SUSPICION, AND RESOLUTION IN FRANCE

IN his History of Modern Europe, Dr. G. P. Gooch has called attention to the nervous, suspicious nationalism that was growing alarmingly in the countries of continental Europe before the outbreak of the World War. This spirit was strong in France. In 1912 the Belgian Minister to that country commented on the chauvinistic attitude of "turbulent youth and the military." He even suggested that public opinion might force the governments into war, as it had "forced the hand of Napoleon in 1870." The atmosphere seemed to be one of hostile expectancy. Yet when the Crime of Sarajevo occurred, French public opinion at first showed little concern over the incident. Crisis after crisis had passed and the great catastrophe had not come. "Wolf! Wolf!" had been cried too often. Besides, Frenchmen had their eyes turned toward the other side of the Rhine rather than toward the distant banks of the Danube. It was the German menace they feared rather than drastic Austrian action against Serbia. So the French Press commented on the assassination in a more or less detached way and gave a

little resentful attention to the anti-Serbian demonstrations that followed. Then there was a lull.

The lull ceased suddenly with the publication of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. The Press showed definite disapproval. The Serbian reply, on the other hand, was praised for its moderation. It was held that Serbia had yielded as far as she could to the unjustifiable demands of the Ballplatz. At the same time, smoldering suspicion of Germany flared into flame. It was suspected that the government on the other side of the Rhine was standing behind the acts of Austria, even that it was seeking to provoke a general war. There was little disposition to bring pressure to bear on Russia to refrain from intervention, though such pressure was advocated by Socialists, and there was here and there a suggestion of it elsewhere. On the contrary, the general tendency was to hold Russia's attitude quite justifiable and to accord that country full support. Loyalty to the Dual Alliance was generally taken as a matter of course. There was a vigorous protest from Socialists and Syndicalists against entering the conflict, but this was rather a protest against war as war, and a condemnation of the imperialistic, capitalistic policies of all the great countries in the past, than an attempt to justify the Central Powers or to criticize the French interpretation of the crisis. All this will be discussed in some detail in the present chapter; and from this discussion it may perhaps appear why there was approximate

unity among the French people in entering the conflict, why the conviction was so strong that the responsibility for the war lay with the Central Powers.

In the early summer of 1914 there were a number of indications in France of the nervous apprehension of war. The question of national defense was causing much anxiety. An attempt to repeal the law, passed the previous year, fixing the term of compulsory military service at three years, led to much excitement in Parliament and in the Press, and finally failed. Senator Humbert's revelations of grave defects in military preparation greatly disturbed public opinion. "Not since 1870," said Clémenceau, on this occasion, "have I been present at a session of Parliament as agonizing, as sad, as that of to-day." (Matin, July 14.) Suspicion of Germany's intentions was frequently expressed, at times abusively. "In front of Pan-German Germany, which desires to impose by blows of the fist its brutal egoism of a parvenu people," wrote the secretary-general of an athletic league (Matin, June 28), "we must not forget that it was by the sword that our fathers made their most noble aspirations triumph."

There were, of course, Frenchmen who looked across the Rhine with eyes more friendly. But the prevalence and seriousness of the feeling of distrust are indicated by the attitude of the Socialists, normally the most internationally-minded of political groups, toward the use of the general strike as a

means of preventing war. The question came up at the Congress of French Socialists, meeting in Paris in July. In the course of the debate, Jaurès, after expressing approval of the principle of the general strike, added: "Yes, we wish to avoid war by an internal, concerted action, but we are resolved to defend ourselves." And again: "Yes, the problem is poignant. Let us not waste words. England is an island. Russia is protected by the very extent of her territory. France, on the other hand, is exposed to the possibility of seeing her civilization perish under Pan-German brutality." Likewise Sembat, approving the principle, advocated the general strike only for the period preceding the declaration of war. "Once war is declared," he said, "there can be no more discussion." Finally Hervé, once the *enfant terrible* of the anti-militarist movement, opposed emphatically the employment of the strike as a means to prevent war. "I was in 1907," he said, "one of those who propagated with energy, as you know, the idea of insurrection in time of war, for there can be no general strike without insurrection. . . . If I had been at the Congress of Copenhagen, I would have voted with two hands for the Keir Hardie-Vaillant motion [to use the general strike]. To-day I shall not vote for it. . . . I shall go to Vienna [for the International Socialist Congress, which was to have been held there]; but it will not be to sing the 'Internationale.'" (Matin, July 16.)

The General Strike motion was finally passed by the Congress, by 1690 votes against 1174. But it was so emasculated as to mean comparatively little.

"Among all the means employed to forestall and prevent war and to impose on governments recourse to arbitration," the amended motion read, "the Congress considers as particularly efficacious the general workingmen's strike, simultaneously and internationally organized, as well as popular agitation and action in the most active forms." (Matin, July 17.)

The apprehension in France on the eve of the war could hardly be revealed more clearly than by this attitude on the part of the Socialists. If even Socialists spoke of "Pan-German brutality," and showed so little confidence in international proletarian action to prevent war, what must have been the feeling in the country at large? But before Austria sent her ultimatum to Serbia, there seems to have been little relationship between such fears and the impression caused in France by the assassination of the Archduke. Immediately after the crime a general sympathy was naturally evinced for Austria and for the old Emperor. For the dead Archduke there was some praise, considerable criticism. The Temps (June 29) spoke of his attachment to his duties. "He was of delicate health and spent himself without counting the cost." The Petit Journal said that the Slav race had had reason to hope for much from the heir presumptive. Other newspapers commented on his too

strong devotion to Catholicism, his obstinacy, his impulsiveness and his brutality. The Matin (June 29) alleged that during the crisis of 1909 the Archduke had been in favor of a war with Serbia, a conflict which, as he well knew, would have resulted in a war with Russia.

It was pointed out in certain journals that the murder was the result of race hatred. "It is the Serbian idea," wrote M. Clémenceau in an editorial in the Homme Libre on July 1st, "which armed the hand of the murderer of Sarajevo. . . . One cannot be surprised at the somersaults of Pan-Serbianism when great masses of Serbs turn their eyes toward Belgrade, whence they expect, without precisely defining it, the magic gesture which should deliver them from the evils of the conquest." But the general disposition of those French newspapers that I have examined, where they took sides at all, was to side with Serbia rather than with Austria. The Radical (June 30), after stating that the tragedy of Sarajevo was an episode in the conflict of races, said that the Serbs had been stirred up by the tyrannical character of the Austrian policy. The Journal (June 29), likewise, criticized severely the Austrian government of the South Slavs. Some of the Socialist journals went even further. Thus a writer in La Guerre Sociale said: "The only crime which I deplore is that which the Austrians have committed against the Serbs of Bosnia, and which has just received at Sarajevo its

just reward." He then asked why the Slavs should not organize themselves along national lines, as had the French, the Germans, and the Italians. So, too, Marcel Sembat, writing in L'Humanité July 1st, expressed the opinion that the real responsibility for the assassination lay with those who had brought about the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria. And he affirmed that if Austria should put to death Prinzip and Cabrinovitch, she would execute, not political criminals, but "exasperated patriots"!

Austrian suggestions, then, that Serbia was fundamentally to blame for the Crime of Sarajevo met with little sympathy in France. "Neither the Serbian Government nor the Serbian people are, in any degree, responsible for Austria-Hungary's mourning," affirmed the Temps categorically on July 2nd. The anti-Serbian demonstrations and riots in the Dual Monarchy naturally increased sympathy for Serbia and strengthened the feeling that Austria was in the wrong. "The Press begins openly and decisively to take the part of Serbia against Austria-Hungary," telegraphed a Paris correspondent of the Hungarian Pester Lloyd on July 2nd. Some of the French newspapers even suggested uneasily that the Dual Monarchy might have the intention of using the assassination as an occasion to make war on Serbia. But the seriousness of the situation was, of course, far from being appreciated. Clémenceau affirmed that there was no reason to suppose that Austria would be

carried away by the excitement of public opinion. "Austria does not wish war," asserted the Radical on July 13th; "a policy of temporizing which will permit people to calm down, remains, at Vienna, the order of the day."

The tendency of French public opinion to hold with Serbia against Austria is significant in that it mildly foreshadows the anger that was to blaze forth after the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia. It stands in contrast with the pro-Austrian, anti-Serbian attitude of German public opinion after the assassination. Practically the same major facts were accessible to the people of each country; but in each country these facts were interpreted in the light of nationalistic prejudices, of the loyalties and antagonisms of international politics, rather than in the spirit of scientific objectivity.

The German reaction to the Note of the Ballplatz to Belgrade was somewhat like that of a bather who has plunged into water that he finds colder than he had expected: an involuntary shudder, a gasp, and then a shout: "The water is fine!" French opinion, however, found the immersion decidedly distasteful, and said so in no uncertain words. "Local Press," reported the German Ambassador to France, von Schoen, on July 25th, "almost unanimously condemns Austrian Note and states generally that Austria-Hungary evidently wants war." "Austria invokes the morals of civilization," said the Matin

(July 25), "yet she does not treat Serbia as a civilized nation. What civilized nation, indeed, can agree to allow the functionaries of a neighbouring state to act as police in its territory, dismiss its officers and professors, and suppress publications which it finds displeasing?" The Socialist newspaper, Humanité, in sympathy in this matter with its most conservative contemporaries, affirmed (July 25) that "the note addressed by Austria to Serbia is frightfully hard. It seems calculated to humiliate the Serbian people to the depths or to crush them. The conditions which Austria wishes to impose on Serbia are such that one can ask whether the Austrian clerical and militarist forces of reaction do not desire war and do not seek to render it inevitable. This would be the most monstrous of crimes." The suspicion that Austria was deliberately using the assassination as a pretext for making war on Serbia was voiced even more definitely by La Lanterne. This newspaper asserted that all that had passed made it seem as if Austria-Hungary counted on utilizing the crime to further her ambition; for it could not be supposed that the blood of the Archduke imposed an abominable vengeance against an innocent nation, because of the cruel madness of one of her sons.

The apparently very conciliatory character of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum of the Ballplatz, the refusal of the Vienna government to negotiate on the basis of that reply, the declaration of war on Serbia

on July 28th, all seemed to justify previous suspicions of Austrian policy. "Satisfactory beyond all expectation," said the Echo de Paris (July 27) of the Serbian reply. "Never," exclaimed the Matin on the same date, "has a people gone farther along the path of concessions and even, let us use the proper expression, along that of humiliation. . . . In truth, the attitude of Austria passes understanding. She achieves a diplomatic victory total, unhoped for, almost terrifying. And she is not content with it. She wishes to go still farther." When Austria declared war on Serbia, l'Humanité denounced her conduct as unjustifiable. With regard to Austria's allegation that Serbia had not fulfilled all the conditions of the ultimatum, L'Humanité (July 29) maintained that the little state had conceded much more than was to be expected. It is unnecessary to multiply examples further to show how thoroughly indignant the French Press was at Austria's attitude and actions by the time that that country had declared war on Serbia.

More striking than this indignation at Austria, however, was the readiness with which suspicion of German complicity with Austria's course fermented in the public opinion of France. It needed but little evidence to focus on the theory of complicity the widespread distrust felt for the neighboring empire. As early as July 2nd the Echo de Paris suggested an indirect, partial responsibility of Germany for the Crime of Sarajevo in the statement that, "the

Austrian crisis is the work of the Hohenzollerns who took from the Hapsburgs the management of Germany, the work of Bismarck who turned Austria toward the mirage of the East, and finally the work of all those who, at Vienna, having flattered themselves that they were astonishing the world by their ingratitude, have succeeded only in disheartening it by their blindness." But French public opinion had little thought, in the early part of July, of connecting the murder at Sarajevo with an Austro-German plot to bring about a war with Serbia, much less to cause a general war.

The Austrian Note to Serbia, however, at once brought to the fore the theory of German complicity. "I have run against the rumour in the Press," telegraphed von Schoen to the German Foreign Office on July 25th, "that the Austro-Hungarian démarche was arranged between Vienna and Berlin." "No one will believe," wrote Clémenceau editorially in the Homme Libre the same day, "that Austria has acted otherwise than in full accord with Germany." The Action Française pointed out (July 24) that Austria always acted in accord with Germany; when Germany's support was lacking (as, for example, when Vienna desired a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest), Austria had remained immobile. In the present instance, Germany seemed to have urged Austria on. In view of the now well-known fact that on July 5th and 6th Germany gave Austria *carte blanche* in deal-

ing with Serbia, it is evident that this argument struck not far from the truth.

Circumstances strengthened suspicions. On July 24th the German Ambassador paid a visit to the Quai d'Orsay. The Echo de Paris reported that he had declared: (1) that the German Government approved thoroughly of the Note addressed by Austria to Serbia; (2) that it hoped that the discussion would remain localized between Vienna and Belgrade; and (3) that if a third Power were to intervene in the discussion, serious tension might result between the two groups of European Powers.[1] Such a *démarche* could easily result from a sincere desire on the part of the German Government to localize the Austro-Serbian issue and thus prevent a general conflict. But it could also be interpreted as a threat, a challenge to the Powers of the Entente, and an incitement to Austria to make war on Serbia. So the Echo de Paris said: "This démarche is as much as to say: 'Let Austria crush Serbia, otherwise you will have to reckon with Germany.' It is, under the singularly paradoxical pretext of localizing the conflict, the menace of a collective humiliation for the Triple Entente or the prospect of a general war." The

[1] Echo de Paris, July 25; Matin, July 25. Relative to the newspaper report of his *démarche*, von Schoen telegraphed the German Foreign Office as follows: "Echo de Paris publishes a material portion of my yesterday's announcement to the French Government, in part correctly, in part, distorted, inasmuch as it lends a threatening character to my warning against intervention on the part of other Powers."—Kautsky Documents, No. 170, p. 194.

Echo de Paris also alleged that this new "*coup d'Agadir*" had been prepared in the greatest secrecy, at a time when, in London, the Ulster crisis had reached its height, in St. Petersburg the labor question had taken a sharp turn; at a time when the President of France and the President of the Council (Viviani) were leaving Russia. So, too, the Homme Libre affirmed July 26th that "the good naïve people who wished to soothe themselves with the hope that there was no previous arrangement between Vienna and Berlin (which would have implied that these governments were afflicted with insanity) know now what to think." Even the pacific Jaurès, in L'Humanité of the same date, said that if Serbia were to be invaded by Austria, "it will be necessary to judge severely, not merely Austrian diplomacy, but German diplomacy as well."

Distrust of Germany was further deepened by the cold attitude of her Government toward Sir Edward Grey's proposals for mediation, by the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, by the seeming failure of the Wilhelmstrasse to do anything, as the days passed, to restrain the Ballplatz in its mad course. The Temps (July 29) asserted that if Germany should reject Sir Edward Grey's proposal for mediation "*à quatre*," civilized opinion would conclude that she desired war. The Action Française held the reply of Berlin to Sir Edward to be equivalent to a refusal, and asserted (July 29) that it was becoming more and

more evident, from hour to hour, that the Austro-German bloc was persevering in that policy of intimidation which had been so continuously successful for the past nine years. On July 30th the Temps, commenting editorially on the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia, said: "It is henceforth certain that Germany has not wished to do anything to restrain her ally." On the previous day Izvolsky had telegraphed Sazonov that the French Press "passes severe judgment upon the Austrian attack and Germany's manifest share of blame for it." The complaint that Germany was not acting to restrain Austria was made over and over again by the French Press. In conversation with Bienvenu-Martin, von Schoen expressed astonishment that "the idea that we were urging Austria on and should therefore be responsible if a general conflict grew out of the Austro-Serbian quarrel, not only found expression in the French Press, but even seemed to haunt the minds of highly-placed personages who ought to know better." Bienvenu-Martin replied that the Press was not accusing Germany of "driving Austria directly onward, but only of not restraining" her. But between the theory that Germany was not trying to restrain her ally and the idea that she was urging Austria on, there was no very clear dividing line. It is not easy to build fences in the field of suspicion.

It would be unfair to imply, however, that during these terrible days there was a total unwillingness on

the part of French public opinion to give Germany the benefit of any doubt. "Everywhere," said La Petite République on July 27th, "is offered the goodwill necessary for mediation; it becomes more and more clear that Germany has not premeditated an evil blow: so many reasons to justify our first hopes and to re-enforce our confidence that the diplomatic sky will soon clear." Similarly, the Radical stated on July 26th that, "Germany, more than we, has been surprised by the disconcerting initiative of her ally and Germany does not love the unknown in circumstances which she has not herself prepared." Two days later the same paper said: "So we see, at the present moment, a single light in the dark storm which overhangs Europe: the calm attitude of France and Germany, who still watch with folded arms and sword in sheath." But at the same time it pointed out that it seemed improbable that Austria would embark on such a terrible adventure without the assent and the counsel of her ally. On the 29th, with diminishing confidence, the Radical said that while the German Government did not declare itself hostile to peace, its protests of goodwill, general and not precise, were not followed by any useful act, so that her adherence to the principle of mediation seemed rather to delay than to hasten a favorable solution. "Berlin holds herself in reserve," continued the journal; "we shall not precipitately conclude from this that the German Government is pre-

paring a surprise or that it is secretly pushing toward war. . . . The German Government is perhaps more embarrassed than threatening." But the hope of Germany's goodwill grew dimmer and dimmer, as the clouds of suspicion rolled in more and more thickly. "Pessimism continues in Paris," telegraphed the correspondent of the London Times on July 29th, "and the tone of the Press against Germany is much sharper." (Issue of July 30.) Germany's declaration of war on Russia on August 1st seemed to confirm belief in her guilt. "Germany," said the Echo de Paris (August 2), "has coldly provoked the greatest catastrophe ever seen in the history of the world."

In contrast with these darkening suspicions of Germany, stood confidence in Russia, approval of her attitude and policy. "We find ourselves in the presence of an anti-Slav reaction to which Russia cannot remain indifferent," said the Journal on the 24th, the day after the dispatch of the Austrian Note to Serbia. The next day the Radical affirmed that it was Russia's place to determine in what measure the Serbs could count on material aid from her. Other organs of public opinion expressed themselves more strongly. "Russia has multiplied the proofs of her patience since 1908," said the Temps (July 25). "What they demand of her to furnish to-day would take—how deny it?—the form of an abdication. In all conscience we do not believe that the Russian peo-

ple would permit this, even if the Government consented to it." "There are hours when no retreat is possible," proclaimed La Libre Parole; "they know at St. Petersburg that at the first cannon-shot on the Danube, the general war is inevitable." And Clémenceau, with a lack of balance little characteristic of him, wrote editorially in l'Homme Libre July 27th: "All the despatches from Petersburg show us, as it was easy to foresee, that having made so many sacrifices in the cause of peace, Russia could not, nevertheless, consent to be *annihilated*."

Similarly, the Echo de Paris, after pointing out that Russia appeared to have resolved on vigorous action if Austria should act against Serbia, affirmed (July 25) that, "the attitude of Russia could not be otherwise." "Russia cannot allow Austria to achieve the ruin of the Slavic nations of which she [Russia] has declared herself the protector," said the Matin (July 26); and added that "the day that Russia enters on the scene, the clauses of the Triple Alliance will come into play, Germany will have to come to the aid of her ally, and then it will be the turn of France to fulfill her engagements." "France waits for the action of her ally" said the Action Française (July 29), and added that the *casus foederis* could present itself "to-day or to-morrow in all its clearness." Izvolsky, the Russian Ambassador to France, was delighted with the development of French opinion. "The firm attitude taken up by the French

Press continues," he telegraphed to Sazonov on July 29th. "It passes severe judgment on the Austrian attack and upon Germany's manifest share of blame for it, and unhesitatingly declares that this touches us and that we cannot remain unsympathetic. As regards solidarity with us, this question is not once discussed, but is taken as a matter of course. Every journalist expresses himself in this sense, including such prominent personages belonging to the most diverse parties as Pichon, Clémenceau, and even Jaurès, and also Hervé, the father of anti-militarism."

For all this approval of Russia's attitude and policy, however, there was evinced in certain quarters a disposition to bring pressure to bear on her to persuade her not to intervene forcibly in the Austro-Serbian issue. The chief effort to bring such pressure to bear was made by the Socialists. On July 28th they published a party manifesto, in which, among other things, they demanded that the French Government "act on its ally, Russia, in order that she might not be so carried away as to seek, in the defense of Slav interests, a pretext for aggressive operations." L'Humanité (July 28) asserted that Russia would commit a grave fault if she precipitated operations and enlarged the conflict. Approaching the question from a different angle from that of the Socialists, a writer in the Aurore argued that the Serbs had an excellent army, well-equipped. There was no reason

to assume that Serbia could not, by herself, attain victory. Why, then, should Russia intervene? Even the Matin, whose sympathies were with Russia very decidedly, but whose attitude during those trying days impresses the investigator as one of dignity and sincerity, expressed the hope (July 29) that that country would not consider the entrance of the Austrian army into Belgrade as a *casus belli.*

The effort of the Socialists, however, was belated. Their influence was slight. Other suggestions that Russia might hold aloof were few and far between. In the Journal's rather extensive review of the French Press, no suggestion is to be found, between July 25th and August 2nd, that pressure ought to be brought to bear on Russia not to intervene. The Paris correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, indeed, affirmed on July 28th that war on behalf of Russia would not be popular in France. "Should Germany declare war only against Russia," he said, "France, it appears, would be obliged by the terms of the Franco-Russian Alliance to join with Russia. In that case there might be serious troubles in France, for a war on behalf of Russia, if France had not been attacked, would be extremely unpopular." (Issue of July 29.) The opinion of the correspondent of the Manchester Guardian is certainly entitled to respect. But quite possibly he gained his impressions from conversations with individuals rather than from a survey of the Press. The tendency of the newspapers was de-

cidedly to sustain Russia's course; and in the formation of the opinion of the moment—which is all we are here considering—the voice of the Press counted for far more than the voice of the man in the street. Moreover, to French public opinion the issue appeared to be not that of a Balkan imbroglio, in relation to which France had to decide whether or not to aid Russia against Austria, but rather that of an Austro-Russian quarrel, dangerously complicated by a grave German menace. In regard to this larger issue the Manchester Guardian's correspondent said: "Some people here believe that if Russia should declare war on Austria, Germany would attack France. In that case the whole French people would at once unite to resist the attack, and all agitation against the war would cease."

Imbued, then, with this strong tendency to sympathize with Russian policy, however vigorous, the French Press naturally put little faith in the idea of localizing the Austro-Serbian conflict as a means of maintaining European peace. The Journal, for example, pointing out that Germany was asking for a localization of the conflict, said (July 28) that France and England, on the other hand, considered that in localization lay the principal risk of complications, because it exposed Russia to violent attacks against Slav interests. "The idea of localizing the conflict," said L'Humanité on July 27th, "appears more and more chimerical. Passions, already

everywhere excited, would be inflamed to delirium by the outbreak of [Austro-Serbian] hostilities." Some hope in mediation was expressed. But Clémenceau, in the Homme Libre of July 29th, even though he supported Sir Edward Grey's proposals, said that "all the European conferences in the world are powerless to change facts. Who knows it better than the very Minister who is still president of a pompous European conference which we see in process of foundering in the waters of Albania?" And the Action Française (July 28) affirmed editorially of Sir Edward's proposal for a conference: "He has made one of those solemn declarations, on the effectiveness of which experience has unfortunately taught us no longer to count." This newspaper also said that it seemed probable that if the conference met, Germany and Austria would dominate it and the Triple Entente would again have to submit to their domination.

The feeling was very strong in France during these decisive days that the key to peace was to be found in Berlin. "It is not at St. Petersburg, nor at London, nor at Rome that the secret of to-morrow lies," said La Lanterne, "it is at Berlin." Germany's warning to France and England of the consequences which would ensue on the entry of Russia on the scene, L'Humanité pointed out (July 27), implied that these governments would be able to act on the Russian Government. "But, in that case, why should

not Germany, on her side, act on her ally, Austria?" "Everyone knows," asserted Clémenceau in an editorial in L'Homme Libre July 28th, "that a word from Berlin [to Austria] would be sufficient to stop everything." "Vienna would dare nothing," affirmed a newspaper of the provinces, "if Berlin refused her the support of the German sword." It expressed the hope that the firm attitude of Russia, protector of the Slavs, would cause the Kaiser to reflect. Many other illustrations of this point of view might be adduced. The correspondent of the London Times (July 27th) emphasized the feeling in Paris that the possibility of a solution lay in the attitude of Germany. "Does Germany want war? In the answer to this question lies the key to the situation." The German Ambassador telegraphed home on July 30th that a "large portion of the Press seems to think that chances for peace lie materially in the fact that war would be too dangerous a game for Germany in view of firm coherence of Triple Entente."

A small minority sought a way out of the terrible situation through direct protest and demonstration against war itself. The manifesto of the Socialist Party, published in L'Humanité July 28th, has already been mentioned. It called for mediation, it urged the French Government to bring pressure to bear on Russia, and it denounced war. "Against the policy of violence, against the methods of brutality which can at any moment unchain on Europe a catas-

trophe without precedent," the manifesto ran in part, "the proletarians of all countries rise and protest. They signify their horror of war and their will to prevent it. The Socialists, the workers of France, make an appeal to the entire country to contribute with all its strength to the maintenance of peace." On the evening of the 27th of July there were demonstrations against war on the grand boulevards of Paris. Crowds sang the Internationale and with raucous voices shouted: "A bas la guerre! Vive la paix!" The police intervened, with some brutality, according to L'Humanité and the Echo de Paris of July 28th, and arrested some five or six hundred persons. But, according to Izvolsky, the French Government attached little importance to these anti-military demonstrations. In truth, there seems little reason for it to have done so. Even the revolutionary newspaper, La Guerre Sociale, said that if the catastrophe should come in spite of all efforts to prevent it, then "we know but one duty—we international Socialists—it is to defend the hearth of liberty which our fathers, the revolutionaries of 1789, of 1792, of 1848, of 1870 and of the Commune created at the price of so many efforts and of so much blood!

"Between imperial Germany and republican France, no hesitation, our choice is made.

"Vive la France républicaine et socialiste."

There were warlike demonstrations in Paris, too, as there were in Vienna, Berlin, and St. Petersburg.

On the evening of July 26th a patriotic manifestation took place at the Place de l'Opéra, where some three hundred young people, preceded by the tricolor, marched to and fro, crying: "Vive la France! Vive l'Armée!" But they were dispersed by the police. At the Place de la Concorde a hundred and fifty people met and intoned the Marseillaise before the Strassbourg statue. Meetings were also improvised on the grand boulevards. When Poincaré returned to Paris on July 29th, he received a great ovation. There were shouts of "Vive Poincaré! Vive l'armée!" and occasionally "Vive la guerre!"

But the spirit of France, in this dark hour, was not given over to chauvinism. In commenting on the ovation to Poincaré, the Paris correspondent of the London Times (July 30) telegraphed: "The Chauvinistic note . . . was far from being general, and it was distinctly a patriotic display and not a war demonstration." "War enthusiasm not present in the country," reported German agents in France about this time. "Fleet remains at Toulon." "I cannot believe in war unless Russia wants it. . . ." wrote Lord Bertie, the British Ambassador to France, in his diary on July 27th. "What is a danger is the war fever in the Berlin populace. There is no war fever here." And the next day he noted: "There is much nervous excitement [in Paris], but no popular demonstrations for war, like [sic] at Berlin." Lord Bertie was hardly in a position to measure the feeling in Berlin; but his

testimony in regard to the popular attitude in Paris is of value. Difficult as it is to gauge popular sentiment with accuracy, it would seem from the evidence available that there was less enthusiasm for war both in Paris and in Berlin than there was in either Vienna or St. Petersburg. There seems to have been much of fatalism in the French attitude. "Practically the whole Press and behind it the whole French people," telegraphed the correspondent of the London Morning Post on July 27th, "is unanimous in declaring that if Germany wants war France is ready and will be loyal both to the letter and spirit of her Alliance." (Issue of July 28.)

To French public opinion in general, then, the case appeared quite clear. An objective attitude toward the situation was from the start virtually impossible, by reason of the bias against the Central Powers, particularly the prejudice against Germany, fostered by the schools and the Press, and by reason of sympathy for Russia, largely the fruit of the Franco-Russian alliance. In spite of underlying suspicions, however, the possible international significance of the Sarajevo incident was little appreciated by the French Press; and the severity of the Austrian Note took opinion by surprise. The feeling against Austria aroused by its terms was intensified by the moderation of the Serbian reply. Underlying suspicion of Germany crystallized quickly in the theory that Germany must be in league with Austria in the action;

for it was reasonably felt that the Dual Monarchy would never have adopted such a policy without German backing. Distrust of Germany was strengthened by her apparent failure to listen receptively to Sir Edward Grey's proposals for mediation, by her seeming failure to bring pressure to bear on Austria to keep hands off Serbia, and finally by her apparently precipitate and unnecessary declaration of war on Russia. On the other hand, Russia's firm attitude, her resolve to protect Slavic Serbia seemed to French opinion both natural and commendable. "One thing that is certain for France and for England," said the Temps on July 30th, "is that Russia has done everything and continues to do everything not to precipitate the crisis." The French placed little faith, then, in the idea that the Austro-Serbian conflict could be localized, and there was unfortunately but a slight tendency to bring pressure to bear on Russia to refrain from intervention. It is in its failure to bring strong pressure to bear on the Tsar's government that French public opinion is perhaps chiefly open to criticism; though it must be admitted that it is highly improbable that at that late date such pressure would have had any decisive effect. In any case, the conviction became more and more firm that the choice between war and peace lay with Berlin.

Toward the end it seemed to the French more and more evident that Berlin was resolved on war. They felt that France was caught in the clutch of

circumstance and that she was being forced into a war that she neither willed nor desired. Feeling against Germany became so heated that it could boil over at almost any time; and it would seem that this feeling, coupled with the fear and suspicion in Germany, had, toward the last, rendered the entrance of France into the conflict practically inevitable, unless possibly Russia had unexpectedly backed down, an outcome extremely unlikely. Even had Russia yielded, frontier friction might easily have precipitated a conflict between France and Germany. That Germany actually declared war on France on August 3rd is a fact of minor causal significance for the outbreak of the war, however important it may have been for French morale. At one o'clock in the morning of August 1st, the Russian military attaché at Paris dispatched a telegram to St. Petersburg stating that the French Minister of War had informed him that the French Government had decided on war. The same day the French Government ordered general mobilization, but did not declare war. According to Izvolsky, Poincaré for certain reasons preferred to have the declaration of war come from Germany, though the President of France had no doubt that if the French Parliament were to be assembled to consider the question, it would decide to declare war. French public opinion was evidently ready for such a decision.

CHAPTER IX

INDECISION IN ENGLAND

IN the calculations and speculations of the other Powers the attitude of Great Britain remained an uncertain factor almost to the time of her declaration of war on Germany. As Professor Bernadotte Schmitt has expressed it, "Great Britain, by her unwillingness or her inability to state her position, made it possible for the war parties in every capital to speculate on her assistance or her neutrality"; and Professor Barnes has pointed out that "Russia and France were never sure of the degree to which they could count upon British aid until August 2, 1914." Certain critics have even suggested or affirmed that for its failure to take a definite stand until too late the British Cabinet must bear a heavy share of responsibility for the immediate origins of the war. "I must raise against the British Cabinet," says Admiral von Tirpitz, "the grave charge that, although it was well aware of Bethmann's love of peace and his whole nature, it brought upon itself a large share of the responsibility for the outbreak of war by its vagueness as to England's attitude during the crisis." "The final mistake," says Lord Loreburn, "was that when, on the actual

crisis arising, a decision one way or the other might and, so far as can be judged, would have averted the Continental War, the Ministers could not make up their minds or take a firm resolution in time."

It is the contention of the present writer that it would have been both difficult and unwise for the British Cabinet, at any rate until toward the very end of the crisis, to have announced a decision to stand by France and Russia in the event of war. Shortly after Austria had sent her ultimatum to Serbia, Sazonov asked Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St. Petersburg, whether England would support Russia in case of need. Sir George replied that the English Government would give all the diplomatic support in their power; but he "could not . . . hold out any hope of their making a declaration of solidarity that would entail an unconditional engagement to support France and Russia by force of arms on behalf of a country like Serbia, where no direct British interests were involved. Such an engagement would not be sanctioned by British public opinion; and, unless backed by public opinion, no British Government could take upon themselves the responsibility of pledging their country to war." It will be shown in this chapter that during the greater part of the diplomatic crisis British public opinion was seriously divided. There was much more criticism of Serbia in England than there was, for example, in France. There was a decided disinclination in many quarters

to support Russia and France in a Continental war arising out of the Austro-Serbian issue. Toward the end there was, indeed, a drift toward participation; and with the invasion of Belgium there came unity, though not unanimity. But a premature declaration on the part of the Cabinet would have placed it in an extremely awkward position in relation to the British public.

No one who follows intelligently the comments of the British Press on the Austro-Serbian affair will be surprised that many Austrians and Germans believed that there was strong sympathy in England for the Austrian cause. The theory that the Crime of Sarajevo was the outcome of a Pan-Serbian plot was supported from the first by influential British newspapers. Thus the London Standard said on June 29th that behind the typesetter and the student there appeared to have been personalities more serious; and it suggested that the crime was perhaps committed in revenge for the annexation of Bosnia under Count Aerenthal in 1908. The Pall Mall Gazette went further, asserting that the plot was apparently hatched in Belgrade, that it was quite possible that the most severe consequences would fall on the heads of the Serbian people, and that it was to the interest of the Serbian Government to shake off the insane nationalism that had given birth to the crime. This newspaper protested that it did not assert that any responsible Serb in any way shared in the crime; but

it alleged that Serbia, in the recent past, had soiled herself with dark deeds and that brutality was only too often a factor in Serbian politics. The Daily Mail pointed out that the "iron hand" had been frequently employed by Austria in the past, and that one could not much blame her, inasmuch as within her frontiers were five million people of the Serb race who had tended to look to Serbia for the satisfaction of their desires.[1] Even the London Times (July 2) said that "there cannot be any doubt that the murders were the result of a political conspiracy, or that this was a Serb conspiracy." "Basing their information upon reports coming from Austrian sources," telegraphed the Serbian Minister in London to the Serbian Prime Minister on July 1st, "nearly all the English newspapers attribute the Sarajevo outrage to the work of Serbian revolutionaries."

Some of the British newspapers pointed out that it was the duty of Serbia herself to investigate the origins of the crime, criticized her failure to do so and condemned roundly the Serbian Press campaign of vilification. Serbia "ought herself, and of her own motion," said the London Times of July 16th, "to undertake the inquiry, which she has reason to suppose that Austria-Hungary will call upon her to make, and to lay the full report of the proceedings

[1] Cited in the Matin, June 30; on July 2nd, the Daily Mail, while expressing regret at the anti-Serbian demonstrations in Sarajevo said that "they are at least explicable by the natural indignation of the local inhabitants at the cowardly deed of a Serb fellow-citizen."

before the Powers." "Serbia will be well advised," warned the great Liberal organ, the Westminster Gazette, the next day (July 17), "if she realises the reasonableness of her great neighbor's anxiety, and does whatever may be in her power to allay it, without waiting for a pressure which might involve what Count Tisza calls 'warlike complications.'" The Daily Graphic, a few days later (July 21), said that Austria's natural anger at the "monstrous crime of Sarajevo" had been aggravated "by the callous posture of Belgrade." "It is possible," continued that journal, "—we hope, indeed, it is true—that the conspiracy of Prinzip and Cabrinovitch had no abettors in Serbia; but if the Serbs wished to act with the most elementary 'correctitude' and civility, it was their duty, from the moment they found suspicion settling upon them, to make public and official repudiation of the crime. If, moreover, they had spontaneously offered to assist the Austrian Government in tracking out its organisers and abettors they would have performed a neighbourly duty, and would have vastly enhanced their reputation in the eyes of Europe. Instead of that they have passed over the crime, committed by a Serb in the interests of Serb megalomania, with a cynical shrug of the shoulders."

Earlier in the month, the Daily Graphic had written that the Belgrade Government would do well to disavow the tactless Serbian newspapers and to demonstrate the loyalty of its protests against the murder

of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand. The Westminster Gazette a little later (July 17) pointed out that the Austro-Serbian situation had "not been improved by the Press campaign which has gone on in Serbia since the assassination; and it is suspected in Vienna and Buda-Pesth that a deliberate campaign is being made to work on the population of Serbian nationality in the Empire, in order to prepare their separation from the monarchy, should an opportunity present itself." The London Times (July 16) denounced even more roundly the conduct of the Serbian Press. "The reckless and provocative language which a good many Serbian newspapers are alleged to have used, both before and after the crime that has shocked Europe," it said, "cannot do anything but mischief to the cause they have at heart. It exasperates public opinion across the Danube and it estranges the sympathies of all civilized peoples. Some of these articles not only charge the Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia with all manner of enormities, but openly advocate the destruction of the Dual Monarchy as a service to humanity."

A balanced appraisal of England's attitude toward the Austro-Serbian affair before July 23rd, however, can not confine itself to utterances condemning Serbia or favorable to Austria. The great conservative Morning Post and the Daily Citizen, organ of Labor interests, in domestic politics at opposite poles, were almost at one in their opposition to the Austrian atti-

tude toward Serbia. A few days after the Crime of Sarajevo the Morning Post (July 1) did, indeed, state that there was no doubt "that the assassination was purely political in the sense that the crime was the outcome of bitter feelings produced in the Serb race by Austro-Hungarian policy. It was as foolish as it was wicked." But it was Austria that the Post held fundamentally responsible. "The Agram trial," it said, "revealed to the world the nature of the intrigues by which the Austro-Hungarian bureaucrats were ready to attack the unity of the Serb race and the unscrupulous character of those who carried on these intrigues. It was against the Orthodox Serbs, the religious as well as racial kin of the inhabitants of Serbia, that the bureaucrats' energies were directed. . . . The resentment [of the Orthodox Serbs] produced the crime of Sunday. . . . There is no need to look across the border to Serbia for instigators of the crime. But it is the obvious cue of the bureaucrats of the class that arranged the Agram persecutions to point to Serbia as the source of the trial." Later the Post (July 6) asserted that "the Serbian Government, quite apart from the absence of motive for it to favour the crimes that were committed, knows too well the danger that would threaten it from an angry Austria-Hungary to have in any way countenanced a conspiracy such as is suggested in the Pester Lloyd." On July 21st it said: "Count Tisza lately made a speech full of menace to Serbia. There seems

to be a school of politicians at Vienna and Budapest that would like to conquer and annex Serbia."

The Daily Citizen of July 4th severely criticized Austrian oppression of Serbians living in the Dual Monarchy, and affirmed the absurdity of the Austrian attempt to hold the neighboring country responsible for the Crime of Sarajevo. "We wish to protest strongly," it said, "against the shameful cruelties now being perpetrated in Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . Though society has a right to guard all its members against the hand of the assassin, it has no right to hold a whole people responsible and to punish them mercilessly for the crime of a fanatic or a few fanatics." Later (July 22) it stated that "Austria has tried to fix responsibility for the murder on the Serbian Government and the Serbian people. This, of course, is absurd, and raises the suspicion that Austria will try to use the murder as an excuse for picking a quarrel with Serbia in order to advance her own territorial ambitions."

Even those newspapers which evinced some sympathy for Austria's attitude before July 23rd, were some of them inclined to qualify this sympathy with suggestions of moderation, with warnings, and sometimes with frank criticism. The Daily Mail, which, as has been pointed out, said that one could not much blame Austria for having used the iron hand in the past, added that the Emperor Francis Joseph was not the man to be led to vengeance, and that he could be

counted on to pursue a policy of reconciliation. The Pall Mall Gazette, while highly critical of Serbia, on July 10th asserted that "unfortunately the political position of the Serbs under Austrian rule makes disaffection inevitable, and with those conditions it is impossible to prevent their restlessness from finding succour from their kinsmen beyond the border. The real 'pacification' of her Southern Slav provinces is a task which Austria has not yet attempted." The same newspaper (July 14) deplored the failure of Austria to "get to the deeper roots of the Pan-Serbian movement by liberalizing the government of the South Slav provinces of the Monarchy and withdrawing the goad of Magyar high-handedness." The London Times, which supported the idea that the Crime of Sarajevo was the outcome of a Serb conspiracy, added that "unsupported accusations against the Government of Belgrade, and against the subjects of King Peter, can but lessen the impression produced by the assassinations and divert the European sympathies they may have aroused. . . . The crime . . . affords Austria-Hungary an opportunity for showing that she can treat the Serb question with justice and magnanimity, despite the outrage done her dearest sentiments. To use that opportunity wisely and well, disregarding the clamours of the hour, would be a real proof of provident and sagacious statesmanship." So, too, while the Times denounced the Serbian Press campaign in scathing terms, it pointed out that

the Dual Monarchy could not solve the South Slav question "in a sense satisfactory to Austria-Hungary by force, or by menaces of force which irritate, but do not strike terror." (Issues of July 2 and 16. Vide editorials July 6 and 22.)

In general, Englishmen concerned themselves little with the Austro-Serbian affair before July 23rd. The Irish question was at that time in the forefront of British consciousness. Austrians were justified, however, in believing that influential sections of British opinion attributed the assassination of the Archduke to a Greater Serbian conspiracy, and felt that the Dual Monarchy had had much to endure from her recalcitrant Slav neighbor. But Austrians and Germans tended to read too much into expressions of opinion favorable to them. They were prone to quote such utterances and to neglect the statements of such journals as the Morning Post, which was severely critical of the Austrian attitude, and the qualifications and warnings which, in other newspapers, often accompanied expressions of opinion friendly to the Dual Monarchy.

English sympathy with the Austrian cause, however, persisted even after the publication of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, though it tended somewhat to cool during the next few days. "The Austro-Hungarian Note to Serbia," said the Pall Mall Gazette on July 24th, "is conspicuous for its union of firmness with restraint. That Belgrade is a hotbed

of conspiracy against the tranquillity of a neighbouring State is undeniable. It is the duty of the Serbian Government not only to keep itself aloof from such machinations, but to refuse them the shelter of its jurisdiction. Austria is entitled to demand the strict fulfilment of those obligations, and we trust the answer to her summons will show a genuine readiness on the part of Serbia's rulers to purge the country of its reproach." The tone of the next day's editorial (July 25) was a little less cordial, though still friendly: "Austria has every warrant for requiring that the Serbian Government shall bestir itself to put an end to these machinations upon its soil. . . . The moral claim of Austria is thus incontestable. The only way in which she can lose the general sympathy of Europe is by advancing it in such a form as would appear to make war inevitable even if Serbia were prepared to make satisfaction of her legitimate demands. It is impossible to say that the Austrian note to Belgrade does not lend itself at some angles to this construction. Its language is so peremptory that the Serbian Government may feel itself placed between the alternatives of conflict and of a humiliation that could not be exceeded by defeat in war." On the 27th the Pall Mall Gazette pointed out that there were really two issues: (1) The immediate and narrower issue between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. "Here the balance of right and justice is with Austria. Serbian aggression on her security and internal peace has

become intolerable." (2) The possibility of a desire to bring the solidity of the Triple Entente to the test. The newspaper pointed out that the strain on Russian national sentiment was severe and might bring war. It said that Serbia had accepted all the demands of the Note but two, and that it was for Austria-Hungary to decide whether she would insist on these two or would find other guarantees for her security. The next day it asserted that now that the full text of the Serbian reply was known, it was "seen to teem with endless possibilities of evasion," that "a lasting settlement" could "only be obtained on a basis of reparation and justice," that "the Powers must see to it that Austria" got "her due," but that the Dual Monarchy must give strong guarantees that it was seeking no territorial expansion and would not impair the sovereignty of Serbia.

Lengthy citations from other newspapers would be wearisome. A few extracts, however, will serve to show how widespread was English sympathy for the Austrian point of view in spite of the severity of the Note. But they will show also that that sympathy did not necessarily imply full approval, and that, as in the case of the Pall Mall Gazette, there was a drift away from support of the Austrian cause. The Daily Telegraph, on July 25th, said that it was "not . . . in a position to assert that the charges against Belgrade are all justifiable or all true. But since Serbia obviously considered the Archduke as her enemy, and it

was considerably to her interest that he should be removed out of the way, there is, at all events, something more than mere plausibility in the accusation that the military party in Serbia are not wholly free from responsibility in this matter." On the 27th it said: "We reprobate all the crimes which are associated with the Serbian military party. On general grounds we are inclined to believe that Austria-Hungary is justified in demanding full and prompt repudiation of all those nefarious schemes which have politics as their excuse and murder as their handmaid." But the next day, after the Serbian reply to Austria's ultimatum had been published, the tone of the Daily Telegraph changed. It said that Serbia had refused only two demands; so that "we can hardly be surprised that M. Pashitch and his advisers should be reluctant to surrender so entirely Serbia's integral powers and responsibilities as a sovereign state." Yet Austria had deemed the answer unsatisfactory "which suggests the sinister explanation . . . that the Dual Monarchy has made up its mind, and insists on war at any price."

The Financial News (July 27) affirmed that "Serbia deserved no consideration in a plight which she has brought herself into [sic] by sheer indifference to the ordinary decencies of international life." But on the other hand it said that "though this country is traditionally friendly to Austria-Hungary, we are under no obligation to approve slavishly—as

the German ally does—the Dual Monarchy's policy and attitude towards Serbia. It has unvariably been sordid and hard." The London Times on July 25th summarized the case for and against Austria:

"It can hardly be doubted that a movement does exist in Serbia which aims at the ultimate creation of a 'Greater Serbia' mainly at Austria-Hungary's expense, or that this movement is promoted and carried on by societies like the Norodna Odbrana, or that Serbian officers and officials are engaged in it, or that Serbian newspapers foster it and incite their readers to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary and her institutions. It is true, too, speaking broadly that the Serbian Government have not taken effectual action to suppress this movement against a neighbouring Power or to keep its activities from the taint of crime. It may be acknowledged that from the strict standpoint of international right any Power which suffers such treatment from a neighbour is entitled to end it by the threat of war, or even by war itself. But the Power which determines to exercise this right cannot expect others to own the justice of her action until she establishes it by something more than bare assertion. That is all Austria-Hungary has given us hitherto—except perhaps in the unpublished *dossier*." [2]

[2] The Daily Chronicle for July 25th, commenting on the Austrian ultimatum, said: "The Note is drastic; so much so that it would be difficult for any Government to swallow it in 48 hours; and yet scarcely more drastic than the reasonable self-defence of the Dual

The attitude of a few British newspapers was more critical of Austria. "The tone of the Austrian Note," said the Daily Express (July 28), "the harshness in insisting on humiliating demands, the abrupt enforcement at a 'selected moment,' all recall the Bosnia-Herzegovina coup, and dissipate the idea of reasonableness in Vienna." The Daily Mail (July 25) asserted that the content and tone of the Austrian Note went far beyond the exigencies of international usage: "Austria-Hungary," said this newspaper, "bases her demands on right. In reality it is the voice of might that speaks." The Morning Post of the same date, consistent in its anti-Austrian attitude, of course, criticized severely the tone and the terms of the ultimatum.

On the whole, however, British sympathy after the dispatch of the ultimatum was at first clearly rather

Monarchy requires it to be." The Westminster Gazette, July 24th, said: "The allegation is that Serbian officials are directly implicated, and we cannot imagine that Serbia will be so ill-advised as not to deal very respectfully and seriously with the charges made. We do not say that the charges ought to be admitted." The next day it affirmed that Austria had established a prima facie case and repeated its opinion that Serbia ought to give a serious answer. But it added that "the ultimatum is in terms so urgent and severe that compliance with its demands is extremely difficult to an independent State which, though small, has a high opinion of its own importance." The Manchester Guardian said on July 25th that the Note to Serbia was very stiff in its terms, but "would not any country be angry which believed that the heir to its throne had been assassinated by a conspiracy in a neighbouring country and in furtherance of a design to detach one of its provinces from its allegiance?" The Standard (cited in L'Homme Libre, July 26) said that English sympathies were entirely with the country and the government which was suffering from Serbian obstinacy.

with Austria than with Serbia. There had long been a certain prejudice in England against Serbia; there had long been a somewhat tepid friendliness for Austria. The crime had shocked British opinion; and the attitude of the Serbian Government and Press later had made a bad impression in England. The feeling against the little country found its most vigorous expression in an article in John Bull, the organ of the cultured Bottomley, entitled "To Hell with Serbia." [3]

Austria's intransigent policy, however, culminating in her declaration of war on Serbia naturally tended to alienate English sympathy. On July 29th, Lichnowsky reported that Sir Edward Grey had told him that the English Government "of course had to reckon with public opinion. Up to the present it had in general been in favor of Austria, as the justice of a certain satisfaction due her was recognized; but now it was beginning to turn completely to the other side, as a result of Austrian stubbornness." Austria's Note, her flat rejection of Serbia's reply, her declaration of war on Serbia aroused the suspicion in certain quarters that she was deliberately challenging the Entente and thus helped to orient the English people toward war. But the English people would, of course,

[3] Cited in Montgelas, The Case for the Central Powers, p. 239. On August 3, the Manchester Guardian said: "Of all the smaller Powers of Europe, Serbia is, quite decidedly, the one whose name is most foully daubed with dishonour. The record of her rulers and her policy in recent years is unmatched as a tissue of cruelty, greed, hypocrisy and ill-faith," etc.

never have fought solely for Serbia's sake; and a declaration by Sir Edward Grey of the solidarity of England with France and Russia, before the Austro-Serbian question had broadened into a definite European issue, would clearly not have been sanctioned by British public opinion. Winston Churchill says of the Cabinet itself on July 27th that it was "overwhelmingly pacific. At least three-quarters of its members were determined not to be drawn into a European quarrel, unless Great Britain were herself attacked, which was not likely."

As the fear developed, however, that the Serbian crisis might lead to a general war, British opinion cast about for means to avert the threatening calamity. After the Austrian ultimatum had been dispatched, the first possibility for peace was that Serbia might yield. Certain influential British newspapers advised or suggested that she do so, at least so far as she "reasonably" could. It has already been pointed out that the Pall Mall Gazette, on July 24th, said that it trusted that the reply to the Austrian Note would show "a genuine readiness on the part of Serbia's rulers to purge the country of its reproach." The Daily Chronicle (July 25) said that the most that Russia "can wisely do is to advise Serbia to give way, at the same time pledging herself to stand guard over Austria's non-annexation assurance." The Manchester Guardian of that date, while it criticized the terms of the Note, held that "Serbia would be well advised, on

political grounds, not to press the legal objections to Austria's Note, but to promise once more to be a good neighbour, to take the necessary disciplinary steps, to express regret for any unlawful actions of her subjects, and to undertake to try all officers and civil servants against whom Austria makes out a prima facie case." Even the Morning Post (July 24) said that "the Serbian Government would be well-advised to meet the wishes of Austria-Hungary as far as possible, to comply with any and every reasonable request, and so to remove any pretext for an attack," but it added that "if the Austro-Hungarian policy is to find an excuse for an invasion of Serbia, it will not be in Serbia's power to prevent the attempt." The Westminster Gazette, after the Serbian reply had been received, said (July 27) that Serbia had submitted on nine out of twelve demands and had proposed arbitration on the other three, that this seemed "as much as could fairly be expected in the first stage," but that Austria had rejected the reply. Nevertheless the newspaper added that "if it is the last word, the peace depends on Serbia yielding the remaining three points, and that again depends, by general admission, upon whether Russia will or will not advise her to give way." Furthermore, "while we plead with Austria-Hungary for forbearance, we cannot encourage Serbia to a resistance in which we shall be powerless to help her."

As another means of averting a general war, a

part of the Press turned to the idea of localizing the Austro-Serbian conflict. "If . . . war breaks out," said the Daily Chronicle on July 25th, "it may, we hope, be localised; but it scarcely could be unless Austria-Hungary were allowed within the limits of the programme set out in her Note to act without vexatious interference." "If actual mediation is no longer practicable," said the Daily Telegraph two days later (July 27), "the next best course is, clearly, to localise the area of the conflict." After Austria had declared war on Serbia the Westminster Gazette (July 29) said: "We have now to reckon with the accomplished fact of a declaration of war upon Serbia by Austria-Hungary. . . . It is not the end of all things, but it calls for the most strenuous and immediate efforts to localise the conflict." The London Times of the same date took the same attitude, and as late as July 31st argued that even at that time if Austria-Hungary announced that she considered the destruction of Belgrade as sufficient chastisement for Serbia's offences, or if she were to give Russia binding assurance that her chastisement would not exceed certain limits, accommodation might be possible. "What is the main object to which efforts of diplomacy can be directed?" asked the Daily Telegraph on the same day. "It can be expressed very briefly. It is the limitation of the area of conflict, so that Austria and Serbia may fight out their differences without entangling other powers." Other newspapers

demanding localization were the Manchester Guardian, the Pall Mall Gazette, the Daily Citizen, the Daily Express, and the Financial News. The Neue Freie Presse would seem to have been justified in stating on the 29th of July that the English Press was for the localization of the conflict. But what it apparently failed to realize was that this did not mean that if France and Russia were drawn in, England would necessarily stand aloof.

It goes without saying that English public opinion stood overwhelmingly behind proposals for mediation. Newspapers of all shades of political opinion suggested methods and terms of mediation or fell in with the suggestion of others. England, as the Manchester Guardian pointed out (July 27), was the one Great Power in a position to lead in diplomatic action of this sort. She had no direct interest in a quarrel between Austria and Serbia, and was "in no danger of being dragged into the conflict by treaties of alliance." But one or two newspapers questioned, as did certain French journals, whether the calling of a conference was the best method to adopt. "We are not at any time enamoured of a conference as a solvent of troubles," said the Daily Express on July 28th, "but any plan which promised alleviation was a good plan in desperate circumstances." The Manchester Guardian (July 28) took a similar view.

A number of newspapers emphasized the responsibility that rested on Russia for the preservation of

peace in the crisis. Some criticized her for not showing herself more conciliatory. Indeed, suspicion of Russia and her aims distinctly colored the sentiments expressed in certain sections of British opinion at this time. "It is in reliance on Russian sympathy," affirmed the Daily Graphic July 23rd, just before the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, "that the Serbs are pursuing their incendiary course; and if once that sympathy were withdrawn all danger of war would vanish. Why the necessary word of warning should not be spoken by Russia we cannot understand. Apart from the claims of Slav kinship, there is nothing either in the case or the conduct of the Serbs which the Russians in their hearts can approve." Several days later the same newspaper (July 27) characterized the Russian Press, "with a few honourable exceptions," as "extremely violent." "What possible reason," asked the Graphic, ". . . can Russia have for taking the fateful decision her newspapers are attributing to her?" The Daily Chronicle (July 25) said that Serbia had a bad case and that Russia, while guarding against Austrian annexation of her territory, should advise her to give way. The Manchester Guardian asserted on July 25th: "If Austria has been overbearing towards Serbia, at any rate she has some excuse. Russia's threat of war against Austria is a piece of sheer brutality not disguised by her sudden discovery of the sacredness of the laws of the Concert of Europe."

The Guardian (July 27) recognized, however, that Russia had "a natural interest in the independence of Serbia." But a few days later (July 30) it asked: "Is her [Russia's] national existence threatened? Is any substantial interest of hers at stake at all beyond the ambition to be regarded as the champion of the smaller Slav States." Sir Harry Johnston, writing in the Daily Chronicle on July 29th, said that a war, if it broke out, ought to be no concern of Great Britain's, "provided it did not lead to two developments—the aggrandizement of Russia in Europe or the defeat of France by Germany, with a consequent irruption into Belgium and Holland." The "Neutrality League," later, protesting against war, said that if England were to take sides with Russia, the balance of power would be upset as never before. Russia would become the dominant Power in Europe, and—"You know the kind of country Russia is."

The Pall Mall Gazette, on August 1st, complained of all this criticism of Russia. "We find a tendency," it said, "to cry out against the idea of 'aiding Russia' on various grounds—the 'reactionary' tendencies of her Government, her supposed aspirations to the hegemony of a predominant Slavdom, the alleged breach of her undertakings in Persia, and so forth. These protests are the height of indiscretion at the present moment, and quite beside the mark."

Certain newspapers, however, though they might deplore Russian intervention and suggest compro-

mise, nevertheless seemed to think it quite natural that Russia should sustain Serbia, by force if need be. "No Governments are so immediately influenced by national opinion as autocracies," said the Daily Express, July 27th. "It is probable that if Austria went to extremes the Czar would be forced to bow to national sentiment and make Serbia's quarrel his own." "The Russian Government would hardly remain indifferent to an attack on Serbia. . . ." asserted the Morning Post, as early as July 21st. "A war between Austria-Hungary and Serbia would thus probably bring Russia into the field." Later, however, the Post (July 28) said that peace could be preserved "by both Austria-Hungary and Russia conceding a little to one another." The Daily Telegraph, on July 27th, maintained that "the real pivot of the situation lies primarily in St. Petersburg, and only in a secondary degree in Berlin. The question which tortures the imagination of diplomats is what precisely Russia intends to do. . . . She is not likely to allow a Slavonic State to be crushed without energetic protests, or, perhaps, without something more formidable than protests." The Westminster Gazette on July 22nd, just before the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum, said: "We have to remember that the Russian Government might easily find itself compelled to take action which of its own desire it would not be anxious to take. As the Times says this morning, Slav sentiment is the one cord to which Russian feeling in-

variably responds." But on the 28th the Westminster Gazette argued. that if guarantees were given by Austria and endorsed by the Powers that the Dual Monarchy would not annex Serbian territory, "it ought by no means to be impossible to satisfy Russia that her interests are not challenged by the effort of Austria-Hungary to get satisfaction from Serbia." And the Daily Telegraph, on the 29th, after stating that "Austria must be counselled by her friend and Ally to restrict her ambitions within reasonable limits," said that "Russia, too, must be counselled by her friends in the Triple Entente, not merely to give good advice to her protegé, Serbia, but to take care that her championship of a Slav race does not become a provocative challenge to Teutonism."

All this Press comment on Russia gives further evidence of the divisions of opinion on foreign affairs that existed in England on the eve of the Great War. Feeling against Russia was of old standing; and it had not been killed by the surface adjustments of diplomacy.[4] If there was little enthusiasm in England for helping Serbia against Austria, there was still less for the possibility of a war simply to pull Russia's

[4] On August 3, the Manchester Guardian said: "What Serbia is among the lesser Powers, Russia, so far as regards her Government, is among the great ones. . . . The blackness of the Russian Government, as a dealer with men's and women's lives and liberties, is inky. We must not forget the brutalities practised in Finland, the wholesale baitings of Jews, the detestable barbarity and injustice with which every effort of the Russian people to gain a tolerable government has been suppressed."

chestnuts out of the fire. The bulk of English opinion would have been quite willing to see Russia compromise or yield on the Serbian issue.

For the preservation of peace a number of the English newspapers looked to the cooperation of Germany, and the criticism of that country was, until the very last, much less than one might expect. Thus when the German Government rejected Sir Edward Grey's proposal that a conference of representatives of the four Powers not directly concerned in the Austro-Serbian affair should meet in London to discuss mediation, certain leading British newspapers, including the supposedly Germanophobe Daily Mail, commented on Germany's refusal with surprising leniency.[5] "Germany," said the Daily Chronicle (July 29), "has indicated that in her judgment Sir Edward Grey's invitation which Italy and France had provisionally accepted, should be deferred now that direct negotiations are proceeding between Vienna and St. Petersburg. This implies no lack of sympathy with what Sir Edward had in mind; his ambassadorial conference was not intended to derogate in any way from the dignity either of Austria-Hungary or Russia; and we are far from thinking

[5] Manchester Guardian, July 29; London Times, July 29; Daily Chronicle, July 29; Daily Citizen, July 29; etc.; The Daily Mail, July 29, said: "Germany has declined Sir Edward Grey's proposal for a conference of Ambassadors and mediation, but in a perfectly friendly manner and on the very reasonable ground that the conversations between Russia and Austria render the British proposal unnecessary."

that the German attitude has been unreasonable. Austria-Hungary took up from the beginning the position that her vital interests were at stake (as no doubt they are) and she deprecated even mediation as interference. That she has nevertheless embarked on direct discussion with Russia, renders mediation for the moment unnecessary."

There were kind words for the Kaiser, too, in those anxious days. "There is reason to believe," said the London Times of the 29th, "that in the most exalted quarter in Germany the maintenance of European peace is warmly and honestly desired. Pressure from all manner of influential personages and groups is doubtless being exerted to overcome the pacific leanings of the Emperor. It may tax his powers of resistance severely, but in foreign affairs he is the undisputed master, and he has often shown that he has a will and judgment of his own. . . . Our Paris Correspondent repeats that grounds exist for the belief that Germany has already given better proof of her wish for peace than is known to France." "The German Emperor holds the issues of European policy in the hollow of his hand," affirmed the Daily Telegraph of the same date. "For ourselves we look with confidence to Kaiser Wilhelm not only to hold the scales fairly even, but to give his ultimate vote on the side of the better cause." "It would be grossly unfair not to count the Kaiser among the peacemakers," maintained the Daily Express on July 28th, and the

next day the same paper said: "We believe, indeed, that there is in Berlin a sincere desire for the major peace of Europe." The Morning Post, on the other hand, on July 31st, argued that the part of mediator could "hardly be played by a German Government which assumes from the beginning that Austria-Hungary may do as she pleases." But the Pall Mall Gazette said the next day, of Germany: "We cannot but feel the more respect for her because she is true to her word and her bond. We believe that the Emperor William and his advisers have laboured ardently for peace. If, as seems but too probable, their efforts have been overborne by forces beyond the control of man, why should we utter a word of bitterness towards them? We will not."

The reader who has followed this account thus far may infer that at least until the outbreak of war on the Continent, British public opinion, as a whole, in its reaction toward the crisis, was interested solely in the preservation of peace. Such an inference, however, would not be correct. For while British opinion was undoubtedly generally pacific at this time there was developing in certain circles a feeling that under certain conditions England ought to fight. In other words the feeling was growing that if, despite all efforts to keep the peace, France and Russia were to find themselves in a struggle with the Central Powers England ought to participate in the conflict. England must "play the game." She must "stand by her

friends." This opinion was a recognition at once of the alleged claims of the Triple Entente and the alleged duty of England to help preserve "the balance of power."

That redoubtable Tory organ, the Morning Post, said as early as July 21st that while Great Britain had no motive likely to involve her in war, she would be unwise to fold her hands if her friends should be attacked. The day after the dispatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, it asked: "Is England to regard the European issues with indifference and to ignore her own responsibility in connection with them, or is she to play her part?" Several days later it said that apparently there was to be a challenge from the Dual Alliance to the Triple Entente. "It is hard to know which would be the greater misfortune for Europe," commented the Post, "—the acceptance of the challenge and a great war, or the non-acceptance and the consequent domination of the Triple Alliance. It is for Englishmen as fast as they can to realize the situation and to make up their minds as to the country's duty." (Issues of July 24 and 29.) On the 30th it asked whether, if France were involved, "England should stand idly by? Not from any motive of animosity to any nation but from a sense of duty to her neighbour must not England, if war is forced upon Europe, stand by her friendships and play the game?" And on the first of August the Post frankly and vigorously urged the Government to participate

if France and Russia should be involved in war. "Englishmen are all agreed," it asserted, "that this country must stand by France, which means, in the existing situation, standing by Russia also. The decision required is to announce plainly that such is British policy, and that a mobilisation of Germany will be instantly followed by the mobilisation of the British Navy, the Expeditionary Force, and the Territorial Force. . . . There is only one thing that can be imagined worse than a war, and that is a European war in which England did not play the game."

On July 27th the London Times came out for possible participation. England, said the Times, will work for peace so long as possible. "But should there arise in any quarter a desire to test our adhesion to the principles that inform our friendships and that thereby guarantee the balance of power in Europe, we shall be found no less ready and determined to vindicate them with the whole strength of the Empire than we have been found ready whenever they have been tried in the past." The Manchester Guardian (July 28), commenting on this statement, said: "This is mediation with the shirt-sleeves rolled up," and remarked that a part of the Press seemed bent on depriving England "of that reputation for impartiality on which the success of our efforts for peace must chiefly depend." On the 29th the Times affirmed that "the English people . . . know . . . that the surest way to preserve that peace for which

they long, and perhaps the only way, is to make clear to all that if their friends are forced into such a war England for her part will support them to the full." On succeeding days (the 30th, 31st, etc.) it reiterated with firmness its view that England must sustain the other Powers of the Entente in the event of a general war.

Among the other leading newspapers that by August 1st had taken much the same stand were the Daily Mail, the Pall Mall Gazette, the Westminster Gazette, the Daily Telegraph, and the Daily Express. Thus the Daily Mail said on July 25th that if Austria should reject the request of Russia, the Triple Alliance would find itself face to face with the Triple Entente. The Liberal Westminster Gazette, one of the more temperate of the British newspapers, warned on July 30th, that under certain conceivable circumstances, England "could not remain a disinterested spectator of a European conflict. . . . We have interests and liabilities to consider which must gravely affect any decision we may take with regard to a Continental war—the safety of India, the interests of our overseas Dominions and possessions, and of the vast areas which have to be guarded in time of peril." Two days later this journal said that "Germany knows . . . that there are certain possible developments of a struggle between her and France which might kindle British opinion and drive us out of our present resolution to remain neutral if we possibly

can." The Daily Graphic expressed the hope on July 27th that England would keep clear of complications. On the 31st the same newspaper said: "It may be necessary for us to take sides at some time or other. For the moment we are on the side of peace." The Pall Mall Gazette, the day after Austria declared war on Serbia, said, "Our duty is clear. We must stand by our friends with the most prompt resolution, and with the whole of our might." It was on this day, the 29th, that Grey warned Lichnowsky that while England might not take part in a conflict between Austria and Russia, she would do so if France and Germany were brought in; and he added that English public opinion which had hitherto favored Austria, was, because of that country's obstinacy, beginning to turn completely against her. It is evident that had Sir Edward, on the 30th or 31st, publicly proclaimed the solidarity of England with the other Powers of the Entente, he would have had behind him, not indeed the whole of English public opinion, but at any rate an influential part of the Press.

The events of August 1st and 2nd carried British opinion farther toward war. Germany's declaration of war on Russia on August 1st, her invasion of Luxembourg the next day, and reports of other violations of international right, caused the tone of an important part of the Press to change toward her completely—even before the news of her purpose to invade Belgium had reached the newspapers. On

August 1st the Times asserted that neither France nor Germany nor Russia was anxious for war. "On the contrary, all of them have done their utmost to avert it." On August 3rd it said: "The blame must fall mainly upon Germany. She could have stayed the plague had she chosen to speak to Vienna as she speaks when she is in earnest. She has not chosen to do so. She has preferred to make demands in St. Petersburg and in Paris which no Government could entertain, and to defeat the last efforts of this country and of others for mediation by irrevocable acts. She has lived up to the worst principles of the Frederician tradition—the tradition which disregards all obligations of right and wrong at the bidding of immediate self-interest. . . .

"The whole situation has been revolutionized by the events of yesterday. The doubts which many of us tried hard to cherish as to Germany's real intentions have been dispelled by her high-handed contempt for public law. The Government and the nation now realize that she has been bent on a European war."

The Daily Telegraph (August 3), in a fury of wrath, called Germany "the mad dog of the European crisis," and said that the whole might of Great Britain would be thrown into the task of defeating her. "In one day Germany has violated the neutrality of Luxembourg, guaranteed under the hands of the European Powers; has invaded the territory of

France without declaration of war; and has, equally without notice of hostile intention, laid hands upon two British vessels." The Daily Express, which on July 30 had said that "no one wants war," on August 3rd maintained that "for days past it has been evident that Germany intended to plunge Europe into a horrible war."

Certain important sections of British opinion, however, refused to do obeisance to the dictum that England must "stand by her friends," or the shibboleth that she must "play the game." As late as August 1st, the Daily Chronicle expressed the opinion that England was not obliged to support the Dual Alliance in case of war. The Daily News, the same day, insisted that the English Government immediately proclaim its neutrality. The Standard said that France could hope for England's aid, but ought not to count on it; for England was free either to enter the conflict or to remain out of it, despite the Entente.

From first to last throughout the crisis of diplomacy such papers as the Daily Citizen and the Manchester Guardian opposed British participation in a war. The Daily Citizen (July 27) looked to international Socialist and Labor action to avert the great catastrophe: "There must be immediate international action on the part of the organised working-class movement throughout Europe, and the initiative will probably be taken by the International Socialist Bureau. The task of Socialist and Labour comrades in

lands more directly affected by the war spirit will not be easy, but their course is clear. They will be the one firm wall against the waters of militarist reaction." On August 1st the Citizen appealed for anti-war manifestations in the large cities. It said that "Sir Edward Grey will be a traitor to the present and future interests of his country if he allows himself to be drawn in except as a keeper of the peace." And it asked him to declare "that he is not directly or indirectly committed to war, and has no intention of letting this country draw the sword in a quarrel which does not concern her." (Issues of July 30 and August 1.)

The Manchester Guardian, as early as July 25th, said that "it will be Sir Edward Grey's task not to destroy our influence for good in Europe by marching us into the camp of the Dual Alliance, or for that matter into any camp." "We have no . . . commitments," it said a few days later (July 28). "Not only are we neutral now but we could and ought to remain neutral throughout the whole course of the war. It is strange that Sir Edward Grey should not have referred to this fact, which is the chief source of our moral authority in Europe." "Sir Edward Grey," it complained on July 30th, "walks deliberately past opportunities of saying that we are and will be neutral in the quarrels of Europe. . . . If we, who might remain neutral, rush into the war or let our attitude remain doubtful, it will be

both a crime and an act of supreme and gratuitous folly." On August 3rd, after Germany had declared war on Russia and had invaded Luxembourg, the Guardian said that "sober Englishmen, while grieving that Germany should have thought fit to take this frightful responsibility, will not let German military opinion of what is best for Germany affect their own judgment of what is best for England. Germany was not free to choose; whether war was to come depended not so much on what she did as on what Russia meant to do. Having convinced herself, and not without cause, that Russia meant war, she conceived that her policy was one for her soldiers to determine on purely military grounds."

There is ample evidence, furthermore, to show that opposition to England's participation in a war to sustain France and Russia was not confined to an inconsiderable protesting minority. Mr. Francis W. Hirst, writing in the Daily Chronicle on July 29th, said that "in the City one is glad to learn—and I believe the same is true of business men all over the country—that one opinion prevails. 'It is no concern of ours' is the general cry. The greatest of British interests is peace. The folly and wickedness of fighting for Russia against Germany are not less clear than the folly and wickedness of fighting for Germany against France." A few days later the Manchester Guardian (August 1) published a large number of letters from people of various sorts protesting against going to

war. The Guardian said that evidence was growing that public opinion was becoming "shocked and alarmed" at the idea. On August 2nd, Lichnowsky quoted Mr. Asquith as saying: "that a war between England and Germany, in the present state of English public feeling, would be very unpopular, but that a neutral attitude on the part of the local Government would be greatly hindered by two things: (1) violation of Belgian neutrality, and (2) attack by German warships on the unprotected northern coast of France." On August 3rd the Neutrality League published in the Westminster Gazette a full-page advertisement, strongly protesting against entering the war. In the afternoon of the same day a great Socialist demonstration against war was held in Trafalgar Square.

As is well known, it was the invasion of Belgium that finally brought British public opinion into line. A small minority, indeed, opposed making even this a *casus belli.* The Manchester Guardian (August 4) stood out against it, contending that Englishmen could not "repair the violation of Belgian neutrality by violating the neutrality of England." But Englishmen in general, whether or not in their hearts they wanted war,[6] were outwardly substantially united.

[6] Mr. John Langdon-Davies, in a recent article, says of a London crowd waiting on August 3rd to hear of war: "If the members of that crowd waiting for war could have been honest with an inquirer, they would have had to admit that they wanted war because they wanted something new to happen. Their silence was a breath-

Mr. Lloyd-George once said that if a poll of the electors of Great Britain had been taken on August 1st, it "would have shown 95 per cent. against embroiling this country in hostilities. . . . A poll on the following Tuesday would have resulted in a vote of 99 per cent. in favour of war. . . . What had happened in the meantime? . . . The revolution in public sentiment . . . was attributable entirely to an attack made by Germany on a small and unprotected country which had done her no wrong." One need not accept Mr. Lloyd-George's percentages to agree substantially with this interpretation of his countrymen's opinions.

In general, British public opinion on the eve of the Great War followed a somewhat confused course. Before July 23rd, vitally concerned with the Ulster crisis, it showed little interest in the new Balkan tangle. Such comment as there was, however, revealed more sympathy with Austria than with Serbia, though Austria was not accorded unqualified approval. Even after the publication of the Austrian Note British opinion was more pro-Austrian than pro-Serbian. Many felt that Serbia had been a bad neighbor and deserved punishment. Later, the apparent stubbornness of Austria's conduct alienated the

less hope rather than a breathless apprehension, a hope that the monotony of life was going to be broken."—Crowds and Crises, Atlantic Monthly, July, 1926. On the other hand, the Manchester Guardian held on August 4th that the majority of Englishmen were still opposed to war.

greater part of British opinion from the Dual Monarchy. But the British public was far more concerned with the preservation of the general peace than with the Balkan issue. Therefore certain influential newspapers advised Serbia to yield, either wholly or as far as she reasonably could, to the Austrian demands, severe as these were acknowledged to be. When the Ballplatz rejected the Serbian reply, British opinion in general would willingly have accepted either localization of the conflict, or mediation as a means looking toward the solution of the problem of keeping the major peace of Europe.

Even had the Austro-Serbian affair broadened into an Austro-Russian conflict, British opinion would have stood overwhelmingly for England's neutrality, provided the struggle had spread no farther. But when the issue seemed to develop into a challenge from the Central Powers to the Triple Entente, British opinion was seriously divided. Certain leading newspapers, such as the Times, the Morning Post, and the Pall Mall Gazette, demanded, with increasing insistence, that if France and Russia were involved in a war with Germany and Austria, England should step in to aid her "friends" and help preserve the balance of power. Other important elements in public opinion, however, opposed this course and some of these demanded that Sir Edward Grey proclaim England's neutrality. A love of peace and the belief that it was for England's

best interest to keep out of the conflict were probably the chief causes of this opposition. But these were reinforced by a friendly feeling for Germany that was to be found in certain quarters, and by a feeling against Russia. Prejudice against Russia was old and strong. Many Englishmen believed that Russian and British interests were fundamentally opposed and were suspicious of a war that might strengthen the power of Russia in Europe and in the world. After Germany had declared war on Russia and invaded Luxembourg, however, the hand of the war party was strengthened and that of the opposition somewhat weakened. Even so, substantial divisions died only with the invasion of Belgium.

Considering all the circumstances it was natural for Sir Edward Grey to have made no decisive pronouncement of England's position before August 2nd. Even on that day he gave France only a conditional promise of aid, subject to the consent of Parliament and in the event of a German naval attack on French coasts or shipping. It is of the essence of British political theory that the Government should be at least in general accord with public opinion. And the delay of Grey in making a definite pronouncement reflected the indecision of British opinion during the crisis. Furthermore, a premature promise would have greatly weakened, if not totally destroyed, Grey's influence as a mediator, and might

have worked unutterable harm to British morale in a conflict in which unity was of the highest importance. Nor would the Cabinet, in all probability, have supported him in such a premature promise. As Winston Churchill has said: "Suppose . . . that . . . after the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia, the Foreign Secretary had proposed to the Cabinet that if matters were so handled that Germany attacked France or violated Belgian territory, Great Britain would declare war upon her. Would the Cabinet have assented to such a communication? I cannot believe it. If Sir Edward Grey could have said on Monday [the 27th] that if Germany attacked France or Belgium, England would declare war upon her, might there not still have been time to ward off the catastrophe? The question is certainly arguable. . . . But . . . I am certain that if Sir Edward Grey had sent the kind of ultimatum suggested, the Cabinet would have broken up, and it is also my belief that up till Wednesday or Thursday at least, the House of Commons would have repudiated his action. Nothing less than the deeds of Germany would have converted the British nation to war. To act in advance of those deeds would have led to an exposure of division worse than the guarded attitude which we maintained, which brought the country into the war united."

On the other hand, Sir Edward was in no position to pledge England to neutrality. Not only did his

previous commitments to France virtually preclude such a course, but, had the latter country been overrun by the Germans, the demand that England "stand by her friends" might have become overwhelming. He had no mandate thus to mortgage the future.

CHAPTER X

WEAKNESSES IN THE CASE AGAINST INDIVIDUALS

IT has been cynically said that we human beings are more interested in the wrong-doing of others than in any other one thing. Whether or not this be true, it is characteristic of human nature to seek out individual scapegoats for a catastrophe so terrible as the World War. And, as was pointed out in the first chapter of this book, even revisionist scholarship has succumbed to this tendency, concentrating thus far rather on the responsibilities of individuals and governments than on general influences. Numerous articles and books have appeared, attacking from new angles and in the light of the revelations of the archives, men who were in high position in the summer of 1914, men like Poincaré, Sazonov, Lord Grey and, of course, the Kaiser. Some of these articles and books have been written with care, courage, and sincerity.

In the present chapter, however, it will be shown that the case against individual leaders is less strong than the authors of these attacks have believed it to be.

To certain historians of the revisionist school the double-dyed villain of the ghastly tragedy of the summer of 1914 was M. Poincaré. It is alleged, first, that his visit July 20th to 23rd to St. Petersburg was deliberately planned with the intention of inciting the Russians to war. Second, it is charged that during his visit to the Russian capital, Poincaré "encouraged the military group at the Russian court, and gave them to understand that he regarded the Austro-Serbian crisis as a satisfactory incident in the Balkans over which to precipitate the expected European war." Third, it is said that after M. Poincaré had returned to Paris, he and his associates of the French Government held a secret council on the night of July 29-30. At this council they agreed to urge the Russians to accelerate their military preparations, though advising them to conduct these preparations as secretly as possible. Professor Barnes, following Morhardt in this, asserts that this secret conference "marks the moment when the horrors of war were specifically unchained upon Europe. After that, there was no chance whatever of preserving peace, and the French President and ministers knew this as well as did Izvolsky and Sazonov." Finally, the reproach is brought against the French leaders that France was the first Great Power in the crisis to announce her decision for war. This decision was reached in the evening of July 31st and Izvolsky was informed of it shortly after midnight.

The theory that Poincaré deliberately went to St. Petersburg to incite the Russians to war can be summarily dismissed. The visit did not result from the Crime of Sarajevo. It had been arranged during the previous January. Nor does the evidence show that during the visit M. Poincaré and the Russian leaders decided to precipitate a European war. What they did do was to confirm the obligations of the Franco-Russian Alliance and to agree to try to prevent a possible infringement of Serbia's sovereignty and independence.[1] This agreement may possibly have meant that the French and Russian leaders preferred to risk a European war rather than take a diplomatic defeat at the hands of Austria, though there is no reason for assuming that it did. But it may also have meant that they believed a policy of firmness to be the best means of preserving the peace of Europe. It is not improbable that they believed that Russian public opinion would never permit an infringement of Serbia's sovereign rights by Austria, and that an Austro-Russian war would inevitably become a European conflict. If they held such beliefs it was rea-

[1] The agreement reached runs as follows:

"1. Entire community of views concerning the various questions facing the Powers, so far as concerns the maintenance of the general peace and balance of power in Europe, and especially in the East.

"2. Resolve to take steps in Vienna to prevent a request for explanation or any demand equivalent to an interference in Serbia's internal affairs, which Serbia might legitimately regard as an attack on her sovereignty and independence.

"3. Solemn confirmation of the obligations laid by the Alliance on the two countries."—Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War, p. 214.

sonable for them to assume that a policy of firmness and unity was better calculated to preserve European peace than a policy of total or partial surrender to the Austrian course.

Furthermore, while in St. Petersburg, M. Poincaré warned the Austrian Ambassador that it would be dangerous for Austria to go too far with Serbia. " 'With a little good will this Serbian affair can easily be settled,' " he said. " 'But it can also easily develop dangerously. Serbia has very warm friends among the Russian people. And Russia has an Ally, France. What complications are to be feared here.' " Had Poincaré and Sazonov been plotting war, Poincaré would hardly have warned Austria of the serious danger of complications and that France and Russia were standing together, but would rather have allowed her to walk blindly into the trap prepared for her.

Nor is it necessary to interpret the decisions of the night of July 29-30 as part of a conspiracy to bring about a European war. If the contention be correct that the Austrian declaration of war virtually entailed the Russian general mobilization, which in turn entailed the European conflict, then obviously it was important for Russia to carry on military preparations as quickly and efficiently as possible. In any case, the hope of keeping peace was rapidly waning and it was practically inevitable at that time that governments should think in terms of military advantage. On

the other hand, if any hope of peace still remained, it was of high importance that it should not be endangered by measures too provocative of Germany. It seems, then, quite logical for the French Government to have advised Russia to continue and even to accelerate her preparations, but at the same time to carry them on as quietly and secretly as possible. The request not to move troops "on a large scale" may have been intended as advice against general mobilization. This explanation of the decisions of the night of July 29-30 is not necessarily the correct one; but at least it is a possible explanation. Professor Barnes says that "sharp refusals to sanction the Russian mobilization coming from Paris would . . . have prevented Sazonov from taking the fatal step." But does he think that in the excited state of Russian opinion, Russia's withdrawal at that late stage was possible?

Finally, the declaration of the French leaders on July 31st that France had definitely decided on war seems of as little causal significance as the German declaration of war on Russia on August 1st. The news of the final decision of the Russians to begin general mobilization reached Paris shortly before midnight on July 30th. In view of all that had gone before, and in view of the state of public opinion in France, what else could the French Government do but decide on war? "Technically," says Professor Barnes, "France was not bound by the terms of the alliance with

Russia to come to her aid in 1914, in the light of the priority of the Russian mobilization to that of the Germans, but the personal promises of Poincaré had superseded the treaty obligation."

But it was not a question of technicalities in that dark hour, or a question simply of Poincaré's promises. On July 31st a war between Russia and the Central Powers, in which France did not participate, was unthinkable. French public opinion was almost entirely united on that point. The French Government simply followed the path from which, by that time, there was practically no turning.

In general, it has not been proved that M. Poincaré went to Russia to stiffen the backs of the Russians and to plot a war. It has not been proved that during his visit he made arrangements with the Russian leaders to precipitate a war. It has not been proved that the decisions of July 29-30 were taken in order to urge Russia on or that they made war virtually inevitable. It has not been proved that the declarations of Poincaré and his associates on July 31st that France had decided for war exercised any major influence on the course of events. In fine, Poincaré and his associates have not been proved villains.

Neither has Sazonov been proved guilty. Despite all the damaging evidence adduced against him, there is ample reason for doubting any deliberate intention on his part to precipitate a European war after the

Crime of Sarajevo. One of the questions that was irritating Austria at this time was the possibility of a union between Serbia and Montenegro. This union would have increased the Slav strength south of Austria, and would have been extremely distasteful to her. Any suspicion on the part of Austria, after the assassination and before the dispatch of the ultimatum, that progress was being made toward such a union at that time, would naturally have tended to intensify the severity of any measures that might be taken against Serbia in relation to the incident at Sarajevo. If Sazonov, then, had been plotting a war with Austria, we should expect him to have done what he could, in a quiet way, to further irritation between Austria and Serbia. On the contrary, he attempted to exercise a restraining influence on Russia's little protegé. On July 7th he sent the following telegram to the Russian Minister at Belgrade:

"Confidential. The recent events in Serbia, which have led to an accentuation of the anti-Serbian feeling at Vienna, induce us to advise the Serbian Government to treat with the utmost caution all questions which might tend to accentuate this feeling and thus create a dangerous situation. We are consequently of the opinion that it would be advisable to postpone the negotiations concerning the Serbo-Montenegrin rapprochement a little, for these negotiations have already attracted the attention of Austria-Hungary and even of Germany.

"I beg you to communicate confidentially this opinion to Pashitch."

The language of this message is not that of a man seeking trouble.

Furthermore, on July 22nd Sazonov telegraphed the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, asking him to bring pressure to bear on Berchtold to prevent the humiliation of Serbia. He also requested the Ambassador to consult with his colleagues of France and England, who were likewise expecting to advise Berchtold to moderation. "*But keep in mind,*" admonished the Russian Foreign Minister, "*that in order to avoid an undesirable tension, your démarches ought to be neither collective nor simultaneous.*" [2] This, too, is not the language of a man deliberately trying to provoke war. Had Sazonov wished to stir Austria up, he would hardly have recommended tact in dealing with Berchtold. Nor was this despatch intended for effect; for it was not expected that it would see the light of publicity for many a long year.

Once Austria had sent her ultimatum to Serbia, the situation was altered. If Sazonov believed, as presumably he did, that Russian public opinion would not tolerate an Austrian attack on Serbia or an Austrian infringement of Serbia's sovereign rights, it would naturally seem to him that a policy of firmness would offer the best means both of preventing a diplomatic defeat for Russia and of keeping the

[2] Italics mine.

general peace. For the pursuit of such a policy he and the other Russian leaders had arranged with Poincaré, as has been pointed out, during the latter's visit at St. Petersburg. The keynote to Sazonov's policy after July 23rd was a determination not to permit Austria to "gobble up Serbia." Failure to follow such a course might possibly have led to the downfall of the Russian Government.

It is generally admitted that Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues were sincerely pacific during the crisis. Considering the decided disinclination of the British people to being dragged into the war, and the serious division of opinion on the question of standing by the Entente, they could hardly have been anything else. Sir Edward Grey was the logical leader in any attempt of diplomacy to keep the peace. But certain critics have maintained that through encouragement of the Russians Sir Edward incurred a share of responsibility for the outbreak of the war. Thus Dr. Rosen makes much of certain conversations Sir Edward had with the French diplomats at the Quai d'Orsay in the spring of 1914, concerning a projected naval agreement between England and Russia. Dr. Rosen does not claim that a definite agreement was reached, but he says: "There can be no doubt that the Anglo-Russian naval conversations were the final factor that enabled the war party at St. Petersburg to gain the upper hand with the weak Czar and with those Russian politicians who were still undecided."

Another critic cites a telegram of Grey to Buchanan on July 25th, 1914, and a conversation which the British Foreign Secretary held the same day with the Russian Ambassador, in both of which Sir Edward expressed the opinion that the brusque Austrian *démarche* of July 23rd would almost certainly entail Russian mobilization. "There is ample reason to believe," says this critic, "that a delay of a day or two might have saved the situation. As it is, on the basis of the evidence available, Sir Edward Grey must be held, without intention, partially responsible for Russia's fatal mobilization order."

The weakness of these attempts to implicate Sir Edward Grey in responsibility for the outbreak of the war is obvious. They afford no proof whatsoever that what Sir Edward said and did exercised a decisive influence on the Russian military measures leading to war. In 1916 Sazonov denied Bethmann-Hollweg's assertion that France and Russia would not have gone to war unless they had been sure of England's support. The evidence set forth in this investigation supports Sazonov's statement. No doubt the Russian Foreign Minister was glad to have all the assurance he could get of British support. But this does not mean that Russia would not have mobilized if such support had been withheld.

The old accusation that Germany was guilty because it was she who first declared war on a Great Power is still made. So responsible a historian as Pro-

fessor Bernadotte Schmitt has said that "however much the Germans may argue that military necessity compelled them, in the face of Russian mobilization, to declare war, it is clear that the diplomatic situation on August 1, 1914, though desperate, was not hopeless, and that it was Germany's overt act which destroyed the last chance of a peaceful solution." The present writer believes that it has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt by competent scholars that the only possible answer on the part of Germany to Russian mobilization was war, and that the Russian leaders themselves realized that fact. But it may be added that the present investigation points clearly to the conclusion that by August 1st, public opinion in Germany, France, Austria, and Russia was in such a state of excitement and was at the same time so determined not to yield on the issues in controversy that war was inevitable, Russian mobilization or no mobilization. The writer believes, also, that if any unprejudiced person will take the trouble to go through half a dozen newspapers for August 1st, in each of the countries named, he will reach the same conclusion. The situation was not merely desperate; it was hopeless.

It is clear from all this that even students of war origins who have weighed the evidence with some care have at times overleaped the bounds of scientific scholarship. They have assumed motives for which they have no clear proof. They have attached to cer-

tain actions of individuals in authority in 1914 a causal significance unwarranted by the facts. In a word, in attempting to affix guilt or responsibility on certain persons they have allowed their suspicions and hypotheses to cloud their judgment.

CHAPTER XI

CONCLUSIONS

THE chief conclusion resulting from the present investigation is that after the Crime of Sarajevo Austro-German diplomacy created a situation from which public opinion in various countries made a peaceful escape virtually impossible. Should it be clearly proved that the Serbian Government had had foreknowledge of the conspiracy to kill the Archduke and had failed to give the Ballplatz serious and unmistakable warning, then that Government of course would have to bear a grave responsibility for the events that followed. Should it be clearly proved that Russian officials were privy to the plot, their guilt would be double-dyed.[1] To such possibilities as these the historian will naturally keep an open mind; but neither of them has yet been proved. And of course their proof would in no way nullify the responsibilities of Austro-German diplomacy and of public opinion in the five great countries involved in the outbreak of the war.

[1] In his Genesis of the World War, Professor Barnes cites certain evidence indicating possible Russian complicity in the plot to murder the Archduke. (pp. 313-315.)

In defense of the Austrian and German Governments it should be said that the provocation to the Dual Monarchy from Serbia had been protracted and grievous. Furthermore, their object was not to bring on a European conflict, but to abate what seemed to them an intolerable nuisance.[2] When the German Government saw that the danger of a general war was imminent, it bitterly regretted its action in giving Austria a free hand with Serbia and made a desperate effort to hold in check its reckless ally.

It can not be said, however, that the Austrian authorities adopted their policy of force at the instance of an overwhelming popular demand. Immediately after the Crime of Sarajevo anger at Serbia was naturally strong and general. But despite anti-Serbian demonstrations and riots, despite the catcalls of some of the more chauvinistic journals, an influential part of the Press at first urged moderation; and the opinion at first prevailed on the Bourse that the Dual Monarchy would continue to pursue a policy of peace. As the days passed, however, resentment against Serbia was fanned by the reckless and provocative language of the Serbian Press as well as by the piecemeal revelations of the results of the investigation into the origins of the Crime of Sarajevo.

[2] Even Poincaré has said: "I do not claim that Austria or Germany, in this first phase, had a conscious, thought-out intention of provoking a general war. No existing document gives us the right to suppose that, at that time, they had planned anything so systematic."—Responsibility for the War, Foreign Affairs (American), October, 1925, p. 19.

The conviction grew that the plot was hatched in Belgrade and that King Peter's government was in greater or less degree responsible.

Once the ultimatum had been dispatched, it is hard to see how the Austrian Government could have prevented the war with Serbia, even had it so desired. The Socialists opposed the idea of war vehemently, and continued to oppose it; but with the vast majority of the people the Note was thoroughly popular. Approval of the Austrian Government was expressed widely and emphatically. Its "firmness" in the crisis was contrasted with its former "weakness." Doubts and hesitations were thrown to the winds. According to Dr. Dillon the people were determined on war, not from bellicosity, but from a desire to finish once for all with the Serbian menace. The Serbian reply of July 25th, which many persons in other countries considered entirely too submissive, and which even the Kaiser pronounced a sufficient surrender to the demands of the Dual Monarchy, was held by Austrian opinion to be clearly and thoroughly unsatisfactory. There is perhaps the barest possibility that the Ballplatz, yielding to German pressure, could have accepted the Serbian answer as a basis for negotiations, and by piecing and patching a compromise could have averted the catastrophe of a European conflict. But, in any event, once war had been declared on Serbia on July 28th, control was lost, the situation had gotten completely out of hand. Perhaps Berch-

told, after that, would have been glad to retreat. But he was helpless. At that time Austro-Hungarian public opinion, inflexible in its decision to settle its accounts with Serbia at all costs, saw in a localization of the conflict the only hope of keeping the major peace of Europe. Until toward the very last localization seemed to the Austrians quite possible because the danger of Russian intervention was underestimated, and because Austrian opinion counted on a certain sympathy from the Entente Powers, especially from England.

An Austrian attack on Serbia, however, seems to have been one thing that Russian public opinion, in the summer of 1914, would not endure. It is all very well to say that the security of Serbia was not a vital interest to Russia in the sense that relief from the Serbian menace was a vital interest to Austria. The real point to be considered in attempting to relate public opinion to war origins, however, is not that Serbia's territorial integrity was a vital interest to Russia, but that Russian opinion believed it to be so. Racial sentiment, religious sentiment, expansionist sentiment, the Russian interpretation of the theory of the balance of power, fear of Germany and Austria, prejudice against these countries, the burning desire to avenge the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the belief that "Russia was ready," all united to solidify Russian opinion to defend Serbia. Austrian as-

surances that the Dual Monarchy would not annex territory were naturally enough brushed aside.[3]

Under these circumstances the severity of Austria's ultimatum to her little Slavic neighbor was enough to arouse the alarmed suspicion that the Dual Monarchy intended to "gobble up Serbia." "C'est la guerre Européenne" was the feeling of many. Naturally, then, the Russian authorities began at once (July 24th) to take measures looking toward mobilization. Had Austria yielded on the essential issues, however, orders could have been given to recall these preliminary measures; for they were not such as to render war inevitable. But the Austrian declaration of war on Serbia on July 28th seemed to destroy the last hope of peace. "Up to yesterday," von Chelius telegraphed the German Foreign Office on July 29th, "all in the entourage of the [Russian] Emperor were filled with the hope of a peaceful outcome; to-day, since the declaration of war [Austria's declaration of war on Serbia] they consider a general war almost inevitable. . . . They do not want any war and would like to be able to avoid it, and regret that no

[3] In connection with the subject of guarantees, Professor Schmitt has well said: "The Austrian action, however much disguised as a preventive measure necessary for future safety, involved an immediate displacement; for it contemplated (1) an abridgement of Serbian sovereignty by the participation of Austrian officials in the work of government; (2) the payment of an indemnity, even if Serbia had accepted an ultimatum in toto; and (3) 'the isolation of Serbia' as Franz Josef assured William II—that is the award of Serbian territory to Bulgaria and Roumania."—Current History, March, 1926, p. 800.

Power was successful in restraining Austria from taking the decisive step." And the King of Roumania about this time said that he considered the Russian mobilization against Austria to be "a measure adopted for the purpose of pacifying public opinion." It was well recognized that if Russia and Austria should fight, Germany would undoubtedly participate to sustain Austria. General mobilization of the Russian forces, therefore, was the logical step to take, once the hope of peace with Austria had been given up. In other words, it would seem that if the Russian general mobilization entailed war with Germany, Austria's declaration of war on Serbia had previously entailed the Russian general mobilization. The Russian mobilization is therefore of far less causal significance than many revisionist historians have believed it to be.

As the Austrian Government developed its warlike policy of its own accord rather than as a result of popular pressure, so the German Government of its own accord gave Austria *carte blanche*. It can not be maintained that the German leaders took the stand that they did in deference to German public opinion. Widespread criticism of Serbia, it is true, followed the Crime of Sarajevo; but there was certainly no general demand that Austria take any action she might choose against her Slavic neighbor. Nevertheless, after the dispatch of the ultimatum, the tendency of German public opinion was to follow too

closely in the wake of Austrian opinion and policy. The Note itself was hailed on the whole with approval, though not with the enthusiasm with which it was greeted in Austria. Certain conservative newspapers of the "Pan-German" type, it is true, opposed going to war for Austrian interests. The Social Democrats opposed war as war. Even in certain circles of moderate opinion, too, there was no little discontent with the severity of the Austrian Note and with the high-handedness of the ensuing Austrian policy. But in general, German opinion looked not to German restraint of Austria, but to localization of the conflict, to preserve the major peace of Europe. And in the event of failure of the policy of localization, public sentiment was determined to hold true to the Alliance, to stand by Austria against Russia. Even the "Pan-German" journals, which opposed fighting for Austrian rather than for purely German interests, in the end held that Germany must aid the Dual Monarchy in the event of a Russian attack on the latter. In view of this stern resolution of German public opinion, it is evident that an Austro-Russian war without German participation would have been impossible. But despite certain chauvinistic manifestations and the open or suppressed excitement inevitably attendant on the crisis, the prevailing mood was not one of bellicosity, but of readiness to accept war, if war were what fate held in store for Germany.

There was less division of opinion in France during the crisis than there was in Germany, much less than there was in England. From the start French opinion sided with Serbia rather than with Austria in the Austro-Serbian quarrel, though it can not be said that before July 23rd much attention was paid in France to distant rumblings in the Balkans. The ultimatum to Serbia, however, aroused widespread indignation among the French; they severely condemned the Note and the subsequent policy of the Ballplatz. Russian intervention in aid of Serbia, on the other hand, in spite of a small minority demand that pressure should be brought to bear on the Tsar's government to hold aloof in the crisis, was considered natural and logical, and was accorded widespread approval. Loyalty to the Franco-Russian Alliance was almost everywhere taken for granted.

Perhaps loyalty to the Alliance would not have been so generally taken for granted had there been any confidence that if Austria and Russia came to blows, Germany would keep out of the fight. But one of the most striking characteristics of French public opinion during the crisis was the readiness with which it assumed that back of the Balkan imbroglio there lurked a German challenge. Suspicion of Germany had been growing rapidly in France before the crisis of 1914; it was powerful even with the Socialists and Syndicalists, with men like Jaurès and Hervé. After the publication of the Austrian

Note it quickly flared up; and Germany was accused of being privy to the *démarche* of the Ballplatz. French opinion put little faith in the idea of localizing the conflict, insisted that the key to peace was to be found in Berlin, and seemed to feel little hope that Berlin would use its power to prevent a European War. Even L'Humanité argued as early as July 27th that the idea of localizing the conflict appeared more and more chimerical, and that passions already excited would be inflamed to delirium by the outbreak of Austro-Serbian hostilities. Toward the last, suspicion of Germany was transformed into a conviction that war was inevitable because Germany willed it. It is safe to say that had Poincaré demanded of Parliament a declaration of war on Germany immediately after that country had declared war on Russia, he would have received it.[4] Like the Germans, the French accepted with resignation what fate seemed to hold in store for them.

Public opinion in England after the Crime of Sarajevo followed a seemingly peculiar but really perfectly natural course. In the original Balkan quarrel British sympathies were rather with Austria than

[4] In this connection it may be noted that on August 2nd Moltke sent the following message to the German Foreign Office: "'I do not think it desirable that the declaration of war on France should be delivered just yet. On the contrary, I anticipate that by withholding it for the present, France for her part will be forced by popular feeling to order war-like acts against Germany, even if war has not been formally declared."—Quoted by von Wegerer in Current History, July, 1926, p. 556.

with Serbia. But this meant little. British public opinion would have been willing enough to have seen the problem solved by a Serbian triumph over Austria, an Austrian triumph over Serbia, mediation, localization of the conflict, almost anything that did not involve a European war. In certain quarters, furthermore, there was strong objection to aiding Russia, whose interests many believed to be still opposed to those of England. And there still existed in England no little friendliness for Germany, despite alarm at Germany's growing strength, despite trade rivalries which had tended to embitter relations, and despite the assiduous anti-German propaganda of a part of the Press.

As the crisis became acute, however, British sympathies tended to turn away from the Central Powers and toward support of France and Russia. The severity of the ultimatum to Serbia and the seemingly stubborn, high-handed character of ensuing Austrian policy turned many people against the Dual Monarchy. Furthermore, to a portion of British opinion Austro-German diplomacy seemed to take on the character of a challenge to France and Russia, and even to the Entente. The demand grew stronger in certain quarters that if France and Russia should be involved in war, England should "stand by her friends" and "play the game." The German declaration of war on Russia and the invasion of Luxembourg aroused in some circles a storm of indignation.

By August 2nd the British Cabinet, which had been watching public opinion closely and which had just been assured of the support of the Unionist leaders, felt that it was in a position to promise France, subject to the approval of Parliament, that if the German fleet gave signs of proceeding to attack the French coast or French shipping, the British fleet would "give all the protection in its power" to France. Whether this promise would have proved embarrassing to Sir Edward Grey and the other members of the Cabinet, in view of the serious divisions of opinion that still existed in England, had Germany refrained from violating the neutrality of Belgium, we can never know. For the invasion of Belgium swept the bulk of British public opinion off its feet and made England's participation in the war inevitable.

It may be argued that those in charge of affairs in the various countries during the crisis could have made greater efforts to keep the peace, could have offered stronger resistance to the pressure of public opinion at home. There are a number of possible reasons for their not having done so. In the first place, the leaders seem to have shared the nationalistic fears, suspicions and prejudices of their fellow-countrymen. In the pre-war years the Kaiser and those in his entourage were too ready to believe that the purpose of the Entente was to encircle and crush Germany. The Emperor Francis Joseph, Berchtold,

Hötzendorf and the other Austrian leaders became too certain that the South Slav question must be solved by the sword. In the mind of Poincaré, the Lorrainer, the Alsace-Lorraine question loomed too large, and he was too ready to assume that Germany meant harm to France. Sazonov had an anti-Austrian obsession. "I do not hate Austria, but I despise her," he told Pourtalès, and made wild remarks about Austrian plans to swallow up Serbia and Bulgaria, and then: "we shall have them on the Black Sea." And Sir Edward Grey solemnly states in his Memoirs that in the summer of 1914 he suspected Germany of planning war because it was at "the same time and season of the year" that "Prussian militarism" had attacked France in 1870. One wonders if Sir Edward had shivered with apprehension each preceding year as the open season for German wars approached. As the American historian, Garrison, once said of James K. Polk, so it might be said of the rulers, statesmen, and diplomats of 1914: that they were of the type of mind in which "political dogma finds too easy lodgment."

In the second place, it is quite probable that lurking fear of revolution exercised a potent influence during the crisis. The possibility of revolution was ever-present in the ramshackle Hapsburg Empire; and in the excited state of public opinion after July 23rd, a reversal of policy might easily have precipitated it. In Serbia, too, the Government was none

too strong. The military element was turbulent and popular. Patriotic societies were powerful. The Government seems to have found great difficulty in attempting to moderate the tone of the Press. It is not improbable that after receiving the Austrian ultimatum, Belgrade felt that if it yielded too much to Austrian demands, revolution would result.[5] As for Russia, we have the word of Kerensky, who knew the revolutionary movement in Russia thoroughly, that had Russia refused to intervene to protect Serbia, public opinion would have been so irritated at such "feebleness" that the Government's overthrow might easily have resulted. The whole question of the danger and fear of revolution deserves much more study than it has yet received.

Third, the statesmen were bound not merely by technical commitments but by general sentiments of loyalty to the countries allied to their own. The German leaders held it their duty to stand by Austria if that country were attacked by Russia, even though their belated disapproval of the Austrian course might lead them to bring pressure on the seemingly stubborn Ballplatz. The French leaders felt bound to stand by Russia, in response to what seemed to be an Austro-German challenge. Sir Edward Grey was conscious of the assurances he had given France and

[5] Bienvenu-Martin said on July 24th that revolution would result in Serbia if she were to accept the Austrian demands in their entirety.—British Diplomatic Documents, No. 16; French Yellow Book, No. 28.

promised that the British fleet would protect the French coasts and shipping against German attack.

Fourth, some of the statesmen and diplomats may well have believed, at first at any rate, that a policy of firmness was the best means of keeping peace. The German authorities, for example, may well have felt, before they began to reverse their policy on July 27th, that only by standing solidly with Austria could they force Russia to back down, thus localizing the conflict and preventing a European war. The Russian and the French statesmen, too, anticipating that an Austrian attack on Serbia would inflame Russian opinion, not improbably believed that the best way to prevent a general war was to stand together and bring united pressure to bear on Austria not to interfere with Serbia's independence or sovereign rights. As for England, there are those who even today say that had Sir Edward Grey stood solidly with France and Russia from July 23rd on, the Central Powers would have yielded. This, as we have shown, he was not in a position to do; nor is it at all likely, in any case, in view of the condition of public opinion in Austria and Russia at that time, that such a stand would have had a pacifying effect. A policy of firmness is all very well, if there is a tendency on the part of those against whom it is directed to yield. But two conflicting policies of firmness lead to catastrophe.

Finally, those in charge of affairs in a serious inter-

national crisis must necessarily keep military considerations in mind. In the initial stages of modern warfare, the time element is of tremendous importance. Delay of a day or two in mobilizing or taking steps looking toward mobilization may result in serious derangement of military plans, invasion by the enemy, great loss of life and property. As the situation grows more and more serious, the civil authorities tend to think more and more in terms of military advantage, especially because they are subjected to heavier and heavier pressure from the military leaders. Yet any steps that they may feel themselves obliged to take excite alarm in potential enemy countries, are interpreted in these countries as threats of war, are likely to be answered or more than answered by counter measures. Thus may develop, as did develop in 1914, a situation in which the nations are in the grip of nervous excitement and fear, the authorities are ordering one military measure after another, and almost before the participants themselves are aware of it, war has broken out.

In general, it is incorrect to say, as it has often been said, that peoples are always peace-loving and only governments are bellicose. It is true that in normal times the normal man abhors war. But, as the present writer has said in another connection, "in times of intense national crisis the normal man becomes abnormal. Inhibitions relax their stern rule. The psychological causes of war come into play and

public opinion becomes angry, suspicious and pugnacious." Now, in the summer of 1914, it so happened that once the machinery had been set in motion by the Crime of Sarajevo and the errors of ensuing Austro-German diplomacy, issues developed which threw the peoples of five great European countries into angry excitement, issues for which they were determined to fight rather than yield. The Austro-Hungarians were determined to carry through war with Serbia, cost what it might. The Russians, always fatalists, were determined to defend the Serbs, cost what it might. The Germans made up their minds to stick to the "Nibelungentreue" and stand by Austria. The French were ready at all costs to defend Russia and themselves against an Austro-German attack. And the English resolved to go to war when the Germans invaded Belgium. Even had Belgium not been invaded, it is quite possible that had the German fleet bombarded the French coast or attacked French shipping, the majority of Englishmen would have demanded that England enter the struggle. In the surge of public opinion in the various countries, and not in the orders and telegrams of statesmen and diplomats, lies the fundamental explanation of the disastrous outcome of the crisis.

APPENDIX

Extracts from *The Outbreak of War*, collected and arranged by J. W. Headlam-Morley as Vol. XI of *British Documents on the Origins of the War*, 1898-1914, edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley.

No. 29.

Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir Arthur Nicolson.

Vienna, July 3, 1914.

. . . The "Reichspost" and some few papers of that colour are inciting strongly to an attack on Servia and severe suppression of the Southern Slavs within the Dual Monarchy. The official "Fremdenblatt," however, and most of the more reasonable papers, take the line that it would not be politic to take Servia as a whole to account for the crimes of a small band of degenerates who draw their inspiration from pan-Serb headquarters at Belgrade. The army, I hear, are very bitter, straining at the leash. I can hardly believe they will be "let slip." But, of course, a difficult time is in prospect. I must say I think the Servian Press is behaving shamefully. Long extracts are published here from the Servian newspapers, which seem inclined to regard the assassins as martyrs, sacrificed in a holy cause. Insulting expressions are used against this country—"worm-eaten" is the favourite epithet. Ordinary decency would have at least postponed such expressions for a time, and would have made some pretence of offering sympathy and disclaiming the murderers. My friend Jovanovitch, Servian Minister, really a very good fellow, and moderate in his views, is in absolute

despair at the collapse of his efforts to bring about better relations with Austria, efforts which in the Oriental Railways question were promising very well. No doubt the Servians were really annoyed at the choice of a date for the Bosnian manœuvres which corresponded with their national celebrations on the anniversary of the battle of Kossovo (14th century). They say the Austrians lose no opportunity of harrowing their legitimate feelings as Servians. Unfortunately, this is in accordance with the anti-Serb policy to which this Government is so obstinately wedded. . . .

No. 44.

Sir H. Rumbold to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received July* 13.)

Berlin, July 11, 1914.

. . . The practical absence at first of detailed speculation in the German Press as to what might happen between Austria-Hungary and Servia was an indication that the situation was difficult for Germany. The papers merely printed telegrams from Vienna, reporting that some immediate steps were in contemplation at Belgrade. When, however, it was announced that the Austro-Hungarian Government were going to await the results of the investigations at Serajevo before taking action, a feeling of relief was noticeable. . . .

The Press have discussed the situation much more freely within the last day or two. The general upshot of their remarks is that Austria-Hungary cannot indefinitely tolerate the state of things prevailing on her Servian frontier. Hard things are said about Servia and the Servians, and it is freely assumed by some papers that the latter will shelter themselves behind the big Slav brother. There is a consensus of opinion that Germany will and must stand by her ally in this matter. . . .

No. 106.

Mr. Max Müller to Sir Edward Grey.

Budapest, July 24, 1914.

. . . Note has been, on the whole, favourably received by press, which considers unusual tone justified by the circumstances. Financial circles are taken aback by its violence, and there has been a heavy fall on the Stock Exchange.

General opinion is that Servian Government cannot accept demands, and that Servia's day of reckoning has come.

Probability of Russian intervention is denied or disregarded, and Government apparently expects that war will be localised, in spite of fact that they have prejudiced their case by their intemperance. . . .

No. 134.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.

British Embassy, Paris, July 25, 1914.

I do not think that if Russia pick a quarrel with Austria over the Austro-Servian difficulty public opinion in France would be in favour of backing up Russia in so bad a cause.

Consequently the French Government will probably advise the Russian Government to moderate any excessive zeal that they may be inclined to display to protect their Servian client.

No. 239.

Sir Arthur Nicolson to Sir G. Buchanan.

Foreign Office, July 28, 1914.

. . . What has preoccupied, and I confess has troubled, me very much, is satisfying Russia's very natural request as

to what we should do in certain eventualities. I foresaw as well as you did that this crisis might be taken by Russia as a test of our friendship, and that were we to disappoint her all hope of a friendly and permanent understanding with her would disappear. We, of course, living under such conditions as we do here, when no Government practically can take any decided line without feeling that public opinion amply supports them, are unable to give any decided engagements as to what we should or should not do in any future emergencies; but I think we have made it perfectly clear that in any case neither Germany nor Austria could possibly rely with any certainty upon our remaining neutral, and I think this fact has been much impressed upon them by one or two incidents which have occurred within the last two or three days. The decision to keep our battle fleet together instead of allowing it to disperse in order to give leave to its crews was officially notified and given prominence in the papers, and has been immediately taken as a sign by Germany and others that we are prepared to take our share in hostilities if circumstances arose to make it necessary for us to do so. Moreover you will see that the tone of our press, after the first shock which was occasioned by the Austrian ultimatum, has come round to the fact that it would be difficult, if not impossible, for us to stand outside a general European conflagration. There is no doubt whatsoever that were we drawn into this conflagration we should be on the side of our friends. Although therefore we were unable to give Sazonof a definite undertaking as to what our attitude would be, I think you will see that there is very little doubt, supposing we were called upon to take a share, that we should not hesitate to do our duty. . . .

No. 677.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Arthur Nicolson.—(Received September 5.)

Berlin, July, 1914.*

. . . Jagow practically admitted to me that the Servian reply went *very* far towards meeting the Austrian demands —but he also admitted that Austria meant business and that nothing from Berlin or anywhere else would stop her from punishing Servia, short of a complete acceptance of her demands. He also again assured me that the Austrian ultimatum was not submitted to Berlin before being sent in. The general opinion here even among pro-Austrians is that Austria made her note brutal on purpose that it should not be accepted.

I have telegraphed so fully that I will not weary you with vain repetitions. My chief diplomatic difficulty has been to satisfy Cambon's curiosity as to my repeated visits to the Chancellor without giving the latter away on points which he has made me promise to keep secret. I have a stronger conviction than Cambon that both the Chancellor and Jagow would like to avoid a general war—whatever may be the opinion of the hot-headed division and the general staff. This is not only my opinion but the opinion of most diplomatists and many Germans. Cambon won't have this at all and considers, wrongly I think, Jagow to be a Junker of the most bellicose description. This is contrary to all I have ever heard of Jagow and contrary to my own opinion of him. As for the Chancellor, if he makes war it will be because he is forced into it. Jules Cambon is continually scolding me about England keeping her intentions so dark and says that the only way by which a general war can be prevented is by Sir E. Grey's stating *carrément* that England will fight on the side of France and Russia.

[* Note: Context indicates that date was July 30. J. F. S.]

But I tell him that a statement to that effect at the present stage, while it might cause Germany to hesitate, might equally urge Russia on; and if Russia attacked Austria, Germany would have to cut in whether she feared the British fleet or not. That Germany is very much preoccupied by the British fleet is quite clear—both from the fall in the shares of the great shipping lines and from other symptoms. Friedländer, who is about the richest financier in Germany, is in despair at the chances of England being drawn in; (he tried to sell his Hamburg-America shares but could get no price for them) and he advised a lady of my acquaintance to clear out of Berlin as soon as she could "because [he said] a month after the declaration of war by England Berlin will be starving and not only will you get nothing to eat but—starving crowds are always dangerous." I hear in fact from all sides that the financial and industrial classes are dead against a war in any shape—but particularly against a war which in its origin does not touch German interests. Jagow told me the other day that Austria was so determined to make war on Servia and so frightened of being prevented from doing so, that any advice was likely to make her hurry up to present a *fait accompli*. This may be true or not—but at any rate her declaration of war, (which as far as I can judge was not expected here so soon) following so close upon the heels of the suggestion that the Servian answer offered a basis for discussion, is rather a proof that Jagow was not far wrong in his statement. . . .

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THE

JOHN DAY

COMPANY

INC.